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Abstract 
This dissertation draws on gang organization research and organizational theory to assess 
the underlying dimensions of organization in terrorist groups. Using the Leadership for 
the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) dataset, findings suggest 
that organization is a multidimensional construct in terrorist groups, including the 
structuring of activities dimension and the concentration of authority dimension. In 
relation to violence, terrorist groups high on the structuring of activities dimension were 
significantly more lethal in general and more lethal when attacking hard targets, whereas 
terrorist groups high on the concentration of authority dimension attacked hard targets at 
a significantly higher rate. These findings demonstrate that both dimensions of 
organization were related to an increased capacity for violence yet in different ways. In 
light of these findings, a theoretical model is outlined, and practical implications are 
discussed with a focus on how both organizational dimensions highlight the role of 






























First, I would like to thank my wife, Kimberly, for her support and encouragement 
through my academic journey. Leaving our families and moving halfway across the 
country was never easier for her. She took a chance on me and for that I am thankful. 
Second, I would like to thank my daughter, Landry, who provided the much-needed 
motivation, laughter, and fun as I completed my comprehensive exams and dissertation. 
Although there many more people to go, I cannot move forward without thanking my 
dog, Leroy, who has been at my side since I started my master’s program. On many 
occasions, taking him to the park or on car rides were the best part of my day. Third, I 
would thank my parents, Pat and Sandy, who instilled a strong work ethic in me and 
always encouraged my intellectual curiosity. To that end, I’d also like to thank my in-
laws, Angus and Josett, for their support and welcoming me into their lives with open 
arms. Although I moved over one-thousand miles away, my friends Erik, Brandon, 
Thomas, Jared, Albert, and Lucas have also been supportive and provided a much-needed 
distraction from academia whenever we spoke.  
I am extremely grateful to my mentors, Drs. Gina Ligon and Doug Derrick, for 
their support over the past five years. Gina and Doug took a chance on me early in my 
doctoral studies. They truly pushed me to be more than I thought was possible. I would 
also like to thank my committee members, Drs. Gaylene Armstrong and Todd Armstrong, 
for their encouragement and advice not only on the dissertation, but also in my 
development as an academic. I would not have pursued my Ph.D. without guidance from 
Drs. Kimberly McCabe and Nicole Hendrix. The two of you were instrumental in my 




acknowledgement section without thanking my doctoral cohort members, Sara and Julie. 
We experienced many successes and failures together in five years and I can’t wait to see 
what the future holds for us. With that in mind, I would also like to thank my cohort 
members from my master’s program, Danielle and Cheryl for their friendship and 
support. I would not have gotten where I am today without help from Steven Windisch. 
Watching and trying to mimic his professionalism and work ethic was huge for my 
development as a researcher and scholar. I would also like to thank my network of UNO 
graduates including Drs. Karyn Sporer, Tim Barnum, Starr Solomon, and Jared Ellison 
for their advice and friendship. 
  Finally, on a lighter note, I would like to thank Jim Rome and the rest of the 
clones for providing me daily humor and sports talk. I started listening to Jim Rome when 
I began graduate school and -- while many things came and went since then – “The 
Jungle” has remained. I would also like to thank the Jacksonville Jaguars, Virginia 
Cavaliers, and Nebraska Cornhuskers for entertaining me during my graduate career. 











TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM .......................................................................................... 2 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND AGENDA ............................................................................... 4 
KEY TERMS: TERRORISM AND TERRORIST GROUPS .......................................................... 6 
CRIMINOLOGICAL STUDY OF TERRORISM ......................................................................... 7 
Crime-terror continuum ............................................................................................... 9 
Gang-terror continuum .............................................................................................. 10 
LEVEL OF ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................... 11 
THE TERRORIST DILEMMA AND THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATION ....................................... 15 
CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................ 17 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................... 19 
INSTRUMENTAL-RATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ...................................................................... 20 
INFORMAL-DIFFUSED PERSPECTIVE ............................................................................... 21 
GANG ORGANIZATION AND CRIMINOLOGICAL OUTCOMES ............................................ 24 
Structural indicators of gang organization ................................................................ 27 
GANG ORGANIZATION THEMES AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS ............................ 32 
Centralization ............................................................................................................ 33 
Formalization ............................................................................................................. 34 
Interconnectedness .................................................................................................... 35 
Complexity ................................................................................................................ 36 
Summary .................................................................................................................... 37 
ORGANIZATION IN TERRORIST GROUPS .......................................................................... 38 
ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS AND THEORETICAL MECHANISM .................................. 43 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................... 48 
GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE .................................................................................... 48 
LEADERSHIP FOR THE EXTREME AND DANGEROUS FOR INNOVATIVE RESULTS .............. 49 
Historiometric approach ............................................................................................ 52 
Data collection and source credibility ....................................................................... 54 
Missing data ............................................................................................................... 55 
MEASURES OF ORGANIZATION ....................................................................................... 55 
VIOLENT OUTCOMES ...................................................................................................... 58 
ADDITIONAL GROUP LEVEL VARIABLES ........................................................................ 61 
ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES ............................................................................................. 64 
Exploratory factor analysis ........................................................................................ 65 
Cluster analysis .......................................................................................................... 67 
Hierarchical Poisson regression ................................................................................ 69 
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS .................................................................................................. 71 
EFA FINDINGS ................................................................................................................ 71 
Structuring, authority, and group characteristics ....................................................... 74 
Summary of findings: Structuring of activities and concertation of authority .......... 75 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS FINDINGS ....................................................................................... 79 




Cluster 3: Divisional structure ................................................................................... 83 
Cluster 4: Formal-professional .................................................................................. 84 
Cluster 5: Instrumental-rational ................................................................................. 86 
Summary of findings: Structural types of terrorist groups ........................................ 88 
TERRORIST GROUP ORGANIZATION AND VIOLENT OUTCOMES ...................................... 90 
FINDINGS FROM HIERARCHICAL POISSON MODELS ........................................................ 93 
Summary of findings: Terrorist group organization and violent outcomes .............. 98 
Summary of findings: Additional group characteristics and violent outcomes ...... 101 
TERRORIST GROUP TYPES AND VIOLENT OUTCOMES ................................................... 108 
Summary of findings: Terrorist group types and violent outcomes ........................ 110 
CHAPTER 5: CONCULSIONS ...................................................................................... 112 
STRUCTURING OF ACTIVITIES AND CONCENTRATION OF AUTHORITY IN GANGS .......... 115 
Structuring of activities in gangs ............................................................................. 118 
Concentration of authority in gangs ........................................................................ 119 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS ....................................................................................... 120 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS ............................................................................................ 129 
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH .............................................. 130 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 135 
APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................. 153 















LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1. Summary of the Structural Indicators Based on Twenty Studies on Gang 
Organization ...................................................................................................................... 29 
Table 2. Structural Themes of Gang Organization ............................................................ 31 
Table 3. Organizational Dimensions and Structural Themes in Gangs ............................. 33 
Table 4. Perpetrator Group Name Entries Removed ......................................................... 51 
Table 5. Source Credibility ................................................................................................ 55 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Organization ........................................... 58 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Key Outcome Variables .............................................. 61 
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Group Control Variables ............................................. 63 
Table 9. Summary of Research Questions in Relation to Analytical Techniques ............. 65 
Table 10. Results from Exploratory Factor Analysis ........................................................ 72 
Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for Structuring and Authority ......................................... 73 
Table 12. Zero-Order Correlations Between Organizational Dimensions and Additional 
Group Level Characteristics .............................................................................................. 75 
Table 13. Results from K-Means Cluster Analysis ........................................................... 82 
Table 14. Descriptive Statistics for Group Characteristics by Cluster Type ..................... 84 
Table 15. Zero-Order Correlations Between Cluster Types and Group Characteristics ... 86 
Table 16. HLM Estimates of Variance within and between Countries ............................. 91 
Table 17. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Lethality ........................................................ 94 
Table 18. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Hard Targets Lethality .................................. 95 
Table 19. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Attacks on Hard Targets ............................... 96 
Table 20. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Successful Attacks on Hard Targets ............. 97 
Table 21. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Highly Successful Attacks on Hard Target .. 98 
Table 22. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Violent Outcomes by Cluster Type ............ 109 
Table 23. Potential Measures for both Dimension of Organization in Terrorist Groups and 












LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Gang Organization Continuum .......................................................................... 23 
Figure 2. Organizational Types Relative to Tactical Efficiency and Operational Security 
 ........................................................................................................................................... 42 
Figure 3. Theoretical Linkages Between Organizational Theory Constructs and 
Mechanisms for Violence .................................................................................................. 46 
Figure 4. Process for Determining LEADIR Sample ........................................................ 50 
Figure 5. Example Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale for Organizational Centralization













In recent years, a number of terrorism studies have examined the structural form 
of terrorist groups (e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Ligon et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2005; 
Volder, 2016) as well as the relationship between terrorist group characteristics and 
violent outcomes such as lethality or soft target selection (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; 
Heger et al., 2012). Despite advances, few scholars have utilized a criminological 
approach to understand the organizational features of terrorist groups. While terrorism 
studies are relatively new, there is a large body of literature on the structure of street 
gangs and its influence on violence (Bouchard & Spindler, 2010; Decker, 2001; Decker 
& Curry, 2000; Decker & Van Winkle, 1995; Sanchez-Jankowski, 1991; Spindler & 
Bouchard, 2011; Thrasher, 1927; Yablonsky, 1959). Drawing from a group process 
perspective, this literature focuses on how street gangs and criminal groups have specific 
properties that influence the behavior of its members (Short & Strodtbeck, 1965; also see 
Klein & Crawford, 1967). Broadly speaking, insights from street gang research are 
applicable to the study of terrorist groups for two reasons. First, street gangs and terrorist 
groups are difficult to reach populations consisting of mostly young males that engage in 
public violence (Curry, 2011; Decker & Pyrooz, 2011, 2015a, 2015b). Second, research 
has shown that both street gangs and terrorist groups share similar group characteristic 
and vary in degrees of organization (Valasik & Phillips, 2017). 
In this dissertation, I examine the dimensions of organization in terrorist groups 
and their influence on violence. In doing so, this study is of the first to quantitatively 




terrorist group organization, I rely on gang organization research and the group processes 
perspective in criminology.1 Organization refers specifically to the “work environment” 
and ways in which gangs bring order, planning, or coordination to their criminal activities 
(Bouchard & Spindler, 2010, p. 922). Organization is also related to the extent to which 
criminal groups are complex such as a division of labor and specialization, coordinated 
and governed by formal rules, and purposeful with a shared objective (Best & Luckenbill, 
1980; Cressey, 1972). Gang organization research is beneficial for this study for two 
reasons. First, gang organization research is methodologically robust and provides 
measureable indicators of organization that can also be used to examine terrorist group 
organization. Second, gang organization research have demonstrated that more organized 
gangs have higher levels of criminal offending and other deviant activities across 
multiple levels of analysis (Bjerregaard, 2002; Bouchard & Spindler, 2010; Decker, 
2001; Decker, Bynum, & Weisel, 1998; Decker, Katz & Webb, 2008; Decker & Pyrooz, 
2015a; Hagedorn, 1994; Leverso & Matsueda, 2019; Moule Jr, Pyrooz, & Decker, 2013; 
Pyrooz, Fox, Katz, & Decker, 2012; Sheley, Zhang, Brody, & Wright 1995). Thus, gang 
organization research provides a foundation for the expected relationship between 
organization and violence in terrorist groups.  
Statement of the Problem 
 
There are two primary limitation with the current literature on terrorist group 
organization. First, the majority of research on terrorist group organization is theoretical 
in nature or relies on case studies (e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Jackson, 2006; Ligon 
 
1 According to Papachristos, Hureau, and Braga (2013) group processes focus on “a range of interactional 
mechanisms and normative processes fostered by the coming together of members and the formation of 




et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2005; Volders, 2016; Zelinsky & Shubik, 2009). Subsequently, few 
studies focus on measurement or offer ways to quantitative examine terrorist group 
organization. While terrorism scholars put forth common organizational dimensions 
underlying terrorist groups such as centralization or interconnectedness, little is known 
regarding how to quantify these dimensions. This is problematic for the study of 
terrorism since there is no systematic approach to understand organization across a large 
number of terrorist groups. This is also problematic for law enforcement and those in the 
field since there is no empirical basis on what terrorist groups to prioritize based on a 
tangible set of organizational characteristics.  
The second broad limitation is that the majority of terrorism research has 
examined individual or environmental predictors of terroristic violence. In contrast, few 
studies have examined predictors of terrorism at the group level (for exception Abrahms 
& Potter, 2015; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Heger et al., 2012). Moreover, studies that 
have examined the link between terrorist group organization and violence typically 
classify groups into broad categorize (i.e., hierarchical or non-hierarchical). By doing so, 
organization is viewed as a definer as opposed to a descriptor in terrorist groups. Such an 
approach to classifying terrorist groups neglects important variation in organization that 
exists between categorizes.  
To address the limitations in the existing literature, I draw upon existing research 
on gang organization to identify what indicators of organization are frequently used. If 
gangs and terrorist groups are similar (Curry, 2011; Decker & Pyrooz, 2011, 2015a, 
2015b; Valasik & Phillips, 2017; Vishnevetsky, 2009) then many of the indicators of 




assess how those indicators of gang organization map onto specific organizational 
dimensions (e.g., centralization, complexity, formalization) discussed in organizational 
theory. Organizational theory focuses on how organizational features influence 
performance (e.g., Lammers, 1978; Mintzberg, 1979; Rogers, 2003).  In a recent study, 
Moule Jr and colleagues (2014) proposed a similar strategy and argued that five 
organizational dimensions typically found in theories of organizational behavior are 
applicable to gangs including centrality, formalization, complexity, interconnectedness, 
and organizational slack. While Moule Jr and colleagues (2014) used a top-down strategy 
and selected the indicators of organization based on theory, I use a bottom-up approach 
where I identified common indicators in the gang literature, then explore the 
organizational theory literature to contextualize the representation of these indicators. 
Finally, I examine how the indicators found in gang research and their underlying 
dimension manifest in terrorist group and influence violent outcomes of terrorist groups.  
Research Questions and Agenda 
 
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to better understand the organization 
of terrorist groups drawing from existing gang organization research and organizational 
theory. This dissertation addresses two central research questions. The first research 
question addressed: Which indicators of gang organization can be applied to terrorist 
groups to develop a classification schema of terrorist group structure? Classification 
schemas have a long history in the field of criminology (e.g., Moffitt, 1993) and offer an 
approach to organizing complex information into coherent taxonomies. In terrorism 
research, a large body of literature focuses on typologies of terrorist organizations based 




drawback is the majority of this research is either theoretical or based solely on case 
studies. Thus, the goal of the first research question is to identify which indicators of 
organization -- drawn from the gang organization literature and supported by 
organizational theory – are applicable to and vary between terrorist groups. 
 The second research question addressed: Do terrorist groups that are more highly 
organized engage in more group level violence than less organized terrorist groups? 
With regard to violence, I examined two main types: lethality and hard target selection. 
The first type of violence, lethality, is related to the total number of victims killed by a 
terrorist group. Prior research has shown that terrorist groups who are centralized and 
share a strategic vision are more lethal than groups who do not meet those criteria (Heger 
et al., 2012). Studies on gang organization also suggest that members of more organized 
gangs are more violent and criminally active than members of less organized gangs 
(Decker et al., 2008). This, the working hypothesis is that terrorist groups with higher 
levels of organization are more lethal than those with lower levels of organization.  
 The second violent outcome, hard target section, examines the degree to which 
terrorist groups attack targets that are heavily protected such as members of the 
government, or those charged with protecting against violent attacks such as police or 
military members. Relative to soft targets, which typically have few protections in place 
and require little skill to attacks, hard targets demand a considerable amount of 
coordination and expertise to attack given their capacity to deter and combat terrorist 
attacks. While target selection is an essential facet of terrorist organization decision-
making (Abrahms & Potter 2015; Asal, Rethemeyer, Anderson, Stein, Rizzo, & Rozea, 




attacks on hard targets (for exception see, Asal, Gill, Rethemeyer, & Horgan, 2015; 
Berman & Latin, 2008; Piazza, 2020). I expect that terrorist groups with greater levels of 
organization are more likely to attack hard targets relative to those with lower levels of 
organization. This is in line with Best and Luckenbill’s (1980) notion that criminal 
collectives with higher levels of organizational sophistication have a greater capability for 
complex deviant operations. 
Key Terms: Terrorism and Terrorist Groups 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. In some cases, the term 
“terrorism” is used subjectively to label someone or some group to delegitimize their 
actions. In other cases, the term is used in reference to a tactic used by an organization or 
an individual (e.g., Hoffman, 2006). For this dissertation, the definition of terrorism is as 
follows:  
the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to 
attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation (START, 2020).2  
 
In a study of more than fifty scholarly articles, Schmid and Jongman (1988) found that 
the basic definition is that terrorism is a violent tactic used to intimate or coerce an 
audience towards a political or social goal. In a more recent analysis of seventy-three 
definitions from the four leading academic journals on the study of terrorism, Weinberg, 
Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2014) came up with the consensus definition: “Terrorism 
is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which 
 
2 This definition does not include acts of state terrorism and the term terrorism is interchangeable with the 




the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role" (p. 786). The definition of terrorism used 
in this dissertation satisfies these tenants.3 
Similar to the concept of terrorism, prior research has defined terrorist groups in a 
number of ways (e.g., Asal & Rethemyer, 2008; Crenshaw, 1991; Cronin, 2009; Della 
Porta, 1995; de la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca 2011, Enders & Sandler, 2012; Findley & 
Young, 2012; Shapiro & Siegel, 2012). For this dissertation, the definition of terrorist 
groups is as follows: 
Subnational political organizations that use terrorism (Phillips, 2015, p.231) 
This definition is suitable for two reasons. First, it meets three criteria commonly found 
in prior research including subnational, political organization, and the use of terrorism 
(see Phillips, 2015 for review). The focus on subnationality and political goals excludes 
state terrorism and criminal groups who use violence for instrumental purposes.  Second, 
this definition is inclusive and treats a group as a terrorist group regardless of whether it 
meets other exclusive criteria (e.g., holding territory or not).  
Criminological Study of Terrorism 
 
Sutherland and Cressey (1960) defined crime as “behavior in violation of the 
criminal law” (p. 4). By this definition, terrorism and other acts of political violence are 
crimes and fall within the domain of criminology (Maier-Katkin, Mears, & Benard, 2009; 
Pickett, Baker, Metcalfe, et al., 2014). Some scholars argue that acts of political violence 
 
3 Section 802 of the USA Patriot Act defines terrorism as an act dangerous to human life that is a violation 
of the criminal laws of a state or the United States, if the act appears to be intended to:  (i) intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population; (ii) influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to 
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping. While the USA 
Patriot Act focuses on acts against US citizens in their definition, the definition of terrorism used in this 





such as terrorism and genocide are relevant to what some consider “core criminology,” 
given their association with increased levels of street crime and delinquency (Gartner, 
1990; Pickett et al., 2014). However, this view of terrorism has not always been the case. 
Early research on the link between crime and terrorism rested on the assumption that the 
terrorist is altruistic and believes he or she is serving a “good” cause whereas the criminal 
serves no cause outside of his or her personal aggrandizement and material satisfaction 
(Hoffman, 2006). Prominent criminologists, such as Hirschi and Gottfredson (2001), also 
supported the view that crime and terrorism are distinct concepts and that criminological 
theory is poorly suited to explain terrorism since it ‘‘reflect[s] commitment to a political 
cause’’ (p. 94).  
Over time, the treatment of crime and terrorism as distinct concepts has 
diminished as researchers have increasing pointed out similarities, both in motives and 
tactics, between terrorist groups and criminal organizations. For instance, researchers 
have shown that criminal organizations such as Mexican drug cartels employ terrorist 
tactics to advance their interests (Phillips, 2018), while terrorist organizations such as the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) engage in extortion, kidnapping, and 
drug trafficking to support their political goals (Treverton, 2009). Other scholars have 
pointed out that, despite differing goals, terrorists and criminals appropriate each other’s 
activity and seek expertise from one another (Shelley & Picarelli, 2005; Windle, 
Morrison, Winter, & Silke, 2018). Today, a wide range of criminological theories have 
been used to help understand the motivations, tactics, risk factors, and protective factors 
related to violent extremism including life course theory (Simi, Sporer & Bubolz, 2016), 




social disorganization (Fahey & LaFree, 2015; Freilich, Adamczyk, Chermak, Boyd, & 
Parkin, 2015), routine activities (Parkin & Freilich, 2015), displace and diffusion (Hsu & 
Apel, 2015), rational choice (Gill, Marchment, Corner, & Bouhana, 2020; Mandala & 
Freilich, 2017; Perry & Hasisi, 2015), deterrence (Argomaniz & Vidai-Diez, 2015), and 
general strain theory (Agnew, 2010; Nivette, Eisner, & Ribeaud, 2017). Taken together, 
terrorism is a growing research area in the field of criminology and criminological 
theories are well suited to better understand the complexities of terrorism.  
Crime-terror continuum  
 
Initially conceptualized by Makarenko (2004), the crime-terror continuum 
describes an underlying nexus between ideologically motivated terrorism and profit-
oriented organized crime. The crime-terror continuum supports the idea that crime and 
terrorism are not distinct concepts, and the relationships, goals, and tactics of organized 
crime groups and terrorists are not fixed. Instead, the organized crime-terrorism 
relationship is transformational and based on a hybrid of economic and ideological 
motives in a rapidly evolving global market (Makarenko, 2004; Perri & Brody, 2011; 
Phillips & Kamen, 2014). At one end of the continuum are organized crime groups who 
seek to maximize profits while avoiding scrutiny. At the other end of the continuum are 
terrorist organizations that pursue ideological goals through violent or threatening means. 
In the middle of the continuum are theoretical possibilities where one organization, 
organized crime or terrorist, adopts the methods of the other to accomplish its goal 
(Valasik & Phillips, 2017). For example, terrorist groups such as the Islamic State 
embrace traditional organized crimes such as extortion, kidnapping, and drug trafficking 




cartels have increasingly used “ghastly” acts of violence, typically reserved for terrorist 
groups, to intimidate public officials and create a sense of fear among the Mexican 
population. In one potent example, Flanigan (2012) describes how members of La 
Familia Michoaca ́n first gained notoriety by dumping five severed heads onto the dance 
floor of a nightclub.  
Gang-terror continuum  
 
Much of the conceptualization of the crime-terror continuum has focused on 
terrorism as it relates to traditional organized crime and vice-versa. More recently, 
however, several scholars have highlighted ways in which the street gang literature can 
inform terrorism studies (Curry, 2011; Decker & Pyrooz, 2011, 2015a, 2015b; Valasik & 
Phillips, 2017; Vishnevetsky, 2009). Curry (2011) notes that comparing street gangs and 
terrorist organizations is more promising than initially thought. This is likely because 
despite the relative newness of terrorism studies the study of street gangs date back 
“nearly 100 years, with thousands of empirical studies” (Valasik & Phillips, 2017, p. 
194). Furthermore, terrorist groups, like street gangs, are a difficult to reach population 
consisting of mostly young males that engage in public violence (Decker & Pyrooz, 
2011).  
 Another illustration of the gang-terror continuum centers on the organization of 
street gangs compared to terrorist groups. For example, both street gangs and terrorist 
groups widely vary in their level of organization (Valasik & Phillips, 2017). In gang 
research, this is best exemplified by Decker and Van Winkle’s (1995) description of the 
instrumental-rational compared to informal-diffused perspectives of gang organization. 




hierarchical structure and shared goals among its members (Decker & Curry, 2000). In 
contrast, the informal-diffused perspective views street gangs as disorganized and 
comprised of self-interested aggregates of individuals (Decker & Curry, 2000). Research 
on the organization of terrorist groups follows a similar pattern. Some terrorist groups are 
structured like traditional organizations characterized by a hierarchical command-and-
control structure, organizational boundaries, and rules (Ligon et al., 2013; Hoffman, 
2008; Shapiro, 2013). Other terrorist groups follow a decentralized “leaderless 
resistance” model, which emphasizes the ability of individuals or autonomous cells to 
execute terror attacks (Carson et al., 2012; Loadenthal, 2017). Despite the conceptual 
overlap, few studies have examined if, and how, gang organization research can inform 
terrorism studies. To overcome this limitation, I examine the organization of terrorist 
groups through the theoretical lens typically applied to street gangs. 
Level of Analysis 
 
In this dissertation, I am interested in examining the variation in levels of 
organization between terrorist groups at the group level of analysis. My focus on the 
group level of analysis does not discount other existing explanations and any holistic 
perspective on violent extremism accounting for individual level or contextual level 
variation. For example, important individual level differences include the role of adverse 
life experiences such as war-related trauma (e.g., Bhui, Warfa & Jones, 2014), 
discrimination (e.g., De Waele & Pauwels, 2014; Pauwels & Schils, 2016), perception of 
state-level injustice (Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Piazza, 2011), childhood trauma (Simi et al. 
2016; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005) and violent extremism. Contextual level factors 




disorganization, each of which have been consistently linked to terrorism (Coggins, 2015; 
Fahey & LaFree, 2015; Gurr, 1970; Lia, 2007; Piazza, 2006, 2007, 2008; Sandler, 2014). 
Despite the importance of these individual and contextual factors, exploring their relative 
contribution to violence is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
Group level factors and terrorism  
The group level of analysis, also referred to as the unit or organizational level of 
analysis, examines the effect of variation in group dynamics and processes on acts of 
terrorism. Put another way, research operating at this level argue, “much of what 
terrorists do on the outside can only be understood by looking inside the group itself. A 
terrorist organization is not a black box but a living system, subject to a range of 
influences that may be only tangentially related to its stated strategic objectives” 
(McCormick, 2003, p. 486). At the group level, theoretical frameworks have examined 
the role of ideology (Drake, 1998), leadership (Abrahms & Potter, 2015; Hermann & 
Sakiev, 2011), competition (Bloom, 2005), organizational capabilities and resources 
(Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Horowitz, 2010), and terrorist group behavior. For example, 
ideology provides the moral boundaries of the organization and a basis for expectations 
on the appropriateness of targets (Drake, 1998; Crenshaw, 1988; Hoffman, 2006). 
Terrorist groups motivated by religion are deadlier because their violence is 
unconstrained. For these groups, violence serves a supernatural purpose and is justified 
by scripture (Asal & Rethemeyer 2008; Gressang IV, 2001). Likewise, terrorist 
organizations motivated by ethnonationalist concerns are more lethal since they excel at 




2005; Tilly, 2003). By creating this boundary, there is little reason to discriminate when 
killing since nearly all out-group members are legitimate targets.  
Terrorist leaders influence organizational decisions (for a comprehensive review, 
see Hofmann, 2017). For instance, Abrahms and Potter’s (2015) suggest that when 
terrorist organizations undergo periods of weak leadership or “leadership deficiencies,” 
they are more likely to attack soft targets (e.g., private civilians). During period of weak 
leadership, tactical decisions are relinquished to lower level members who are 
incentivized to attack soft targets given their lack of combat experience, resources, and 
stake in the organization (Abrahms, Beauchamp, & Mroszczyk, 2017; Abrahms, Ward, & 
Kennedy, 2018). In contrast, strong terrorist leaders with high levels of charisma, or 
charismatic authority, have a profound influence on their organization and have shown a 
superior ability to recruit and radicalize follower (Hofmann & Dawson, 2014; Ingram, 
2013; Ligon, Logan, & Derrick, 2020; Nesser, 2011; Post, 2006). Terrorist decapitation 
also impacts the tactics of terrorist groups (Carson, 2017; Cronin, 2009; Freeman, 2014; 
Johnston, 2012; Jordan, 2009; Langdon, Sarapu, & Wells, 2003; Price, 2012). The 
evidence on the effectiveness of leadership decapitation is largely mixed with some 
studies showing that leadership decapitation accelerates the mortality rate of terrorist 
groups in some cases (Price, 2012), while others argue that it is counterproductive and 
results in escalating rates of retaliatory violence (Jordan, 2009). Despite mixed 
conclusions, this literature demonstrates that leaders play a pivotal role in the behavior of 
terrorist groups.  
Next, researchers have also shown that competition influences organizational 




between terrorist organizations and law enforcement. Most notably, Bloom’s (2005) 
outbidding hypothesis argues that internal competition for influence incentivizes 
oppressed groups to seize the marketplace by “outbidding” one another by demonstrating 
higher levels of commitment to the cause. This explains why some extremist groups 
adopted suicide bombings – the ultimate signal of an intense commitment to ones’ cause 
– while others do not. Cropley, Kaufman, and Cropley (2008) posit that competition is 
one of the main drivers of malevolent creativity in terrorist organizations (also see Gill, 
Horgan, Hunter, & Cushenbery, 2013). To ensure their survival, terrorist organizations 
must develop creative methods to overcome one another, the same as businesses attempt 
to gain a competitive advantage over rivals (Cropley & Cropley, 2011; Logan, Ligon, & 
Derrick, 2019).  
 Finally, terrorism scholars have emphasized the link between the capabilities and 
resources of terrorist groups and their behaviors. For example, Asal and Rethemeyer 
(2008) found that large terrorist organizations are more lethal than smaller ones.4 
Terrorist organizations with robust membership have greater resources including 
members who are skilled with a high degree of tactical expertise, capable of raising 
funds, and who have access to restricted information, places, and material (Asal et al., 
2015; Bloom, 2017; Hunter, Shortland, Crayne, & Ligon, 2017; Windisch, Logan, & 
Ligon, 2018).  Horowitz’s (2010) adaptation capacity theory also empathizes the 
necessity of organizational capital and financial intensity of terrorist groups seeking to 
innovate. Without the proper tangible (e.g., revenue) and intangible (e.g., expertise) 
capital, terrorist groups are at risk of failing irrespective of their ideological beliefs.  
 
4 While organizational size is also considered an indicator or element of organizational structure, it is most 




 As illustrated above, several factors influence terrorist groups’ behavior and 
decision-making. In this dissertation, I am interested in the degree of terrorist group 
organization and its influence on violent outcomes. To understand this relationship, the 
next section focuses on why, and how, terrorist groups organize.  
The Terrorist Dilemma and the Role of Organization 
 
Terrorist groups face an inherent dilemma while trying to reach their collective 
objectives. On the one hand, terrorist groups must organize, coordinate, and control the 
behavior of their members in order to achieve their strategic and operational goals 
(Shapiro, 2013). In other words, terrorist groups must also overcome fundamental 
organizational issues such as resource pooling and allocation, limiting member discretion, 
and recruitment and retention (Volders, 2016). On the other hand, terrorist groups operate 
in secrecy to avoid infiltration from law enforcement or competitors (De la Calle et al., 
2006; Jackson, 2006; Shapiro, 2013). The need for both efficiency and secrecy in 
operations created a paradox in terrorist groups known as the “terrorist dilemma” 
(Shapiro, 2013; see also, Berman, 2009). The terrorist dilemma stresses the critical 
tradeoff between two organizational goals: (1) the need to maintain operational 
effectiveness and control in order to achieve ideological goals, and (2) the need to operate 
in secrecy to secure the organization’s survival.  
 The issue for terrorist groups is that the organizational mechanisms used to 
coordinate, and control members’ behaviors creates operational vulnerabilities. Put 
another way, as operational efficiency increases, levels of security decrease and vice-
versa. For example, communication between leaders and foot soldiers helps ensure that 




between leaders and foot soldiers also highlights internal linkages in the movement that 
law enforcement can exploit – placing the organization’s survival at risk. In contrast, 
terrorist groups with lower degrees of organization are more secure and less likely to be 
infiltrated since there are fewer communication and coordination mechanisms. The 
drawback of prioritizing security over effectiveness is that control over members 
diminishes. Thus, members have increased autonomy and are at risk of engaging in 
tactics that are counterproductive to the organization’s long-term strategic goals.  
 Terrorist groups’ balance of the need for efficiency and security has implications 
for decision-making and organizational behavior. For example, Volders (2016) argues 
that the nature and impact of the terrorist dilemma is a key factor in the organizational 
design of terrorist groups. Terrorist groups such as the Animal Liberation Front or Earth 
Liberation Front prioritize secrecy over efficiency and are characterized by having “no 
discernible leadership, are not centrally controlled, and have no functional 
differentiation” (Kilberg, 2012, p. 814; see also Shapiro, 2005). These less organized 
terrorist groups are structured in a manner that is difficult to infiltrate, but their lack of 
coordination also makes it difficult to achieve strategic goals (Shapiro, 2013). In contrast, 
terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and the Lord’s Resistance Army prioritize 
efficiency and are characterized by having leadership, central command-and-control, and 
specialization. These more organized, hierarchal terrorist groups are more lethal, more 
likely to sustain violence over time, and more likely to attack hard targets compared to 
non-hierarchal groups (Heger et al. 2012; Kilberg, 2012). While these groups are 
structured in a way that facilitates intra-group coordination and resource allocation, they 




 As first discussed in the limitations, the primary issue with the existing research 
on terrorist group organization is that it is theoretical (e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; 
Volder, 2016) or relies on case studies (Ligon et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2005). In addition, 
the few quantitative studies that have examined the relationship between the organization 
of terrorist groups and violence rely on broad classification schemas (e.g., hierarchal/non- 
hierarchal; Heger et al. 2012; Kilberg, 2013). This study is of the first to provide a data-
driven approach to classify terrorist groups based on indicators of organization derived 
from gang research and supported by organizational theory.  
Conclusions 
 
In a short research note, Decker and Pyrooz (2015b) laid out twelve “lessons 
learned” from gang research that can provide insight in terrorism studies. The third lesson 
highlighted by the authors reads as follow:  
“The study of gangs has taught us time and again that the group is more powerful 
than the individual. Because groups motivate individuals to act in ways they would 
not otherwise do, it therefore is critical to understand the collective features of the 
group and how it relates to crime and deviance. Group structure differs from gang 
to gang and is not monolithic, which is why it is equally important to understand 
the role of group process within the group. Focusing on group process naturally 
leads to asking questions about the catalysts for actions of various sorts. Identifying 
the steps in engaging in violence, whether in the gang or terror context is important. 
Both individual and group motivations are important. Understanding the role of 
group process and organizational structure in recruitment, adopting group norms 
and engaging in violence are key issues in understanding both gang and terror 
groups... It is important not to squabble over generalizing whether extremist groups 
are hierarchical, decentralized, or leaderless, but instead to determine how each of 
the organizational structures relate to different group processes and accordingly 
different collective and per capita rates of crime and deviance.  
 
In line with Decker and Pyrooz (2015b), this dissertation uses a criminological lens 
typically found in research on street gang organization to understand levels of 




no shortage of group level explanations of violent extremism, few studies have drawn on 
the over 100 years of gang research.  
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into five main sections. Chapter 2 
examines the prior research on gang organization. This chapter also integrates insights 
from organizational theory and prior research on terrorist group structures. Chapter 3 
highlights the methodology and analytical techniques used in this research. Chapter 4 
presents the results in three sections. I examine how the underlying structure of terrorist 
group organization using factor analysis. Then, I examine the relationship between 
degrees of organization and violence (i.e., lethality and hard target selection) in terrorist 
groups. Third, I use cluster analysis to provide a data-driven approach to classifying 
structural typologies of terrorist groups. In the final chapter, Chapter 5, I offer theoretical 



















Pioneered by the work of Thrasher (1927), research on gang organization focuses 
on the degree to which a gang effectively and efficiently coordinates and carries out 
activities (see Pyrooz et al., 2012, p. 86).5 After over 100-years of research, the degree to 
which gang organization varies is best characterized by two competing views. First, 
research from scholars such as Mieczkowski (1986), Padilla (1992), Skolnick, Correl, 
Navarro, and Rabb (1988), Skolnick (1990), Sanchez-Jankowski (1991), Taylor (1990), 
Venkatesh (1997), and Venkatesh and Levitt (2000) suggest that gangs exhibit similar 
features of formal organizations with a leadership structure, diversity of roles, rules, and 
control over members. This view of gang organization is termed the instrumental-
rational perspective (Decker & Van Winkle, 1995). More specially, Decker and Curry 
(2000, p. 474) describe the instrumental-rational perspective as one where gangs “have a 
vertical structure, enforce discipline among their members, and are quite successful in 
defining and achieving group values” (also see Decker et al., 1998).  
In contrast to the instrumental-rational perspective, research from scholars such as 
Esbensen and Huizinga (1993), Decker and Curry (2000), Decker and colleagues (2008), 
Decker and Van Winkle (1995), Hagedorn (1994), Klein, Maxson, and Cunningham 
(1991), McGloin (2005), and Waldorf (1993) suggest that gangs are loosely confederated 
groups with little organization or cohesion. This view of gang organization is termed the 
informal-diffused perspective (Decker & Van Winkle, 1995). More specially, Decker and 
 
5 This is very similar to term organizational structure, which refers to the formal configuration between 
individuals and groups regarding the allocation of tasks, responsibilities, and authority within the 




Curry (2000) describe the informal-diffused perspective as one where gangs “are 
diffused” and compromised of “self-interested and self-motivated aggregates of 
individuals” (also see Decker et al., 1998). The following sections describe previous 
studies in the instrumental-rational and informal-diffused perspectives in more detail.  
Instrumental-Rational Perspective 
 
Drawing from interviews with 39 inmates and 43 criminal justice officials, 
Skolnick and colleagues (1988) and Skolnick (1990) highlight the instrumental-rational 
view by concluding that gang involvement in drug distribution was well organized and 
offered rational advantages to youth interested in selling drugs. Furthermore, many 
members of entrepreneurial gangs perceive themselves as “organized criminals.” 
Mieczkowski’s (1986) study of 15 members of the Young Boys Incorporated -- a black 
street gang in Detroit – found gang members operated in a bureaucratic structure 
coordinated by a leader who enforced the rules of the gang and differential roles for 
members in drug distribution operations. Padilla (1992) reached a similar conclusion and 
found that members of Puerto Rican street gangs in Chicago had different criminal roles 
in the gang, with street dealing considered the most prestigious.  
Fagan (1989) developed four gang typologies based on members’ patterns of drug 
involvement and other criminal activities including social, party, serious delinquent and 
organized gangs. The latter two types, serious delinquent and organized gangs, reported 
higher levels of organization sophistication such as having a leader, specific rules and 
codes, division of labor, and a hierarchy based on age. Taylor (1990) identified a 
corporate gang structure among gangs located in Detroit. Corporate gangs functioned like 




with effective leadership and shared goals. After 10-years of fieldwork involving 37 
different gangs across three cities, Sanchez-Jankowski (1991) described gangs as highly 
structured organizations with a leadership structure, diversity of roles, and rules. 
Organized gangs were more likely to be involved in acts of organized violence as 
opposed to individual violence given their ability to control and coordinate the activities 
of its members. More recently, Densley (2012) examined gang organization in a cross-
national content. Utilizing interviews with gang members and associates from 12 
different gangs across London, Densley concluded that each of the 12 gangs were well 
organized with a hierarchical structure with multiple levels of power, an “elder” 
leadership group, rules of conduct, and punishments. Many gang members also reported 
the presence of age-graded roles and an incentive system in the gang.  
Informal-Diffused Perspective 
 
Hagedorn (1994) examined the organizational characteristics of gangs in 
Milwaukee and found that drug sales were consistent with the informal-diffused model. 
More specifically, many gang members were more of individual entrepreneurs as 
opposed to part of a well-organized group. Utilizing arrest records from five Los Angeles 
police departments, Klein, Maxson, and Cunningham (1991) explored differences in 
crack sales between gang members and nongang members. The authors found that gangs 
were not well organized, lacked permanent membership or roles, and did not have shared 
goals. Esbensen and Huizinga (1993) examined involvement in criminal activities for the 
gang and nongang members over time using the Denver Youth Survey. The authors 
described the gangs in their sample as informal organizations lacking structure, and for 




approximately a year. Waldorf (1993) found that few gangs in Southern California did 
not have the organization nor skills to establish new drug markets. Taken together, these 
studies suggest that gangs who focus on drug sales generally have lower degrees of 
organization. 
Using data collected as part of a three-year field study in St. Louis, Decker, and 
Van Winkle (1995) explored the role of gangs and gang members in drug sales. To 
determine how gangs organized drug sales, the authors examined several interrelated 
questions about the presence of organizational roles and leadership in the gang. Of the 99 
active gang members interviewed, the authors found that the majority of gang members 
(58 percent) could not identify any roles related to drug sales in the gang. Decker and 
Van Winkle (1995) conclude that their results “unequivocally support the conclusion that 
the involvement of gangs in drug sales does not affect recruitment, lacks organization, 
and fails to produce a commitment to a central goal” (p. 601). Decker, Bynum, and 
Weisel (1998) examined the extent to which gangs were transitioning into organized 
crime groups using a sample of gang members in San Diego, an emerging gang city and 
Chicago, an established gang city. The authors found that each gang with the exception of 
the Gangster Disciples in Chicago showed low levels of organization. Decker and Curry 
(2000) interviewed 96 current, associate, and former gang members about their perceived 
levels of gang organization. The authors concluded that there was no substantial evidence 
that the gangs described in their study were well organized nor controlled or influenced 
the behavior of individual members. This supports Decker and Curry’s (2002) research 
which found that gang organization was linked to intragang as opposed to intergang 




Drawing from social network analysis, McGloin (2005) found that street gangs in 
Newark were disconnected subgroups of associations. Furthermore, she concluded that 
the overall street gangs were organized in a “very loose fashion” despite the presence of 
more cohesive cliques or subgroups within the street gangs. Decker and colleagues 
(2008) found that levels of gang organization were rather low for both current and former 
gang members. Using a seven-item gang organization index, the authors found that while 
levels of organization were higher among gangs associated with former gang members as 
opposed to current members, the organizational sophistication of gangs as a whole, was 
rather low. Finally, Spindler and Bouchard (2011) examined how gang typologies emerge 
across a sample of 44 self-identified gang members and 171 delinquent group members. 
Results from a cluster analysis using measures of organization suggest that produced four 
gang typologies: low organization, honor-based, location-based, and highly organized. 
The low organization type, characterized by few organizational features, was the largest 
group, while the highly organized type characterized by the most organizational features, 






In sum, there are two important conclusions from the existing research on gang 
organization.  First, as initially pointed out by Thrasher (1927), “no two gangs are alike,” 










Venkatesh, 2003; Klein & Maxson, 2006). Second, gang organization is primarily a 
descriptor rather than a definer of groups (Densley, 2012; Fagan, 1989; Klein & Maxson, 
2006). While prior research has shown that support for the informal-diffused perspective 
of gangs outweighs that of the instrumental-rational view, the key point is that gangs vary 
across the continuum. From this perspective, gang organization is best conceptualized on 
a continuum with informal-diffused on one end and instrument-rational on the other end 
(see Figure 1; Decker & Pyrooz, 2015a).  In the next section, I review prior research on 
the relationship between gang organization and criminological outcomes.  
Gang Organization and Criminological Outcomes 
 
To date, a number of studies have directly or indirectly examined the relationship 
between gang organization and delinquent or criminal behaviors (Bjerregaard, 2002; 
Bouchard & Spindler, 2010; Decker et al., 2008; Esbensen et al., 2001; Pyrooz et al., 
2012; Scott & Maxson, 2016; Sheley et al. 1995). For example, using a sample of 373 
male juveniles incarcerated in a maximum-security facility, Sheley and colleagues (1995) 
found that members of structured gangs were significantly more likely to engage in drug 
sales, burglary, robbery, and gun-carrying than members of unstructured gangs. Esbensen 
and colleagues (2001) and Bjerregaard (2002) both indirectly examined gang 
organization in their research on self-nomination techniques of gang membership. 
Drawing on a sample of 5,935 eighth-grade public school students representing 42 
schools across 11 cities, Esbensen and colleagues (2001) found that members of 
organized gangs were more likely to engage in state offenses, minor offenses, property 
offenses, personal offenses, drug sales, and drug use compared to all other gang members 




found that organized gangs were significantly more likely to have committed a robbery, 
participated in a break-in, stolen a car, committed an assault, and fought rival gangs 
compared to the other groups. A similar pattern existed with regard to the individual gang 
member’s delinquent behavior.  
Decker and colleagues (2008) examined the relationship between levels of gang 
organization and gang members’ involvement in violent crime, drug sales, and violent 
victimization using a sample of approximately 250 self-nominated juvenile gang 
members. The authors found that their seven-item gang organization index was 
significantly correlated with indices of violent victimization, drug sales, and violent 
offending for both current and former gang members. In other words, current and former 
members of more organized gangs reported higher levels of violent offending, gang sales 
of different kinds of drugs, and violent victimization compared to members of less 
organized gangs. Bouchard and Spindler (2010) examined whether levels of gang 
organization influenced drug dealing, violent offending, and property offending among 
523 self-reported delinquent youth in the Canadian province of Quebec. Using a nine-
item organization index, the authors found that gangs were more organized than 
delinquent groups. They also found that levels of organization were associated with 
increases in drug dealing and violent offending, but not property offending. 
Pyrooz and colleagues (2012) examined the relationship between gang 
organization, patterns of delinquency, and victimization using a cross-national sample of 
current juvenile gang members from three different data sources. These data sources 
included the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) project, the Trinidad and 




authors found that gang organization had a significant, positive correlation with measures 
of delinquency and victimization across the three samples. However, the individual items 
used to create the organization scale were “checkered with weak, modest, moderate, and 
strong coefficients, ranging from 0.05 to 0.58.... [and] the mean inter-item correlations 
across the studies are not as large as one would expect to inspire confidence in the latent 
construct of gang organizational structure” (p. 95-96).  
Finally, Scott and Maxson (2016) examined if there was a link between levels of 
gang organization and institutional violence in youth correctional facilities. Scott and 
Maxson (2016) found that levels of perceived gang organization had no effect on 
institutional violence at three time points. However, interviews with the incarcerated 
youth suggested that the transgression of rules that govern respect for the group, and to a 
lesser extent, violence regulated by leaders serve as a catalyst for institutional violence. 
This suggests that some aspects of gang organization may play a role in explaining 
violence between incarcerated youth.  
As illustrated above, the majority of studies on gang organization have examined 
the effects of organization on measures of criminal offending, delinquency, and to a 
lesser extent, victimization. That said, a few studies have also explored the relationship 
between gang organization and other deviant outcomes. For example, Mourle Jr. and 
colleagues (2014) examined the degree to which gang organization influences the online 
presence and behavior of gangs. Drawing from a sample of 418 current and former gang 
members from five large cities across the United States, the authors found that gang 
organization was positively and significantly related to a number of online behaviors, 




Leverso and Matsueda (2019) examined the effects of perceived gang organization on the 
length of time an individual spends in a gang. The authors found that perceived gang 
organization was inversely related to leaving the gang. Put another way, individuals who 
perceive their gang as more organized are more likely to stay in their respective gang 
longer than those who perceive their gang as less organized. 
In sum, prior research has illustrated two important points regarding the nature of 
gang organization. First, there is a clear relationship between degrees of gang 
organization and criminal offending. Members of more organized gangs report higher 
levels of violence and criminal offending compared to members of less organized gangs. 
Second, gang organization affects individual and group behaviors outside of criminal 
offending such as the length of time an individual spends in a gang, victimization, and 
online group behaviors. This suggests that gang organization influence a range of 
criminological outcomes. 
Structural indicators of gang organization 
 
The previous section illustrated that levels of organization vary across gangs, and 
members of gangs with higher levels of organization, typically report more engagement 
in violence and criminal offending. What remains unknown is how gang organization is 
measured across studies. For example, while developing a gang organization index, 
Decker and colleagues (2008) included an item measuring whether gang members “give 
money to the gang”, while Bouchard and Spindler (2010) did not. Likewise, Sheley and 
colleagues (1995) argue that having an identifiable group name is an indicator of 




To address this, Table 1 summarizes twenty studies that have examined, to some 
degree, the structural indicators of gang organization. Table 1 was constructed using both 
quantitative articles that have directly measured gang organization (e.g., Bouchard & 
Spindler, 2010; Decker et al., 2008) as well as qualitative, ethnographic works that 
unpacked indicators of gang organization (e.g., Thrasher, 1927; Sanchez-Jankowski, 
1991). The articles were searched for using a keyword such as “gang organization”, 
“gang typologies”, and “criminal gang structure” in Google Scholar and similar internet-
based search engines (e.g., Lexis Nexis, JSTOR). This search was augmented by reviewer 
the bibliographies of related articles. The primary inclusion criteria for Table 1 was that 
the article was theoretically or methodologically related to gang organization and/or gang 
structure. In other words, the article had to theorize the dimensions of gang organization 
or discuss ways to measure it. I only counted articles by the same author(s) as one entry if 
they used the same measures to assess gang organization across different articles.  For 
example, Bouchard and Spindler (2010) and Spindler and Bouchard (2011) use the same 
items to measure gang organization so only one article was included on Table 1. This 










Table 1. Summary of the Structural Indicators Based on Twenty Studies on Gang 
Organization 
Authors Structural Features  
Bjerregaard (2002) • Size, Group Name, Group Leader, Regular Meetings, 
Designated Clothing, Claim Territory, Gun Stash 
Bouchard & Spindler (2010) • Group Name, Group Leader, Hierarchy, Meeting Location, 
Distinctive Signs/Codes, Rules, Initiation, Protect Territory, 
Defend Honor/Reputation 
Decker (2001) • Levels of Membership, Leaders, Meetings, Rules, Discipline, 
Post Gang Groups 
Decker & Curry (2000) • Age-Graded Groups, Leaders, Meetings, Rules 
Decker & Van Winkle (1995) • Roles in Selling Drugs, Leaders, Leader Duties, Leader 
Influence 
Decker et al. (1998) • Levels of Membership, Leaders, Meetings, Rules, Pay Dues, 
Political Activities, Legitimate Business, Consequences for 
Leaving 
Decker et al. (2008) • Group Leader, Regular Meetings, Rules, Punishment for Rule 
Breaking, Distinctive Signs/Codes, Responsibilities to the 
Gang, Give Money to the Gang 
Densley (2012) • Size, Hierarchy and Rules, Leadership, Incentives and 
Organizational Mobility, Rules, Punishments 
Esbensen et al. (2001) • Initiation, Group Leader, Colors/Symbols 
Fagan (1989) • Join Before Age 13, Initiation, Leaders, Meetings, 
Rules/Codes, Roles, Age-Graded Roles, Symbols/Colors, 
Roles for Girls 
Hagedorn (1994) • Ethnicity, Division of Labor, Centralization, Relationship of 
Drug Organization to Gang, Junior Groups, Adult 
Involvement  
Leverso & Matsueda (2019) • Group Leader, Regular Meetings, Rules/Codes, Specific 
Roles, Age-Graded Group, Roles for Females, 
Colors/Symbols 
Maxson & Klein (1995)  • Size, Age of Members, Duration of Existence, Subgroupings, 
Territory, Crime Versatility  
Moule et al. (2014) • Group Leader, Shot Callers, Regular Meetings, Rules, 
Punishment for Rule Breaking, Responsibilities to the Gang, 
Give Money to the Gang, New Recruits, Claim Territory  
Pyrooz et al. (2012) • Group Leader, Regular Meetings, Rules, Insignia 
Sanchez-Jankowski (1991) • Leadership Structure, Roles/Duties, Codes 
Scott & Maxson (2016) • Group Leader, Distinct Symbols/Styles, Entry Rituals, Claim 
Area, Do Illegal Things Together, Illegal Drug Use 
Sheley et al. (1995) • Group Name, Group Leader, Regular Meetings, Designated 
Clothing, Protect Territory 
Thrasher (1927) • Leaders, Meetings, Roles, Rules/Codes, Punishments, 
Territory, Size 
Yablonsky (1959) • Hierarchy, Size, Roles 




Next, on Table 2, I categorized the indicators of gang organization found in prior 
research under common organizational themes. For instance, reports of gangs having 
different roles, age-graded groups, roles of girls, or responsibilities are suggestive of a 
division of labor within the gang. Likewise, reports of females having levels of 
membership, centralization, shot callers, or organizational mobility is indicative of a 
hierarchy within the gang (see Moule Jr. et al., 2014 for a similar approach). 
Furthermore, I only developed organizational themes in which an indicator was used in 
more than one study. For example, Scott and Maxson (2016) assessed if incarcerated 
youth “did illegal things together” as a marker of organization. Since this was the only 
study to use this measure, and it did not fit in any other related theme, it was not included 
on Table 2.  
Table 2 also shows the number of times (and relative percentage) that a theme 
was documented across the twenty articles. For example, Decker and Curry (2000) 
examined age-graded groups, leaders, meetings, and rules as indicators of gang 
organization. These characteristics were counted once under the following themes: 
division of labor (age-graded groups), leadership (leaders), meetings (meetings), and 
rules (rules). If an article noted multiple structural characteristics representing the same 
theme – that theme only counted once. For example, Decker and Van Winkle (1995) 
examined the presence of leaders as well as leadership influence (of those who sold 
drugs). Both characteristics counted as one entry under the leadership theme since they 
were drawn from the same study.  
Table 2 shows that leadership (90 percent), rules (65 percent), and meetings (60 




appear to be the most important structural themes when examining degrees of gang 
organization. Next, insignia (46 percent), division of labor (45 percent), and hierarchy (40 
percent) were themes that appeared in over one-third of the articles on gang organization. 
Territory (30 percent) and punishment (30 percent) appeared in just under one-third of 
articles, while size (25 percent) and resources or incentives were in a quarter of studies. 
Finally, initiation (20 percent), group name (15 percent), subgroupings (15 percent), and 
age of members (15 percent) were rarely used as indicators of gang organization across 
the twenty articles.  
 
Table 2. Structural Themes of Gang Organization 
Theme Example Structural Feature  n % 
Leadership • Presence of Leaders; Leadership Structure; 
Leader Influence 18 90% 
Rules • Written Rules; Codes  13 65% 
Meetings • Regular Meetings; Meeting Location 12 60% 
Insignia • Distinct Signs or Codes; Designated 
Clothing; Symbols or Colors 9 45% 
Division of Labor • Roles; Age-Graded Groups; Age-Graded 
Roles; Roles for Girls; Duties; Leader 
Duties; Responsibilities; Role in Drug 
Selling 
9 45% 
Hierarchy • Levels of Membership; Centralization;  
Shot Callers; Organizational Mobility 8 40% 
Territory • Claim Territory; Protect Territory; Claim 
Area 6 30% 
Punishments • Discipline; Consequences for Leaving;  
Punishments for Rule Breaking 6 30% 
Size • Size 5 25% 
Resources and 
Incentives 
• Give Money to the Gang; Pay Dues; 
Incentives; Gun Stash 5 25% 
Initiation • Entry Rituals 4 20% 
Group Name • Group Name 3 15% 
Subgroupings • Junior Groups; Post Gang Groups 3 15% 




 Of the fifteen structural themes presented on Table 2, the top eight, including 
leadership, rules, meetings, insignia, division of labor, hierarchy, territory, and 
punishments were selected as the most important themes for measuring organization for 
two primary reasons. First, the eight themes were represented in thirty percent or more of 
studies, which highlights their relative importance in gang organization research. Second, 
the eight structural themes overlap with seminal (Sanchez-Janlowski, 1991) and recent 
(Moule Jr. et al., 2014) theoretical developments on gang organization.  
 In the previous section, I identified the most commonly used indicators to 
measure gang organization and mapped them onto overarching organizational constructs. 
In the next section, I draw on organizational theory to explore the underlying 
organizational dimensions related to the gang organization themes.  
Gang Organization Themes and Organizational Dimensions 
 
Table 3 illustrates how the eight structural themes found in the previous section 
underline four core organizational dimensions including centralization, formalization, 
complexity, and interconnectedness. Building on theoretical insights from criminology 
(e.g., Decker et al., 2008; Moule Jr. et al., 2014; Sanchez-Janlowski, 1991) and 
organizational theory (e.g., Mintzberg, 1979; Pugh et al., 1968; Rogers, 2003), these 
organizational dimensions help explain the linkage between organization and group 
behavior.6  
 
6 Moule Jr. and colleagues (2014) argued that five organizational dimensions underline gang organization 
after reviewing theories of organizational behavior and innovation. The five dimensions included centrality, 
formalization, complexity, interconnectedness, and organizational slack. Unlike Moule Jr and colleagues 
(2014), I did not find that indicators of organizational slack, or the capability to commit resources back into 
the organization, were frequently accounted for in prior gang organization research. As such, I did not 




Organizational theory is particularly insightful given its focus on how 
organizational features influence performance. For example, organizational theory 
researchers have examined how organizational features affect the growth and decline of 
organizations as well as their capacity to innovate (e.g., Rogers, 2003). In the sections 
below, I highlight each organizational dimension.  
Centralization 
 
Centralization refers to the concentration of power and decision-making in the 
organization (Fredrickson, 1986; O’Neill, Beauvais, & Scholl, 2016). In organizations, 
centralization is ensured by designating one or more individuals with formal authority to 
keep actions in line with goals and objectives. A highly centralized organization typically 
has designated authority figures such as executives, managers, and supervisors who direct 
the behavior of lower level members. When there are functionally different units in an 
organization, centralizations safeguards coordination within and across units (Bolman & 
Deal, 2008). Without the presence of a central figure, such coordination is unlikely. The 
benefit of centralization, such as the presence of authority figures and a clear chain of 
command, is that organizations are more efficient in their decision-making, resolving 
internal conflicts, and distributing rewards and punishments.  
In gang organization studies, structural indicators of centralization include the 
presence of leaders, levels of membership, or a group hierarchy. Decker and colleagues 
(1998) in particular, illustrated high levels of centralization in their analysis of the 
Table 3. Organizational Dimensions and Structural Themes in Gangs 
Organizational 
Dimensions  Centralization Formalization Interconnectedness Complexity 
 Leadership Insignia Territory Division of Labor 
Structural 
Themes Hierarchy Rules Meetings 
 




Gangster Disciplines and Latin Kings in Chicago. In an interview with one member of 
the Gangster Disciplines, the subject identified eight levels of membership in the 
hierarchy of the gang including foot soldiers, first coordinator, second coordinator, 
literature coordinator, exercise coordinator, regents, governor, and board members (p. 
403). Likewise, Densley (2012) observed internal hierarchical structures in London street 
gangs consisting of approximately seven members who shared equal authority over all 
other members. Similar to conventional organizations, centralization in gangs promotes 
efficient decision-making, member accountability, and shared goals.  
Formalization 
 
Formalization refers to the rules, regulations, and procedures used to govern the 
behaviors of members of the organization (Fredrickson, 1986; Palmer & Biggart, 2002). 
High degrees of formalization in an organization limits individual discretion and ensures 
predictable and consistent behaviors of group members. In other words, high degrees of 
formalization specify standard ways of completing a task, handling internal problems, 
and relating to key individuals outside the organization (Bolman & Deal, 2008). When 
rules and policies are in place, it is less likely that members of the organizations make 
decisions based on their own personal whims or pressures. This ensures that the actions 
of group members are consistent with the organizational goals.  
Indicators of gang formalization include the presence of gang insignia, rules, and 
punishments. For example, Decker and colleagues (1998) illustrate how members of the 
Gangster Disciples in Chicago are governed by values of secrecy and silence. 
Furthermore, some Gangster Disciple members referred to the “sixteen laws” that each 




are also indicators of formalization. Distinctive colors, hand signs, or tattoos help 
overcome “asymmetries of information” between gang members and between gang 
members and those outside the gang (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996). For instance, specific 
displays of colors or symbols signal authority or status to other members in the same 
gang. Specific displays of colors or symbols also signal gang membership to community 
members and rival gangs (Leverso & Matsueda, 2019). In sum, formalization in gangs 




Interconnectedness refers to the degree to which units in a social system are 
linked by interpersonal networks (Rodgers, 2003). In general, a high degree of network 
interconnectedness is important for knowledge transfer in organizations. An 
organizational unit’s capacity to contribute to the organization's performance depends on 
its connectedness to other units. If one is not well-connected, their contributions to 
knowledge transfer and the innovation process are limited (Granovetter, 1973; Hansen, 
1999). Techniques to secure horizontal coordination and interconnectedness include 
formal and informal meetings, task forces, coordinating roles, matrix structures, and 
networks (Bolman & Deal, 2008). 
Structural indicators of interconnectedness in gangs range from claiming and 
protecting a specific territory to regular meetings between members. For instance, Decker 
and colleagues (1998) showed members of both the Gangster Disciples and Latin Kings 
in Chicago hold regular, mostly informal, meetings. For gangs, these meetings were used 




Curry (2000) note that gang meetings are used to accomplish several gang functions, 
including enhancing group cohesion, communicating responsibilities, and disseminating 
information. Territoriality is often a defining characteristic of street gangs (Miller, 1975) 
and an indicator of interconnectedness (Moule Jr. et al., 2014). In territories where gangs 
claim ownership, there are typically set spaces where gang members congregate and 
perform gang activities. In other words, a gang set space is defined as ‘‘the actual area 
within the neighborhood where gang members come together as a gang’’ (Tita, Cohen, & 
Engberg, 2005, p.280). These set spaces are vital resources for gangs attempting to 
coordinate their efforts with little risk of interference (Taylor & Brower, 1985). In sum, 
interconnectedness in gangs facilitates consistency in action and reduces redundancy of 




Complexity is the organizational dimension linked to differentiation in 
organizations. More specially, complexity refers to the background characteristics of 
members and the specialization of roles within the organization (Yang & Ng, 2015). In 
this definition, there are two forms of organizational complexity. First, organizational 
complexity includes the expertise and specialization of individual members in the 
organization. Second, organizational complexity includes the functional differentiation of 
units within the organization. Both forms of complexity are interrelated since specialized 
organizational units are often formed around the knowledge or skills of individuals 
(Mintzberg, 1979).  The benefit of organizational complexity in businesses is that it 




organizations with high levels of expertise are better equipped to develop innovative 
products (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis, & Strange, 2002).   
In gangs, structural indicators of complexity include a task-based division of 
labor, age-graded roles, and roles for females. For instance, prior studies have shown that 
identified specific roles for females in gangs, such as infiltrating and spying on rival 
gangs and carrying weapons or messages (Campbell, 1984; Thrasher, 1927). These roles 
are strategic and help protect male gang members from arrest. Decker and Van Winkle 
(1995) illustrated differential roles in drug sales played by members of the gang. For 
instance, several gang members indicated that roles such as record keepers, salesmen, and 
pistol packers existing in drug selling gangs. In sum, complexity in gangs facilitates the 




In sum, the most important indicators of gang organization focus on the presence 
of leadership, rules, meetings, insignia, a division of labor, hierarchy, territory, and 
punishment. These eight themes underline four organization dimensions including 
centralization, formalization, interconnectedness, and complexity. In gangs, centralization 
and formalization are beneficial in that they forge consensus, increase discipline, reduces 
uncertainty, and ensures the gang’s reputation on the street (Decker & Van Winkle, 
1996). Interconnectedness enhances horizontal coordination and is beneficial for gangs in 
that it facilitates group cohesion and knowledge transfer (Decker & Curry, 2000). Finally, 




and success of gang activities, reducing uncertainty among members, and enhancing the 
salience of one’s gang identity (Leverso & Matsueda, 2019). 
 In the next section, I examine how the organizational dimensions previously 
discussed appear in terrorism studies.  
Organization in Terrorist Groups 
 
To date, several terrorism scholars have examined the structural features and 
organizational dimensions of terrorist groups (e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Jackson, 
2006; Kilberg, 2012; Ligon et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2005). Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) 
developed the “network, netwars” perspective to emphasize the how technology and the 
information revolution influence networks (i.e., interconnectedness) during conflict. In 
short, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) posit that terrorist networks come in three topologies: 
the chain or line network, the hub, star, or wheel network, and the all-channel network.7 
The authors argue that these flat, networked structures are better suited for technological 
advancements and information dissemination compared to a hierarchical organizational 
structure. 
 Building on Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), Kilberg (2012) argues that there are 
three structural characteristics of terrorist organizations including the presence of a clear 
leader or leadership structure (centralization), functional differentiation (complexity), and 
centralized command and control (centralization/interconnectedness). Based on those 
features, there are four basic types of terrorist organizations including bureaucratic, hub-
and-spoke, all-channel, and market. The bureaucratic structure is the most organized and 
includes clear departmental boundaries, lines of authority, and formal decision-making 
 
7 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) also note that possibility of hierarchical forms of organization, although the 




procedures (Kilberg, 2012). The market structure is the least organized with no 
leadership, functional differentiation, nor command-and-control (Kilberg, 2012). 
 Mishal and Rosenthal (2005) argue that there are four key structural 
characteristics of terrorist organizations including the communication structure within the 
organization (interconnectedness), the level of specialization and division of labor 
(complexity), the chain of command-and-control (centralization), and the organization’s 
time definitions for implementing planned actions. Based on these features, terrorist 
organizations come in one of five basic forms including hierarchical, network hub, 
network chain, network multi-channel, and dune. Next, Shapiro (2005) suggests that 
there are three dimensions of organizational design in covert organizations: 
interconnectedness, hierarchy (centralization), and specialization (complexity). The 
benefit of a hierarchical structure is that the leadership has influence over the 
organization’s resources and operation; thus, all activities coordinated and in line with the 
leadership’s strategy and vision. The drawback of a centralized structure is that these 
organizations are easily infiltrated since they rely on a direct line of communication 
(Shapiro, 2005). Furthermore, high degrees of interconnectedness ensure that there is a 
direct link between leaders and foot soldiers so that all actions are in the interest of the 
organization as a whole. The downside is that the organization is less secure from 
infiltration, given the direct coordination between leaders and low level members.  
Next, Jackson (2006) distinguishes between extremist groups, networks, and 
movements by examining the nature of the authority exerted among group members. For 
Jackson (2006), authority refers to the formal control relationships 




at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. By focusing on the functional 
characteristics of the organization and the authority relations at each level, Jackson 
(2006) describes three canonical classes including tightly coupled groups, coupled 
networks, and loosely coupled movements. Zelinsky and Shubik (2009) developed a 
framework of categorizing terrorist groups by comparing their operational characteristics 
to business firms. Similar to Shapiro (2005), Zelinsky and Shubik (2009) focused on two 
organizational dimensions: centralization of resources and centralization of operations. 
By combining these two dimensions, there are four types of terrorist group structures, 
including hierarchy, venture capital, franchise, and brand. 
Ligon, Simi, Harms, and Harris (2013) drew from organizational theory to 
differentiate terrorist organizations from other types of collectives (e.g., groups) as well 
as describe the attributes of organizations. By definition, organizations refer to 
collections of human systems of cooperation and coordination assembled within 
identifiable boundaries to pursue shared performance goals or objectives (Hodge, 
Anthony, & Gales, 2003). Based on this definition, Ligon and colleagues (2013) hold that 
there are three characteristics that are unique to organizations compared to other 
collectives, including 1) coordination between members (interconnectedness); 2) 
identifiable boundaries (formalization); and 3) adherence to shared performance goals or 
objectives (centralization).  More importantly, Ligon and colleagues (2013) also hold that 
organizations that meet those three criteria can be described in terms of two attributes: 
structure and design. Structure refers to “the total amount of ways in which work and 
people can be divided and organized to accomplish organizational goals” (p. 112). With 




the chain of command (centralization/interconnectedness), and reason for labor division 
(complexity). Next, organizational design consists of two normative processes, including 
formalization and communication (interconnectedness).  
 Finally, drawing from organizational theory, Volders (2016) argues that there are 
four key parameters that differentiate terrorist groups: membership, operational time and 
space, formalization, and centralization. Using these four design parameters, Volders 
(2016) describes four ideal-types of organizational designs in relation to their ability to 
complete strategically successful attacks and their operational security (see Figure 2). 
Quadrant 1 groups characterize terrorist organizations with limited operational time and 
space, few well-trained members, a decentralized structure, and little formal rules or 
procedures that control member’s behaviors. Quadrant 1 terror groups are the least 
organized. Quadrant 2 groups have rising centralization and formalization although 
lacking specialized membership or operational time or space. With increasing 
centralization and formalization from Quadrant 1 to Quadrant 2, groups have more 
control over members’ behaviors and group goals; however, the risk of infiltration from 















Quadrant 3 characterizes groups with senior leadership positions held by well-
trained individuals, formal rules or procedures, and control of physical territory to train 
and coordinate their attacks. Quadrant 3 groups have increased functional specialization, 
accountability, and institutional memory (Volders, 2016, p. 119). Quadrant 3 groups have 
the highest levels of organization of the four types. Finally, Quadrant 4 characterizes the 
“ideal” terrorist group. These groups have specialized members and the necessary 
operational space to “carry out complex operations and/or prolonged terrorist campaigns 
in line with the group’s strategic political goals and their organizational objectives” 
(Volder, 2016, p. 119). However, these groups lack centralization and formalization to 
minimize the risk of infiltration from security threats. The drawback of the Quadrant 4 
design is that without structuring tools to guide members' behaviors (i.e., centralization 
and formalization), organizational control is increasingly at risk. In other words, members 
Figure 2. Organizational Types Relative to Tactical Efficiency and 




have increased autonomy over their actions since there are fewer controls and 
coordination mechanisms in place. 
 In sum, like gangs, no two terrorist groups are alike. For instance, terrorist groups 
vary in several organizational dimensions commonly found in gang research such as their 
interconnectedness (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Kilberg, 2012; Ligon et al., 2013; Mishal 
& Rosenthal, 2005; Shapiro, 2005), centralization (Jackson, 2006; Kilberg, 2012; 
Shapiro, 2005; Volder, 2016; Zelinsky & Shubik, 2009), complexity (Kilberg, 2012; 
Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005), and formalization (Ligon et al., 2013; Volder 2016). The 
primary limitation is that many of these studies are theoretical in nature (e.g., Arquilla & 
Ronfeldt, 2001; Volder, 2016) or rely on case studies (Ligon et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2005) 
to examine the organization dimensions of terrorist groups. Subsequently, few studies 
have used a quantitative approach to examine how these organizational dimensions 
manifest in terrorist group and their relationship with violence (for exception see; 
Kilberg, 2012). This dissertation seeks to overcome this by using a data-driven approach 
to classify the organization of terrorist groups and its relationship to violence.  
Organizational Dimensions and Theoretical Mechanism 
 
Recall that the second research question in this dissertation is: Do terrorist groups 
that are more highly organized engage in more group level violence than less organized 
terrorist groups? For this dissertation, two types of violence are examined: lethality and 
hard target selection. Hard targets are of particular importance in this study since they 
require a considerable amount of planning and coordination to successful attack (Asal et 
al., 2015; Berman & Latin, 2008). Hard targets such as the military or police are well-




and offer little chance of escape (Nilsson, 2018). When successful, attacks on hard targets 
are strategically important for violent extremist organizations for projecting an image of 
strength and “underscore[ing] its credentials as a meaningful force, establishing a 
benchmark of power that it has then used to build morale among existing members and 
attract new recruits” (Libicki, Chalk, & Sisson, 2007, p. 63).  
In general, hard targets require expertise and coordination to successfully attack. 
Given the novelty of measuring organization in terrorist groups, I do not offer formal 
hypothesizes as to the relationship between the underlying organizational dimensions in 
terrorist groups and violence. However, I do expect that terrorist groups with higher 
degrees of organization are more violent and have the operational and tactical capacity to 
successful attack hard targets for three reasons (See Figure 3). First, there is greater 
levels of control and accountability in organized terrorist groups (Heger et al., 2012; 
Shapiro, 2013). In particular, centralization and hierarchical authority roles limit the 
amount of discretion afforded to individual members. Given the risk associated with 
attacking hard targets, centralized terrorist groups are also able to hold members 
accountable for their actions, which reducing the chances of negligent acts and rewards 
successful attacks (Abrahms & Potter, 2015; Shapiro, 2015). Formalization also helps 
regulate the behavior of members. More specifically, formalization mechanisms, such as 
rules and punishments, allow for greater obedience and compliance from members 
(Ligon et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2013; Volders, 2016). Members of highly formalized 
organizations are more likely to use organizational resources toward organizational goals 
as opposed to personal needs or for settling individual grievances (Ligon et al., 2013, 




predictable decision-making. When formalization mechanisms such as training in 
organization rules and procedures are in place, lower level members know who has 
decision-making authority in situations of uncertainty. From this view, formalization 
serves as a “substitute” for day-to-day leadership decision-making (Keller, 2006). As 
such, high levels of formalization connote member compliance through established 
norms.  
Second, there is a greater agenda setting capacity in well-organized terrorist 
groups (Heger et al., 2012). Clear agenda setting ensures that there are few alternative 
sources to distort or challenge the tactics of that specific attack or the larger operational 
goals of the organization. Centralization improves the agenda setting capacity of terrorist 
groups as leaders set the strategic agenda for the group and communication goals 
unidirectional down the chain of command.  Although the goals of leaders and foot 
soldiers are not always perfectly aligned (Shapiro, 2013), research has shown that a lack 
of leadership is especially detrimental. For example, Abrahms and Potter (2015) illustrate 
that foot soldiers are incentivized to attack soft targets, which are not in line with the 
higher-order goals of the group, during period of leadership deficiencies. During these 
periods of instability, limited centralization reduces the ability of the group to regulate 
members behavior and limits goal congruence among members. Interconnectedness 
improves the agenda-setting capacity in terrorist groups. In highly interconnected 
organizations, face-to-face meetings between members help establish the strategic and 
operational goals of the organization. These meetings also help establish trust among 
members, ensuring that there is a clear strategic agenda for the organization. While 




it facilitates consistency in action and reduces redundancy of effort (Ligon et al., 2013). 
Finally, formalization improves the agenda setting capacity of groups through an 
established institutional memory. In particular, training in ideological rules and 
organization procedures develop explicit knowledge related to group goals and 








Third, there is greater expertise in well-organized terrorist groups. Complexity 
ensures the development of group level expertise through a defined division of labor 
allowing members to develop specialized task skills. For example, complex terrorist 
groups provide members with specialized combat training. This training provides 
members with greater tactical expertise in developing and deploying sophisticated 
weapon systems to strike hard targets (Asal et al., 2015; Logan et al., 2019). 
Formalization also enhances the development and management of expertise. For 
example, training in organizational rules, policies, and procedures provides members 
with superior knowledge of the operation of the group. Formalization also enhances the 
institutional memory of groups allowing for more efficient information management and 
transfer. Similarly, centralization and interconnected improve the means in which 
Figure 3. Theoretical Linkages Between Organizational Theory Constructs and 




expertise is managed and allocated in the group. Centralization allows for better-
equipped, highly executed attacks through the pooling and distribution of resources based 
on collective as opposed to individual goals (Ligon et al., 2013). Thus, expertise is used 
in the “right place at the right time.” In interconnected organizations, expertise and 
knowledge are transferred – whether vertically in centralized organizations or 
horizontally in decentralized groups – to other members thorough interactions. 
Interconnected terrorist groups who hold territory also have the operational space to 
develop expertise and coordinate activities.  Without such space, terrorist groups are 
scattered with no central organizing space to train and develop expertise without constant 
threats from law enforcement or competing terrorist groups. In addition, territorial control 
allows terrorist groups move at their own pace and utilize this space for planning 
complex operations (Volders, 2016). In sum, the complexity dimension is linked to the 
development of expertise, while the other three dimensions are related to coordinating 
and managing expertise.  
 In the next chapter, I describe the methods used to assess the centralization, 
formalization, interconnectedness, and complexity dimensions of organization in terrorist 
groups. I also describe the ways I measured the two violent outcomes of interest: lethality 












Data for this dissertation come from two datasets. First, measures of organization 
and group characteristics were derived from the Leadership for the Extreme and 
Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) dataset. Second, measures of violence were 
drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). To examine the relationship between 
the organization of terrorist groups and attack outcomes, I connected the LEADIR data 
with attributed measures of violence collected for the GTD. In the sections below, I 
describe both the datasets in more detail.  
Global Terrorism Database 
 
The GTD is an unclassified, open-source database on domestic and international 
terrorist events from 1970 through 2018 maintained by the National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland 
(START, 2020). Terror events are included in the GTD if they have a political, social, 
religious, or economic motive, are intended to coerce, intimidate, or publicize the cause, 
and/or if they violate international humanitarian law. The GTD excludes all acts of state 
terrorism. While recognizing the complexities in defining terrorism, the GTD’s inclusion 
criteria are generally agreed on by most scholars and experts (LaFree et al. 2014). Each 
attack included in the GTD is coded for information including, but not limited to, the 
number of fatalities, the number of causalities, weapons used, target type, and the 
perpetrator group name. Given the scope and detail of the GTD, it is recognized as the 




(e.g., Carson et al., 2012; Hsu & McDowall, 2017; Mroszczyk, 2019; Santifort, Sandler, 
& Brandt, 2013). 
Leadership for the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results 
 
The LEADIR dataset contains organizational and leadership information on 280 
terrorist groups active between 2008 and 2017.8 To reach the final sample of 280 terrorist 
groups, LEADIR uses a three-stage process (see Figure 4). It is important to note that, to 
develop the final sample of terrorist groups, the GTD was used as the starting point. In 
the first stage, all attack cases in the GTD outside the years 2008 through 2017 were 
removed.9 Attack cases in which (1) there was doubt in whether or not the incident 
qualified as an act of terrorism and (2) there was uncertainty whether or not the 
perpetrator group was involved were also removed.  The remaining dataset included 
73,013 terrorist attacks between 2008 and 2017. In the second stage, the terrorist attacks 
were aggregated to the group level based on the “perpetrator group name” variable. Then 
all perpetrator group name entries with less than five attacks attributed to them were 
removed. In total, 640 perpetrator group name entries were removed at this stage.  
 
8 The sample of terrorist groups is international, and groups were located in 50 different countries. This is 
an important distinct since much of the gang organization literature focuses on US based gangs.  
9 This timeframe was selected for three reasons. First, using a more current date range ensures that sufficient 
and reliable information could be collected and coded for each terrorist group. Second, at the time of data 
collection, the GTD included attack data up until 2017. Thus, 2008 to 2017 creates a practical 10-year date 
range to examine. This 10-year time frame is consistent with other datasets on violent extremist organizations. 
For example, the Big, Allied, and Dangerous Dataset (BADD) collected information on terrorist groups active 
in an 8-year period from 1998 to 2005. Third, the most recent GTD collection period began in 2008. By using 
2008 as our starting period, we do not have to account for different collection methods utilized by the GTD 







Five attacks were selected as the threshold for inclusion for two reasons. First, 
committing five attacks during this ten-year period displayed a minimal commitment to 
violence on the part of the perpetrator. A sustained commitment to violence is often a 
principal in defining criminal organizations (Finckenauer, 2005). Second, five attacks are 




a mid-point of what other similar data collection efforts use.  For example, the Big, 
Allied, and Dangerous Dataset (BADD) collected information on 395 terrorist groups 
with at least one act of terrorism between 1998 to 2005 (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008), 
while Kilberg (2012) coded the organizational structure of 246 terrorist groups with ten 
or more attacks between 1970 and 2007. 
In the final stage, all perpetrator group name entries that did not have identifiable 
group boundaries. The clearest example of group boundaries was the presence of a group 
name or moniker. Thus, I removed all perpetrator group name entries coded as 
“unknown” or those highlighting lone actors, social movements, or a generic reference 
(e.g., “Maoists,” “Separatists,” and “White Extremists”). In total, 46 perpetrator group 
name entries were removed (see Table 4). The remaining dataset included 25,627 terror 
incidents nested with 280 terrorist groups.10 The LEADIR project consists of 
organizational and leadership information collected for these 280 terrorist groups. 
 
10There were 45,860 incidents in which the perpetrator group was coded as unknown. This was the cause 
for the large drop in the number of cases between the second and third stage. 
Table 4. Perpetrator Group Name Entries Removed 
Perpetrator Type Number  of Attacks  Perpetrator Type 
Number 
 of Attacks  
Unknown 43977 Anti-Government extremists 15 
Maoists 1206 FARC dissidents 14 
Fulani extremists 405 Neo-Nazi extremists 13 
Muslim extremists 360 Loyalists 13 
Palestinian Extremists 237 Anti-Semitic extremists 13 
Separatists 198 Chechen Rebels 11 
Jihadi-inspired extremists 90 Pro-Russia Militia 10 
Tribesmen 87 Gbagbo Loyalists 9 
Gunmen 84 Buddhist Monks 9 
Pro Hartal Activists 79 Rohingya extremists 8 
Dissident Republicans 71 Ijaw extremists 7 
Anarchists 65 Hindu extremists 7 







 LEADIR uses a historiometric approach to collect and code organizational 
information. Historiometry is an organizational research method in which nomothetic 
hypotheses about human behavior are tested by applying quantitative analyses to 
historical information (Simonton, 1990; 1999). In other words, historiometric analysis 
allows researchers to convert historical information into numeric data that are appropriate 
for complex statistical analysis and modeling (Crayne & Hunter, 2018). Historiometry is 
commonly used in personality studies and social psychology (Simonton, 2008) as well as 
industrial and organizational (I/O) psychology to assess leaders (Ligon et al., 2012; 
Mumford, 2006).11 Historiometric analysis is particularly advantageous for this study 
given the rarity and inability to access and directly observe our population of interest 
(i.e., terrorist groups). Similar research has applied historiometric analysis to examine 
destructive leader behavior (O’Connor et al., 1995) and leader assassination (Yammarino 
et al., 2013).  
 
11 Criminologist terrorism scholars using comparable open-source information are also using data that is 
representative of the larger universe they are interested in, according to Chermak, Freilich, Parkin, and 
Lynch (2012). 
Militants 34 Anti-Immigrant extremists 7 
Uighur Separatists 29 Anti-Abortion extremists 7 
Israeli settlers 28 Tuareg extremists 6 
Murle Tribe 26 Qaddafi loyalists 6 
Israeli extremists 24 Left-wing extremists 6 
Algerian Islamic Extremists 24 Corsican Nationalists 6 
Right-wing extremists 21 Bedouin tribesmen 6 
Muslim Separatists 20 Ukrainian nationalists 5 
White extremists 17 Anti-White extremists 5 




In accordance with best practice with historiometry, a psychometric content 
coding scheme was developed for both organizational and leadership measures. This 
psychometric content-coding scheme included the use of behaviorally anchored rating 
scales (BARS) and objective indices related to measures of organizational centralization, 
interconnectedness, and complexity. Constructs coded as BARS were measured on 5-
point Likert-type scales with benchmark exemplars for what would be considered low, 
medium, and high on that particular construct in the sample at hand (see Figure 5). Other 
organizational measures, such as the presence of territorial control, training, and uniform 
were measured on dichotomous scales with descriptions of each construct. 
Figure 5. Example Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale for Organizational Centralization 
 
 LEADIR data were collected and coded five raters who worked in an 
interdisciplinary, collaborative research center located at a large Midwestern 
University.12 Each rater was trained in theories underlying terrorist organizations as well 
as best practices in utilizing open-source information to prevent common method bias 
 
12 Each of the five raters were graduate students including one doctoral student in criminology and criminal 
justice, three master’s students in criminology and criminal justice, and one master’s student in political 
science. 
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There is no clear command 
structure; the group is 
anonymously cell-based. 
 
Some command structure, but 
still ambiguous in terms of 
who is given 
commands/leader. 
 
The structure of an 
organization is highly 
centralized and hierarchical 
with a clear chain of 
command. 
Pagan Sect of the Mountain 
and other modern anarchist 
groups operate in 
autonomous cells   
 
Caucasus Emirate has central 
leadership, but it is difficult 
to identify who has 
operational control during 
periods in the group’s history 
 
ISIL has a hierarchical 
command structure featuring a 
central leader (Baghdadi) who 
sets the strategic and 





and ensure data were gathered from reputable sources. Each rater also individually coded 
10 percent of the terrorist groups in LEADIR and met to discuss their evaluations to 
ensure a shared cognitive framework and reach a better understanding of the group 
characteristics. During this time, interrater reliability was calculated across coders for the 
Likert-style organizational constructs. Cronbach’s alpha score for each measure was 
greater than .80, suggesting adequate levels of interrater reliability (Shrout & Fleiss, 
1979).  
Data collection and source credibility 
 
To account for source credibility, LEADIR utilized a three-tier source credibility 
system to help direct raters to the more “trusted” source when conflicting information 
was present (see Freilich, Chermak, & Belli, 2014 for similar credibility system). Tier 1 
sources -- the most credible sources of information about terrorist groups -- included 
academic publications and databases on terrorism (e.g., BAAD; Mapping Militant 
Organization, South Asia Terrorism Portal) and government sources (e.g., Department of 
Justice, United Nations). The next source credibility tier -- Tier 2 sources – included 
media reports (e.g., Wall Street Journal, Al Jazeera, New York Times) and information 
from watch-dog organizations (e.g., Council on Foreign Relations, Counter Extremist 
Project). Finally, the lowest source credibility tier – Tier 3 sources – consisted of 
information abstracted from blogs or extremist affiliated websites. 
 Table 5 shows the average number of sources per tier for each of the 280 terrorist 
groups. On average, there were slightly over one Tier-1 and three Tier-2 sources per 










Missing data  
 
 Missing data is a frequent problem in research using open source information, and 
researchers have employed a host of methods and statistical techniques to resolve such 
issues (see LaFree et al., 2018; Safer-Lichtenstein, LaFree, & Loughran, 2017). For this 
dissertation, I used listwise deletion for missing data on the measures of organization. In 
total, 21 terrorist groups in the final sample had missing information on a core measure of 
organization (see below) and were removed from the final analysis. The remainder of this 
dissertation focuses on the 259 terrorist groups with sufficient organizational 
information (see Appendix A for full sample).  
Measures of Organization 
 
All of the measures of organization were derived from the LEADIR dataset. Table 
6 includes each measure of organization, their operational definitions, and their 
relationship to the gang organization literature. In order to the address centralization 
dimensions of organization three items were employed: leadership, centralization, and 
uniforms. Leadership was a dichotomous measured assessing whether the terrorist group 
were governed by a single leaders or ruling council as opposed to a decentralized 
structure or fractured leadership. Centralization measured the degree to which each 
terrorist group were centralized with a top-down chain of command and multiple levels 
Table 5. Source Credibility  
Tier Source Mean (SD)  Min Max 
Tier 1 1.49 (1.55) 0 11 
Tier 2 3.66 (2.06) 0 14 
Tier 3 0.69 (1.16) 0 7 




of hierarchy as opposed to decentralized using a five-point Likert scale (1 = highly 
decentralized; 2 = somewhat decentralized; 3 = balanced; 4 = somewhat centralized; 5 = 
highly centralized). Finally, Uniforms was a dichotomous measure assessing whether 
members of the terrorist group wore uniforms to denote status or tenure. Table 6 suggests 
that the majority of terrorist groups in our sample had central leadership (78 percent) and 
were relatively centralized (m = 3.25, SD = 1.20), while slightly more than half had 
members wear uniforms to denote status or tenure (53 percent). 
 Three items also assessed the formalization dimension of organization including 
organizational, ideological, and combat training. First, organization training was a 
dichotomous measured assessing whether the terrorist group engaged in organizational 
training (e.g., leadership succession planning; internal memos; financial reports).13 
Second, ideological training was a dichotomous measured assessing whether the terrorist 
group engaged in ideological training (e.g., religious camps; mandatory reading of 
ideological texts). Third, combat training was a dichotomous measured assessing whether 
the terrorist group engaged in combat training (e.g., weapons usage, physical tests). 
Similar to written rules and punishments in gangs, these types of training socialize 
members to the formal and informal codes of the organization. Table 6 illustrates that 
slightly over half of the groups in LEADIR engaged in combat training (54 percent) 
while less than one-third engaged in organizational (29 percent) or ideological (27 
percent) training.  
 
13 Although the indicators of organizational training such as internal memos and financial reports are not 
direct evidence of organizational training, they suggest that the group adopted standardized procedures and 




Two items were used to examine the interconnectedness dimension of 
organization including autonomy and territorial control. Connectedness measured the 
degree to which each terrorist group and its subunits were interconnected as opposed to 
autonomous using a five-point Likert scale (1 = fully autonomous; 2 = somewhat 
autonomous; 3 = balanced; 4 = somewhat interconnected; 5 = highly interconnected). 
Territorial Control was a dichotomous measured assessing whether the terrorist group 
held a sizeable amount of territory for a substantive amount of time from 2008 through 
2017. Table 6 indicates that, on average, the terrorist groups in LEADIR preferred 
operational autonomy (m = 2.54, SD = .90) and roughly one-third had territorial control 
(32 percent). 
Finally, I used three items to assess the complexity dimension of organization 
including departmentalization, deep-level diversity, and services. Departmentalization 
measured the degree to which each terrorist group had multiple task-specific branches or 
units in the organization using a five-point Likert scale (1 = no unit specialization; 2 = 
some unit specialization; 3 = moderate unit specialization; 4 = high unit specialization; 5 
= maximum unit specialization). Deep-Level Diversity measured the degree to which 
each terrorist group had members with specialized skills such as medical professionals, 
military officers, professors (1 = no member expertise; 2 = some member expertise; 3 = 
moderate member expertise; 4 = high member expertise; 5 = maximum member 
expertise). Finally, services was a dichotomous measure assessing whether the terrorist 
group provided community services to their target community. Table 6 indicates that on 




organizational (m = 2.64, SD = 1.16) nor individual (m = 2.22, SD = 1.1) level. 
Furthermore, few groups provided social services to the larger community (23 percent).  
 
Violent Outcomes 
Each of the measures of violent comes from the GTD. There are five primary 
outcomes for this dissertation including Lethality, Hard Target Lethality, Attacks on 
Hard Targets, Successful Attacks on Hard Targets, and Highly Successful Attacks on 
Hard Targets. As previously discussed, the five outcomes were designed around two 
central measures of violence: lethality and hard target selection. Regarding lethality, I 
included both a direct measure of group level lethality as well as a measure of lethality 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Organization 
Variable Operational Definition Mean (SD) Min Max 
Example Indictor of 
Gang Organization 
Centralization      
Leadership “The terrorist group was governed by a single leader or ruling council” .78 (.41) 0 1 Presence of Leaders 
Centralization “The degree to which the terrorist group was centralized” 3.25 (1.20) 1 5 Shot Callers 
Uniforms “There is evidence that members of the terrorist group wore uniforms” .54 (.50) 0 1 
Levels of 
Membership 
Formalization      
Organizational 
Training 
“There is evidence that the terrorist group 
engaged in organizational training” .29 (.46) 0 1 Rules/Punishments 
Ideological Training “There is evidence that the terrorist group engaged in ideological training” .27 (.44) 0 1 Rules/Punishments 
Combat Training “There is evidence that the terrorist group engaged in combat training” .54 (.50) 0 1 Rules/ Punishments 
Interconnectedness      
Connectedness “The degree to which cells or units in the terrorist group operate independently” 2.54 (.90) 1 5 Regular Meetings 
Territorial Control “There is evidence that the terrorist group had control over territory”  .32 (.47) 0 1 
Claim or Protect 
Territory 
Complexity      





“The degree to which the terrorist group’s 
membership is diverse on deep-level 
characteristics such as educational 
background, wealth, or specialized skills” 
2.22 (1.10) 1 5 Specialized Roles 






against hard targets. Concerning hard target selection, I included measure of both the 
number of attacks on hard targets and measures of success when attacking hard targets.  
First, Lethality measured the total number of victims killed by each terrorist group 
between 2008 and 2017. The GTD provides the total number of fatalities as well as the 
total number of perpetrator fatalities per attack. Thus, I subtracted the total number of 
perpetrator fatalities from the total number of fatalities to capture the total number of 
victim-only fatalities per attack. For example, if 15 individuals were killed in a suicide 
bombing including 5 perpetrators and 10 civilians, the number of victims killed is 10.  
 The second outcome, the Hard Target Lethality, measured the total number of 
hard targets killed by each terrorist group between 2008 and 2017. Hard targets include 
four of the twenty-two different target types collected by the GTD including government-
general, government-personnel, police, and military targets (Asal et al. 2015; Conrad & 
Greene, 2015). Similar to the process of capturing victim-only fatalities, I subtracted the 
total number of perpetrator fatalities from the total number of fatalities in attacks on hard 
target to arrive at the number of hard targets killed. For example, if 10 individuals were 
killed in an armed assault including 8 perpetrators and 2 police officers, the number of 
hard targets killed is 2.  
 Next, the Attacks on Hard Targets measured the total number of attacks on hard 
targets for each terrorist group between 2008 and 2017. The fourth outcome, Successful 
Attacks on Hard Targets, measured the number of attacks in which the number of hard 
targets killed was greater than the number of perpetrators. For example, if 12 members of 
Boko Haram died during an attack that killed 15 police officers, this would qualify as a 




perpetrators killed (12). In the same example, if 12 members of Boko Haram were killed 
during an attack that killed 11 police officers; this would not qualify as a successful 
attack since the number of hard target deaths did not exceed the number of perpetrator 
deaths.  
 Finally, Highly Successful Attacks on Hard Targets measured the number of 
incidents in which the number of hard targets killed related to the number of perpetrators 
killed was greater than 10. For example, if 5 members of al-Shabaab died during an 
attack that killed 15 military members, this would qualify as a highly successful attack. 
The number of hard targets killed (15) relative to the number perpetrators killed (5) was 
greater than 10. In the same example, if 14 police officers and 5 perpetrators had died, 
this would not qualify as a highly successful attack.  
 Table 7 includes the mean, standard deviation, minimum value, and maximum 
value for each of the five outcome variables. After examining the descriptive statistics 
and visual diagnostics for each outcome, there were clear outliers in the data. Thus, in 
order to control for these outliers and create more meaningful variation in the distribution 
of each outcome, I top-coded (also referred to as capped) the distribution of each 
outcome at the upper 99th percentile.14 More specifically, Lethality was capped at 4,051, 
Hard Target Lethality was capped at 1,408, Attacks on Hard Targets was capped at 344, 
Successful Attacks on Hard Targets was capped at 253, and Highly Successful Attacks on 
Hard Targets was capped at 37. Moving forward, the top-coded measures are the 
variables of interest.15 
 
14 In other words, 99 percent or more of the respective distributions fell below the value selected to represent the high end of the scale.  
15 The results using the raw data illustrated that there were no substantive differences in the key variables of interest between the raw 






Additional Group Level Variables 
 
Although the focus on this dissertation is on indicators of organization, I 
controlled for several important variables found to influence extremist organizations’ 
capacity for violence. This included ideology, goals, size, age, state sponsorship, alliance 
funding, drug trafficking, and power. First, LEADIR collects information on three 
ideological categories: religious, ethnonationalist, and left-wing. These categories were 
not exclusive, and terrorist groups could fall into multiple ideological categories (see 
Asal & Rethemyer, 2008 for similar schema). Religious was a dichotomous measure (1 = 
religious) of whether the terrorist group was guided by some form of religious principles. 
Ethnonationalist was a dichotomous measure (1 = ethnonationalist) of whether the 
terrorist group advocates for the territorial autonomy or independence of a specific ethnic 
group.  Left-Wing was a dichotomous measure (1 = left-wing) of whether the terrorist 
group promotes economic or social left-wing policies such as communism and its 
variants (e.g., Marxist, Leninist, Maoists). Finally, Other was a dichotomous measure (1 
= Other) of all other ideological motives, including right-wing, anarchists, supremacists, 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Key Outcome Variables 
Variable Mean (SD) Min  Max 
Lethality (raw) 285.22 (1634.60) 0 20339 
     Lethality (99%) 166.83 (576.27) 0 4051 
Hard Target Lethality (raw) 105.45 (612.57) 0 7386 
      Hard Target Lethality (99%) 63.78 (215.32) 0 1408 
Attacks on Hard Targets (raw) 38.25 (218.89) 0 3216 
      Attacks on Hard Targets (99%) 22.86 (60.65) 0 344 
Successful Attacks on Hard Targets (raw) 21.88 (139.44) 0 2072 
      Successful Attacks on Hard Targets (99%) 12.60 (38.97) 0 253 
Highly Successful Attacks on Hard Targets (raw) 2.30 (12.65) 0 139 




and environmentalists. As shown on Table 8, approximately 50 percent of the terrorist 
groups had religious motivations, 49 percent had ethnonationalist motivations, 10 percent 
had left-wing motivations, and 10 percent had other motives. 
 Next, I also controlled for the goals of each terrorist group. In LEADIR, group 
goals are assessed using the six category-coding schema developed by Jones and Libicki 
(2008). The six categories include policy change, status quo, territory change, regime 
change, social revolution, and empire. Next, following Koehler-Derrick and Milton 
(2019), I collapsed the six categories into a smaller set of three categories. First, Anti-
System Expansive is a dichotomous measure of groups that seek to establish an empire or 
create a social revolution. These groups are anti-system in that they want to impose a new 
governing order; however, they are also expansive because they wish for global as 
opposed to local or regional change. Next, Anti-System Limited is a dichotomous measure 
of groups whose goal is territorial control or regime change. These groups want to 
impose a new governing order locally as opposed to globally. Finally, Within-System a 
dichotomous measure of groups whose goal is to maintain the status quo or seek a shift in 
policy. These groups seek to influence change inside a state but do not want to overthrow 
the existing regime nor establish a new political order. Table 8 shows that the majority of 
terrorist groups had anti-system limited goals (69 percent) followed by anti-system 


















Organizational Size was a 5-point ordinal measure of the estimated peak number 
of members in the organization (0 = 0-99 or low confidence; 1 = 100-999; 2 = 1,000-
4,999; 3 = 5,000-9,999; 4 = 10,000 or more).16 This approach to examining organization 
size is similar to that of Jones and Libicki (2008) and Asal and Rethemeyer (2008). Table 
9 shows that the average organizational size for the terrorist groups in LEADIR was 1.42, 
suggesting that most groups are relatively small with between 100 to 999 members. 
Organizational Age was a continuous variable measuring the number of years each 
terrorist group had been in existence. For terrorist groups that are still active, 2017 was 
coded as their most recent year. For instance, the New People’s Army was founded in 
1969 and is still active today, making their organizational age is 49 years. There were 
four outliers including the Karen National Union and the militant wings of the Awami 
League, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, and the Muslim Brotherhood. These historically 
 
16 Low confidence suggests that there was limited evidence regarding the group’s size. When information 
does not exist regarding the number of members in a group, they are typically small.  
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Group Control Variables 
Variable Mean (SD) Min  Max 
Ideology    
Religious .50 (.50) 0 1 
Ethnonationalist .49 (.50) 0 1 
Left-Wing .10 (.32) 0 1 
Other .10 (.30) 0 1 
Goals    
Anti-System Expansive .23 (.42) 0 1 
Anti-System Limited .69 (.47) 0 1 
Within-System .08 (.29) 0 1 
Organizational Size 1.42 (1.27) 0 4 
Organizational Age 15.93 (15.71) 1 59 
State Sponsorship .22 (.42) 0 1 
Alliance Funding .38 (.49) 0 1 
Drug Trafficking .14 (.35) 0 1 




political organizations were founded in the 1920s but have had individuals commit acts 
of terrorism on their behalf in recent years. To account for these four groups, I top-coded 
organizational age at the upper 99 percentile (59 years). Table 8 indicates that the average 
age of the terrorist groups in LEADIR is approximately 16 years old. 
Next, State Sponsorship was a dichotomous measure (1 = had state sponsorship) 
of whether the terrorist group received funding by a state actor between 2008 and 2017. 
Table 8 indicates that 22 percent of terrorist groups in LEADIR had a state sponsor. 
Alliance Funding was a dichotomous measure (1 = had alliance funding) of whether the 
terrorist group received funding from another terrorist group between 2008 and 2017. In 
total, 38 percent of the terrorist groups in LEADIR received alliance funding. Drug 
Trafficking was a dichotomous measure (1 = engaged in drug trafficking) of whether the 
terrorist group engaged in drug trafficking as a source of fundraising. Only 14 percent of 
the terrorist groups had evidence that they engaged in drug trafficking. Finally, I also 
controlled for the length of time groups existed during the study period. In other words, 
the variable, Power, measures the number of years each terrorist group existed between 
2008 and 2017 (see Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008). Given the timeframe, each group could 
have been exposed for one year to ten years. Table 8 indicates that the average exposure 
for each group was around 7 years.  
Analytical Techniques 
 
There were three main analytical techniques used in this dissertation: exploratory 
factor analysis, hierarchical regression modeling, and cluster analysis. In the sections 
below, I describe each technique and how they related to the research questions and goals 




Table 9. Summary of Research Questions in Relation to Analytical Techniques 
Research Question Analytical Technique 
RQ1: Which indicators of gang organization can 
be applied to terrorist groups to develop a 
classification schema of terrorist group structure?  
1a) Exploratory Factor Analysis  
1b) Cluster Analysis  
 
RQ2: Do terrorist groups that are more highly 
organized engage in more group level violence 
than less organized terrorist groups? 
 
2)  Hierarchical Poisson Modeling 
 
Exploratory factor analysis  
 
In the first stage of my analysis, I used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to 
explore the underlying dimensions of organization using the observed measures of 
centralization, formalization, interconnectedness, and complexity. EFA is an 
unstructured, data-driven approach used to determine the appropriate number of factors, 
and to examine which measured variables are reasonable indicators of those latent 
dimensions (Brown, 2015, p. 11). The goal of EFA is to reduce the total number of 
variables into a smaller number of factors composed of highly related variables (Baglin, 
2014). EFA is the most appropriate technique since I do not have a priori hypotheses as 
to the structure of the relationship between the dimensions of organization as they 
manifest in terrorist groups.17   
 In order to examine the underlying structure of the data, I use the PC software 
package FACTOR (Ferrando & Lorenzo-Seva, 2017; Lorenzo-Seva & Ferrando, 2006). 
Given that the measures of organization used on this study are either ordinal or binary, 
FACTOR is useful in that the EFA procedure can be based on polychoric correlations 
(Timmerman & Lorenzo-Seva, 2011). Polychoric correlation is an extension of the 
 
17 In contrast, Principle Components Analysis is not well suited for my analysis since it does not attempt to 
explain the underlying factor structure of the data nor is Confirmatory Factor Analysis, which is typically 





tetrachoric correlation and estimates the correlation between two variables measured on 
an ordinal scale (Baglin, 2014). Large datasets  (> 200 cases) are typically necessary 
when using polychoric correlations since it is calculated from the contingency table 
between the scores of two items, and the more response categories, the greater the 
number of cells that need to be filled (Ferrando & Lorenzo-Seva, 2014, p. 1171). 
Standard software packages (e.g., SPSS) estimate these relationships using the Pearson 
correlation matrix, which assumed that the variables are continuous and that a linear 
relationship exists between the variables. Researchers have shown that Pearson 
correlations underestimate the strength of the relationship between two ordinal variables 
and leads to biased factor loadings (Bernstein & Teng, 1989; Olsson, 1979).  
 In order to perform the EFA, the minimum rank factor analysis (MRFA) 
procedure was employed. The MRFA is beneficial in that it estimates the percentage of 
common variance and unique variance explained by the EFA model (Shapiro & ten 
Berge, 2002; ten Berge & Kiers, 1991). MRFA minimized the common variance that is 
ignored when only some factors are maintained (Lorenzo-Seva & Ferrando, 2006, p.89). 
In order to simplify the factor structure, an oblique rotation (i.e., direct oblimin) was 
performed. Following Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), an oblique rotation is preferred 
when the underlying factors produced by the EFA are correlated. More specifically, if the 
underlying factors are correlated at .32 or above, this means that there is 10 percent or 
more overlap in the variance among factors and oblique rotation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). Results from the unrotated EFA indicated that the factors were correlated above 





Cluster analysis  
 
Cluster analysis was used to classify units of analysis (i.e., terrorist groups) based 
in their similarity with respect to a set of variables (i.e., measures of organization). The 
goal of cluster analysis is to assess similarity based on a set of theoretically relevant 
variables.18 The benefit of cluster analysis is that it develops classification schemas and 
typologies that offer a unique form of theory building by organizing complex webs of 
cause-effect relationships into coherent accounts (Doty & Glick, 1994; Fiss, 2011). In 
order to develop the clusters, a two-stage clustering strategy was used (see Govender & 
Sivkumar, 2020 for review). First, I used Hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s 
clustering method to search for latent behavioral clusters among the terrorist groups. 
Hierarchical cluster analysis is an agglomerative clustering approach where each data 
point starts in its own cluster before merging with similar pairs of clusters resulting in a 
hierarchy. In other words, hierarchical cluster analysis is a bottom-up approach to 
clustering. The Ward’s minimum variance method is one of the mostly frequently used 
method for hierarchal clustering and is defined as the smallest increase in the within-
cluster sum of squares after merging of two clusters (Jolliffe & Philipp, 2010; Ward, 
1963). The primary benefit of the hierarchical cluster analysis is that it produced a 
dendrogram and an agglomeration schedule that can be used to define the optimal 
number of clusters (Govender & Sivkumar, 2020; Yim & Ramdeen, 2015). More 
specifically, dendrogram is two-dimensional tree-like structure depicting the sequence of 
nested clusters (Dubes & Jain, 1976). The distance between each division in the 
 
18 The general goal of cluster analysis is to group (i.e., cluster) a set of objects based in share similarities 
whereas the goal of factor analysis is for data reduction purposes. In other words, factor analysis is concerned 
with grouping variables as opposed to objects. Thus, while factor analysis and cluster analysis are similar in 




dendrogram can be examined to determine the optimal number of clusters. In addition, 
the agglomeration schedule identifies which point two clusters being combined are too 
dissimilar to form a homogeneous group. This is evident by the first large increase in the 
coefficient values and suggests the ideal stop point in the clustering process (Yim & 
Ramdeen, 2015).  
 In the second phase of the two-stage clustering strategy, k-means clustering is 
used to determine cluster assignments. K-means clustering is a partitional clustering 
method used to determine the initial cluster center based on the nearest centroid sorting 
method. After the centers are determined, the k-means procedure assigned cases (i.e., 
terrorist groups) to each cluster based on an estimation of the closest distance between 
that case and the center of the cluster’s centroid (Norusis, 1990). A cluster’s centroid is a 
compilation of a combined mean score across all variables clustered (for review and 
application in criminal justice research, see Terrill, Paoline III, & Manning, 2003). For 
this dissertation, each terrorist group’s combined scores on the measures of organization 
are compared with every other group, and those terrorist groups who are most similar are 
sorted into the same grouping or cluster. Terrorist groups do not have to be identical to 
one another in each cluster, but they are more like the organizations in their cluster 
compared to other clusters. 
 As illustrated by Govender and Sivkumar (2020), a two-stage clustering strategy 
is preferred since it utilizes the strengths of both clustering methods. First, hierarchical 
cluster analysis was used to determine the approprirate number of clusters. Second, k-
means clustering produces a flat clustering structure that is simple and efficient (Jain, 




analysis in this study, I used individual items as opposed to factor scores when 
performing the cluster analysis. Previous research has shown that individual items 
outperforms factor scores when using cluster analysis (Fiedler & McDonald, 1993). 
Before the two-stage cluster approach, each measure of organization was transformed 
into standardized z-scores to control for the unequal scaling of variables. Prior research 
has shown that the use of z-score is more effective and efficient compared to other 
methods when using k-mean cluster analysis (Mohamad & Usman, 2013).  
 As a supplemental analysis, I also examined the relationship between each cluster 
typology and the other group characteristics using Spearman Rank-Order Correlation. 
Spearman Rank-Order Correlation has been shown to improve power and limit error 
when using nonnormal data (Bishara & Hittmer, 2012; Zimmerman & Zumbo, 1993). 
Hierarchical Poisson regression 
 
Finally, in order to examine the relationship between the dimensions of 
organization produced from the EFA and violence, I used Hierarchical Poisson models in 
the HLM 7.03 (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, & du Toit, 2011). Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling (HLM) is a complex form of multiple regression used to analyze 
variance in an outcome variable with predictors existing at different levels of analysis 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). HLM is beneficial since it accounts for the shared variance 
in level-1 predictors (i.e., terrorist groups) across higher-order contexts. The higher-order 
contexts for this dissertation is the country in which each terrorist group operates. There 
is a large body of literature suggesting the country level effects influence violence (e.g, 
Fahey & LaFree, 2015; Gurr, 1970; Piazza, 2008; Sandler, 2014). In total, the 259 




account for the nested nature of data also risk inflating statistical power by failing to 
adjust the degrees of freedom to the appropriate sample size. HLM corrects standard 
errors by accounting for the nested nature of the data – producing a unique effect for each 
group (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). HLM also corrects standard errors by accounting for 
the clustered nature of these data and adjusting significance tests to reflect appropriate 




































 The results of this dissertation are divided in three main sections. First, I 
examined the underlying dimensions of organization using the observed measures of 
centralization, formalization, interconnectedness, and complexity using exploratory factor 
analysis. Second, I employ cluster analysis to classify terrorist groups based on the 
dimensions of organization found from the EFA. Finally, I utilized Hierarchical Poisson 
models to examine the relationship between the dimensions of organization and violence.  
EFA Findings 
 
EFA is an unstructured, data-driven approach used to reduce the total number of 
variables into a smaller number of latent factors composed of highly correlated variables 
(Baglin, 2014). In relation to this study, EFA is appropriate to examine how the 
dimensions of organization manifest in terrorist groups since I do not have a priori 
hypotheses as to the structure of the relationship between variables. The results presented 
below were analyzed in PC software package FACTOR (see Ferrando & Lorenzo-Seva, 
2017; Lorenzo-Seva & Ferrando, 2006) and the use of polychoric correlations to estimate 
the correlation between two variables. 
Table 10 includes the results of the EFA including the factor loading for each 
dimension of organization, eigenvalues for each retained factor, and the percent of 
variation explained by each factor identified. Prior to analysis, significant results on a 
Bartlett’s test (p <.001) and a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin score of .70 suggest that the data are 
suitable for factor analysis. Table 9 indicates that nine of the eleven measures of 




departmentalization and services, cross-loaded on both factors and were removed from 
the analysis for factor parsimony and simplicity. The two-factor solution explained 
approximately 70 percent of the variation in the level of organization in terrorist groups. 
Both factors had Generalized H-Latent Index and Generalized H-Observed Index at or 
greater than .80, suggesting that the items represent a well-defined latent variable that is 










The first factor shown on Table 10 was comprised of four items including deep-
level diversity (i.e., membership expertise), organizational training, combat training, and 
ideological training and explained 53.6 percent of the variation in organization. Based on 
the items retained, this factor was labeled: Structuring of Activities. Structuring of 
activities refers to the degree to which an organization has specialized sections (e.g., 
training) and formal procedures, and encompassed two organizational dimensions, 
formalization and complexity (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1968; Pugh & 
Hickson, 2007).  The second factor illustrated on Table 10 was comprised of five items 
including territorial control, leadership, centralization, interconnectedness, and uniforms 






Deep-Level Diversity  .59 .15 
Organizational Training .90 .11 
Combat Training .92 .01 
Ideological Training .94 -.11 
Territorial Control .14 .55 
Leadership -.11 .94 
Centralization .01 .94 
Connectedness .25 .69 
Uniforms  .08 .48 
Eigenvalue 4.83 1.47 




and explained 16.3 percent of the variation in organization. Based on the items retained, 
this factor was labeled: Concentration of Authority. Concentration of authority refers to 
the degree to which an organization has a hierarchical decision-making structure with 
limited unit autonomy, and encompassed two organizational dimensions, centralization 
and interconnectedness (Pugh et al., 1968; Pugh & Hickson, 2007). 
Next, Table 11 shows the descriptive statistics for both structuring of activities 
and concentration of authority dimension of organization. The values on Table 11 are 
based on the factor scores assigned to each terrorist group based on the results on the 
EFA. Each terrorist group’s factor score indicates their relative standing on that latent 
factor. For example, a factor score of 1.83 on the Structuring of Activities indicates a 
high level of structuring relative to other terrorist groups, while a score of -.20 would 
indicate a less than average level of structuring relative to other terrorist groups. An 
important finding is Structuring of Activities is significantly correlated with 
Concentration of Authority (r = .35, p < .001). This relationship indicates that terrorist 
groups with high degrees of training and member expertise (i.e., structuring of activities) 
are significantly more likely to have centralized top-down command-and-control, 




Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for Structuring and Authority 
Variable Mean (SD) Min Max r 
Structuring of 
Activities .00 (.89) -1.13 1.83 --- 
Concentration of 
Authority .01 (.98)  -2.06   1.97  .35
*** 




There are two primary reasons why the structuring of activities and concentration 
of authority are positively correlated. First, both the structuring of activities and 
concentration of authority dimensions are “structuring” characteristics of organizations as 
opposed to “structural” characteristics (Campbell, Bownas, Peterson, & Dunnette, 1974; 
Dalton, Todor, Spendolini, et al., 1980). In other words, both dimensions are related to 
the “policies and activities occurring within the organization that prescribe or restrict the 
behavior of organizational members” (Dalton et al., 1980, p. 51). Second, although there 
is debate on the relationship between structuring of activities and concentration of 
authority in organizational science (Child, 1972; Greenwood & Hinings, 1976; Pugh et 
al., 1968), both dimensions are necessary for survival in a malevolent context. Terrorist 
organizations with concentrated authority are typically more visible and subject to 
increased law enforcement actions. Subsequently, these organizations are more likely to 
have formalized training and rules to secure the loyalty and secrecy from its members 
(Shapiro, 2013; also see Best & Luckenbill, 1980 for application in criminal 
organizations).  
Structuring, authority, and group characteristics  
 
 To provide a more nuanced understanding of structuring of activities and 
concentration of authority dimensions, Table 12 illustrates the zero-order correlation 
between both dimensions and other group characteristics. Beginning with the structuring 
of activities dimension, Table 11 suggests that terrorist groups with high degrees of 
structuring were significantly more likely to be religious (ρ = .26, p <.001), large in size 


















Next, terrorist groups high in concentration of authority were significantly more 
likely to have anti-system limited goals (ρ = .16, p <.001), be large in size (ρ = .41, p 
<.001), be older (ρ = .25, p <.001), have a state sponsor (ρ = .29, p <.001), receive funding 
from a non-state ally (ρ = .20, p <.001), and engage in drug trafficking (ρ = .14, p <.05); 
however, they were less likely to adhere to other ideologies (ρ = -.23, p <.001). Finally, 
terrorist groups high in structuring were also significantly less likely to adhere to other 
ideologies including but not limited to anti-globalization, right-wing extremism, 
anarchism, and animal liberation (ρ = -.17, p <.001).  
Summary of findings: Structuring of activities and concertation of authority 
 
There are two underlying dimensions of organization in terrorist groups: 
structuring of activities and concertation of authority. These dimensions have theoretical 
implications for organizational theory and the terrorism literature. Importantly, overlap 
Table 12. Zero-Order Correlations Between Organizational 






Organizational Size .46*** .41*** 
Organizational Age .30*** .25*** 
Religious .26*** .05 
Ethnonationalist -.07 .10 
Left-Wing .01 .02 
Other -.17*** -.23*** 
Anti-System 
Expansive -.02 -.10 
Anti-System Limited .03 .16*** 
Within-System -.02 -.11 
State Sponsorship .14* .29*** 
Alliance Funding .16** .20*** 
Drug Trafficking .14* .14* 




exists between the dimensions of organization in terrorist groups as found in this study 
and research on conventional organizations. More specifically, using scales representing 
the centralization, formalization, standardization, specialization, and configuration 
dimensions of organizational structure, seminal researchers from the Aston Group 
research program found that two core dimensions of organizational structure were the 
structuring of activities and concentration of authority (Hinings, Pugh, Hickson, & 
Turner, 1967; Pugh et al., 1968; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1969; Pugh & 
Hickson, 2007). The structuring of activities consisted of variables related to 
standardization, specialization, and formalization whereas concentration of authority 
consisted of variables related centralization and autonomy (Pugh et al. 1968). Findings 
from this analysis indicate that similar underlying organizational behaviors -- structuring 
of activities and concentration of authority – also manifest in terrorist groups. Thus, 
despite the desire for secrecy, terrorist groups share common processes and 
characteristics in common with conventional organizations (Ligon et al., 2013; Shapiro, 
2013; Shapiro & Siegel, 2012; Volders, 2016). This commonality underscores the 
applicability of theories from organizational behavior (Jung & Lee, 2015) and industrial 
and organizational psychology (Hunter et al., 2017) are well suited to study terrorism. 
Although not explicitly discussed, there is evidence of these dimensions in existing 
terrorism studies. For example, Shapiro (2005) suggests that terrorist groups can be 
differentiated based on their centralization and interconnectedness – the two structural 
dimensions of concentration of authority. Likewise, Ligon and colleagues (2013) discuss 
how centralization and communication patterns (i.e., interconnectedness) vary together in 




centralization and a highly connected communication structure based on hierarchy, 
whereas organic terrorist organizations have low levels of centralization and 
unpredictable communication patterns based on the task. 
 The organizational components underlying the structuring of activities 
dimension, formalization and complexity, have also been discussed in the literature 
(Ligon et al., 2013; Volders, 2016). However, few scholars have examined them together 
nor elaborated on why they would underlie a single dimension. One reason why 
formalization and complexity vary together is that, as complexity increased, the need for 
improved communication through mechanisms of formalization such as policies and rules 
in needed (Basol & Dogerlioglu, 2014). As organizational complexity increased, the risk 
that some individuals or units became the sole proprietors of knowledge also increased. 
In turn, formalization is needed to improve organizational cooperation and collaboration, 
facilitate explicit and codified knowledge, and reduce ambiguity (Cohendet, Creplet, 
Diani, Dupouët, Schenk, 2004; Cordón-Pozo, García-Morales, Aragón-Correa, 2006; 
Pertusa-Ortega, Zaragoza-Sáez, Claver-Cortés, 2010). As such, the structuring of 
activities dimension reflects the need for formalization as organizational complexity 
increases. 
Next, results from the bivariate correlations analysis suggest that terrorist groups 
high in both structuring of activities and concentration of authority are more likely to be 
older, large in size, receive state sponsorship, receive funding from a non-state ally, and 
engage in drug trafficking. Similar to the life cycle of conventional organizations, 
terrorist groups become increasingly complex as they age and grow in size. In turn, there 




mechanisms as both size and age increase (Lester, Parnell, Carraher, 2003; Quinn & 
Cameron, 1983). Both state sponsorship (e.g., Byman, 2005; Carter, 2012; Hoffman, 
2006) as well as alliances with other non-state actors (e.g., Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; 
Asal, Ackerman, & Rethemeyer, 2012; Horowitz & Potter, 2014)  offer terrorist groups 
access to additional tangible (e.g., weaponry) and intangible (e.g., knowledge) resources. 
Thus, the need for structuring of activities increases as terrorist groups acquire 
specialization and as the labor pool available to the group grows. Concentration of 
authority is also necessary to efficiently and effectively redistribute resources such as 
weapons or funds within the group (Shapiro, 2013).  Last, drug trafficking is a complex 
operation requiring multiple actors within the supply chain (Benson & Decker, 2010; 
Morselli, 2001; Zaitch, 2002). In turn, concentration of authority is higher as the need for 
coordination and collaboration is greater for terrorist groups involved in drug trafficking. 
The structuring of activities is also greater in terrorist groups who engage in drug 
trafficking since a task-based division of labor is necessary to move drugs across the 
supply chain.   
One key difference at the bivariate level was that terrorist groups high in 
structuring were significantly more likely to adhere to religious motivations, whereas 
there was no significant relationship between concentration of authority and having a 
religious ideology. This likely reflects the processes by which many modern religious 
terrorist groups construct expertise (Bloom, 2017). For instance, some modern religious 
groups (e.g., al-Qaeda) have a large pool of recruits to draw from and develop expertise 
through on the job training, while others (e.g., the Islamic State) engage in “talent 




Windisch et al., 2018). Additionally, religious terrorist groups tend to have a built-in 
theological hierarchy and a global as opposed to geographically centered focus, which 
helps explains why religious groups are not significantly related to the concentration of 
authority dimensions (Kilberg, 2012). 
In addition, the bivariate results indicate that terrorist groups high in concentration 
of authority were significantly more likely to have anti-system limited goals, while there 
was no significant link between the structuring of activities and such goals. Terrorist 
groups with anti-system limited goals (i.e., regime change, territorial control) need public 
support to survive and achieve their goals (Berman, 2003; Siqueira & Sandler, 2006). To 
maintain public support and not alienate potential supporters, terrorist groups must show 
self-restraint and limit acts of indiscriminate violence (Sànchez-Cuenca, 2007). To do so, 
high levels of concentration of authority are necessary to ensure accountability and a 
shared vision among group members (Heger et al., 2012). Without a concentration of 
authority, units or individuals within the group are incentivized to act in their own 
interests as opposed to the collective goals (Abrahms & Potter, 2015; Shapiro, 2013; 
Shapiro & Siegel, 2007).  
While the previous results revealed the dimensions of organization that vary in 
terrorist groups, it did not tell us how such dimensions can be used to classify terrorist 
groups. Thus, the next section examines how the concentration of authority and structuring 
of activities dimensions of organization are related to unique terrorist structure typologies.  
Cluster Analysis Findings 
 
 A second goal of this dissertation was to develop structural typologies of terrorist 




employed. In the first stage, the individual items underlying the structuring of activities 
and concentration of authority factors were standardized into z-score and a hierarchical 
cluster analysis was used to determine the approach number of clusters. Recall that I used 
the individual items underlying both dimensions as opposed to the factor scores 
themselves since this approach is more effective at differentiating clusters (Fiedler & 
McDonald, 1993). The results of the dendrogram and agglomeration schedule were used 
to determine how many clusters should be used in the k-mean cluster analysis. The results 
from both the dendrogram and agglomeration schedule indicated that a five-cluster 
solution was appropriate (see Appendix B). Next, the number of clusters set at five and a 
k-means cluster analysis was performed. K-means clustering is a partitional clustering 
method and was used to assigned cases (i.e., terrorist groups) to specific clusters based on 
their structural similarities.  
 In the sections below, I describe the characteristics of each of the five terrorist 
group typologies (Tables 13-15). More specifically, Table 13 presents the results of the k-
means cluster analysis including the average cluster score for each measure of 
organization. Table 13 also shows specific differences between clusters on measures of 
organization based on post-hoc results from an analysis of variance. Table 14 shows 
descriptive statistics for the additional group characteristics (e.g., size, age, ideology) 
across the five clusters. Finally, Table 15 shows the zero-order relationships between the 
group characteristics and terrorist group clusters.  
Cluster 1: Informal-diffused 
 
 The first cluster shown on Table 13 was labeled: informal-diffused. In total, 59 




Liberation Front, the Baloch Liberation Army, the Conspiracy Cells of Fire, the Earth 
Liberation Front, the Indian Mujahedeen, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta, and the Sindu Liberation Army.19 Terrorist groups in the informal diffused typology 
were the least organized – particularly in terms of their concentration of authority. 
Informal-diffused groups were the least likely of the five clusters to hold territory, have 
leadership, follow a top-down command and control structure, maintain connections 
between members, seek expertise, or engage in organizational or combat training. In other 
word, informal-diffused groups are highly decentralized and cell-based.  
 Informal-diffused groups were significantly more likely to be small in size, 
younger, have “other” ideological motivations such as earth and animal liberation, far-
right, or anti-globalization, and have within-system goals (i.e., policy change, status quo). 
On average, informal-diffused groups had less than 100 members and were 
approximately 12 years old. Of the 59 informal-diffused groups, 29 percent had “other” 
ideological motivations, while 15 percent had within-system goals. Informal-diffused 
groups were also significantly less likely to have religious ideological motives, receive 
state sponsorship, or receive funding from another non-state ally. For instance, only 29 
percent of informal-diffused groups were religiously motived, 5 percent received state 




19 In addition, several of the Mai Mai milita groups also fit into the informal-diffused typology. We suspect 





Cluster 2: Simple structure 
The second cluster shown on Table 13 was labeled: simple structure. In total, 90 
terrorist groups (35 percent) fell into the simple structure cluster including the Al-Qaida 
in the Islamic Maghreb, the Anti-Balaka Milita, Ansar al-Dine (Mali), the Caucasus 
Emirate, Jahba East Africa, M23, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the 
New Irish Republican Army, Seleka, and the Sinai Province of the Islamic State. 
Compared to the informal-diffused cluster, terrorist groups in the simple structure cluster 
had relatively similar levels of organizational capital but significantly higher levels of 
cohesion. For example, terrorist groups with the simple structure cluster had significantly 
higher degrees of territorial control, leadership, centralization, interconnectedness, and 
uniforms compared to the informal-diffused cluster.  
















Stat. Sig (p <.05) 
Mean Diff 
(ANOVA) 
Deep-Level Diversity -.64 -.37 .49 .45 .95 1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 2:3; 2:4; 2:5 
Organizational Training -.64 -.64 .25 1.14 1.23 1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 2:3; 2:4; 2:5; 3:4; 3:5 
Combat Training -.72 -.53 .70 .85 .91 1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 2:3; 2:4; 2:5 
Ideological Training -.56 -.58 .74 1.09 .55 1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 2:3; 2:4; 2:5 
Territorial Control -.61 .04 -.56 -.21 1.47 1:2; 1:5; 2:3; 2:5; 3:5; 4:5  
Leadership -1.28 .52 .46 -.23 .47 1:2; 1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 2:4; 3:4; 4:5 
Centralization -1.35 .32 .24 .16 .91 1:2; 1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 2:5; 3:5; 4:5 
Connectedness -1.11 -.02 .68 .00 1.03 1:2; 1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 2:3; 2:5; 3:4; 4:5 
Uniforms -.74 .30 -.76 .80 .48 1:2; 1:4; 1:5; 2:3; 2:4; 3:4; 3:5  
Structuring  
of Activities -.65 (.22) -.66 (.24) .56 (.65) 1.10 (.53) 1.03 (.63) 
1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 2:3; 
2:4; 2:5; 3:4; 3:5 
Concertation  
of Authority -1.37 (.60) .33 (.54) .24 (.59) .10 (.66) 1.03 (.50) 
1:2; 1:3; 1:4; 1:5; 
2:5; 3:5; 4:5 
n  59 90 37  32  41  259 
The mean for all z-scored items is 0 and the standard deviation is 1.  




 When examining the group characteristics on Tables 14-15, the results suggest 
that terrorist groups in the simple structure cluster were significantly more likely to be 
smaller and younger. On average, simple structure terrorist groups had approximately 
100 to 500 members and were around 12 years old. Regarding ideology, simple structure 
terrorist groups were significantly less likely to have neither religious motives nor 
motives captured in the “other” ideological category. Of the 90 groups in the simple 
structure cluster, only 46 percent were religiously motivated while 4 percent had other 
ideological motives. It is important to note that a large proportion of groups in the simple 
structure cluster had ethnonationalist motives (52 percent) and anti-system limited goals 
(73 percent). 
Cluster 3: Divisional structure 
 
The third cluster shown on Table 13 was labeled: divisional structure. Of the 259 
terrorist groups, 37 (14 percent) fell into the divisional structure cluster including the 
Abdullah Azzam Brigades, the Baloch Republican Army, the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-
e-Taiba, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Afghan Taliban. Compared to the informal-
diffused cluster, divisional structure terrorist groups had significantly higher levels of 
structuring of activities and concentration of authority. Compared to the simple structure 
cluster, groups in the divisional structure had significantly greater levels of structuring 
but relative similar degrees of authority. For example, divisional structure terrorist groups 
had significantly higher degrees of deep-level diversity, organizational training, combat 
training, and ideological training compared to those in the simple structure cluster. In 




significantly lower levels of territorial control and uniform usage compared to those in 
the simple structure cluster.  
Tables 15 indicates that divisional structure terrorist groups are significantly more 
likely to be older and religiously motivated. The average age of divisional structure 
groups was approximately 21 years old while 65 percent of the groups in this cluster were 
religious. None of the other group characteristics were significantly correlated with the 
divisional structure at the bi-variate level. 
 
Cluster 4: Formal-professional 
 
 The fourth cluster shown on Table 13 was labeled: formal-professional. A total of 
32 terrorist groups (12 percent) fell into the formal-professional cluster including the 
Allied Democratic Forces, Boko Haram, Kata’ib Hezbollah, the Lord’s Resistance Army, 
the New People’s Army, the Real Irish Republican Army, Tehrik e-Taliban Pakistan, and 
the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition. Terrorist groups in the formal-












M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 
Organizational Size .66 (.90) 1.17 (1.17) 1.59 (1.32) 1.87 (1.13) 2.68 (.88) 
Organizational Age 11.83 (15.01) 12.22 (13.27) 20.57 (15.31) 21.75 (16.54) 21.27 (17.89) 
Religious .29 (.46) .46 (.50) .65 (.48) .72 (.46) .54 (.51) 
Ethnonationalist .41 (.50) .52 (.50) .32 (.48) .44 (.50) .41 (.50) 
Left-Wing .08 (.28) .13 (.34) .14 (.35) .09 (.30) .12 (.33) 
Other .29 (.46) .04 (.21) .03 (.16) .03 (.18) .05 (.22) 
Anti-System Expansive .31 (.46) .21 (.41) .22 (.41) .22 (.42) .17 (.38) 
Anti-System Limited .54 (.50) .73 (.45) .68 (.48) .66 (.48) .78 (.42) 
Within-System .15 (.36) .06 (.23) .11 (.32) .13 (.34) .05 (.22) 
State Sponsorship .05 (.22) .27 (.45) .16 (.37) .22 (.42) .41 (.50) 
Alliance Funding .14 (.35) .40 (.49) .41 (.50) .53 (.51) .54 (.51) 




professional cluster had significantly higher rates of organizational capital relative to 
those in the informal-diffused, simple structure, and divisional structure cluster. For 
instance, those in the formal professional cluster had significantly higher use of 
organizational training compared to the other three clusters. Formal-professional terrorist 
groups also had significantly higher levels of deep-level diversity, combat training, and 
ideological training compared to informal-diffused or simple structure groups. However, 
there were no significant difference in deep-level diversity, combat training, and 
ideological training for formal-professional groups relative to those in the divisional 
structure cluster. Thus, the key difference between the formal-professional and divisional 
structure clusters regarding organizational capital was the degree of organizational 
training.  
 Formal-professional terrorist groups were significantly more cohesive than groups 
in the informal-diffused cluster. However, there was no significant differences in 
cohesion levels between groups in the formal-professional cluster relative to the simple 
structure or divisional structure clusters. In fact, formal-profession terrorist groups were 
significantly less likely to have central leadership compared to the simple structure or 
divisional structure groups. Formal-profession terrorist groups were significantly more 
likely to use uniforms relative to the simple structure or divisional structure clusters. 
When examining the zero-order correlations, the results suggest that formal-professional 
terrorist groups were significant more likely to be large, older, and religious. Groups in 
the formal-professional clusters had, on average, 100 to 500 members with estimates 
closer to the upper end. Terrorist groups in this cluster were also an average on 22 years 




motivated. None of the other group characteristics were significantly correlated with the 
formal-professional typology at the bi-variate level.  
 
Cluster 5: Instrumental-rational 
 
 The final cluster shown on Table 13 was labeled: instrumental-rational. Of the 
259 terrorist groups, 41 (16 percent) fit into the instrumental-rational cluster such as Al-
Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Nusrah Front, Al-Shabbab, the Badr Brigades, the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Hezbollah, the Houthis, the Kurdistan Workers' 
Party, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Terrorist groups in the instrumental-
rational cluster were the most organized of the five clusters. Instrumental-rational 
terrorist groups had significantly higher levels of cohesion than each other cluster type 
and significantly higher degrees of organizational capital relative to all but the formal-
professional cluster. In terms of cohesion, instrumental-rational terrorist groups were 












Organizational Size -.35*** -.16** .05 .14* .43*** 
Organizational Age -.20*** -.16** .15* .17*** .15* 
Religious -.22*** -.05 .13* .17*** .04 
Ethnonationalist -.04 .12 -.10 -.01 -.02 
Left-Wing -.05 .04 .03 -.03 .01 
Other .35*** -.13* -.01 -.03 -.07 
Anti-System 
Expansive .10 -.03 -.01 -.01 -.06 
Anti-System Limited -.16 .08 -.03 .04 .09 
Within-System .11+ -.09 .02 .04 -.07 
State Sponsorship -.22*** .08 -.06 -.01 .20*** 
Alliance Funding -.27*** .03 .02 .12 .14* 
Drug Trafficking -.04 -.07 -.04 .05 .13* 
*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05; + p <.10 




significantly more likely to hold territory and follow a centralized command structure 
compared to all other cluster types. Instrumental-rational terrorist groups were also more 
likely to have central leadership relative to the informal-diffused and formal-professional 
clusters, more likely to be interconnected than informal-diffused, simple structure, and 
formal-professional clusters, and more likely to use uniforms relative to the informal-
diffused and divisional structure clusters.  
 Regarding organizational capital, instrumental-rational terrorist groups were 
relatively similar to groups in the formal-professional cluster. In other words, there were 
no significant differences between the instrumental-rational groups and formal-
professional groups on deep-level diversity, organizational training, combat training, and 
ideological training. Instrumental-rational terrorist groups were also relatively similar to 
divisional structure groups on indicators of organizational capital with the exception of 
organizational training. Instrumental-rational terrorist groups had significantly higher 
levels of organizational training relative to divisional structure groups. However, terrorist 
groups in the instrumental-rational cluster had significantly higher rates of deep-level 
diversity, organizational training, combat training, and ideological training relative to 
informal-diffused or simple structure groups.  
 Tables 15 indicates that instrumental-rational groups were significantly more 
likely to be large, older, have a state sponsor, receive alliance funding, and engage in 
drug trafficking. On average, terrorist groups in the instrumental-rational cluster were 
approximately 21 years old and included roughly 1,000 members. Of the 41 groups in the 
instrumental-rational cluster, 41 percent received state sponsorship, 54 percent receive 




Summary of findings: Structural types of terrorist groups 
 
There are two main findings regarding the structural types of terrorist groups. 
First, results from the two-stage cluster analysis indicated that there are five basic 
structural types of terrorist groups: informal-diffused, simple structure, divisional 
structure, formal-professional, and instrumental-rational. When organization is 
conceptualized on a continuum, the informal-diffused structure is the least organized and 
represent one end of the continuum. Terrorist groups in the informal-diffused typology 
are decentralized, lack leadership, and have very little functional differentiation nor 
formalization.  In turn, these groups sacrifice operational efficiency in order to maximize 
security. The informal-diffused typology is similar to the brand (Zelinsky & Shubik, 
2009), or market (Kilberg, 2012) structure found in prior terrorism research. Next on the 
organization continuum is the simple structure typology. Terrorist groups in the simple 
structure typology have are hierarchically structured with centralized leadership but lack 
functional differentiation and formalization. The presence of leaders to articulate a group 
vision, ensure accountability, and secure and distribute resources are a notable 
characteristics of simple structure groups. The simple structure typology has 
commonalities with the all-channel (Kilberg, 2012), tightly coupled groups (Jackson, 
2006), and simple organization structure (Ligon et al., 2013) described in the existing 
terrorist literature.  
In the middle of the organization continuum are divisional structure groups. 
Groups in the divisional structure typology are moderately centralized, highly connected, 
and invest in some types of training. Based on these characteristics, divisional structure 




(2001) and Kilberg (2012). In divisional structured groups, actors communicate and 
coordinate via a central node. These groups have a leader and functional differentiation 
between members but lack a hierarchical command-and-control structure. In the next 
position on the organization continuum is the formal-professional typology. Formal-
professional terrorist groups lack direct leadership and centralization but account for this 
through high levels of training and formalization. These groups share similar 
characteristics of organic organizations described by Ligon and colleagues (2013). 
Formal-professional groups are characterized by their mutual accountability and 
decision-making, knowledge and skills-based specialization, low degrees of 
centralization, and expertise-based patterns of communication. The key strengths for 
organic organizations are their diverse pool of resources and ability to develop creative 
and innovative strategies that come with having highly skilled members with few 
organizational restrictions. 
Finally, the instrumental-rational typology is the most organized and represents 
on the end of the organization continuum. Instrumental-rational terrorist groups have high 
levels of concertation of authority and structuring of activities. These groups share 
similar characteristics of mechanistic organizations (Ligon et al., 2013), hierarchical 
organizations (Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005; Zelinsky & Shubik, 2009), and the 
bureaucratic structure (Kilberg, 2012). Instrumental-rational groups are characterized by 
their top-down decision-making structure, function-based specialization, high degrees of 
formalization and centralization, and hierarchy-based patterns of communication. The 
key strengths of these groups are their expertise and human capital, efficient decision-




While the previous results revealed the dimensions of organization that vary in 
terrorist groups and such dimensions can be used to classify distinct typologies, it did not 
tell us how such dimensions nor typologies are related to violence. Thus, the next section 
examines the relationship between the dimensions of organization, the structural 
typologies, and violence.  
Terrorist Group Organization and Violent Outcomes 
 
Tables 16-21 presents the results of Hierarchal Poisson models (with the 
correction for overdispersion available in the HLM 7.03 software) (Raudenbush et al., 
2011). The Poisson-based regression model with the HLM overdispersion parameter is 
the “HLM equivalent to negative binomial regression” (LaFree & Bersani, 2014, p. 466), 
and models with the overdispersion parameter produce more accurate significance tests 
compared to standard models (Osgood, 2000). It should be noted that, although the multi-
level data set was created to adjust for problem resulting from the hierarchical data 
structure, the models presented in this dissertation are technically single level models 
since they only include measures at the group-level of analysis. I considered examining 
country level effects but results of the unconditional models discussed below in 
conjunction with my theoretical focus on group level effect did not warrant such an 
analysis (see Steiner & Wooldredge, 2014 for a similar approach).  
 The analysis proceeded in several stages. First, I estimated unconditional models 
to reveal if there was significant variance (p < .10) in each outcome at level- 1 (within 
countries) and level-2 (between countries). These models revealed non-significant 
between-country variance in the number of attacks on hard targets and the number of 




country variance for the number of victims killed, the number of hard targets killed, and 
the number of highly successful attacks on hard targets (see Table 16). It could be argued 
that the use of HLM is not warranted for the two outcomes with non-significant between-
country variance and another approach for analyzing clustered data (e.g., fixed effects for 
clusters, cluster-corrected robust standard errors) could be employed. However, Johnson 
(2012) argues that HLM is still the preferred method for examined clustered data since it 
clearly differentiated level 1 and level 2 effects, properly adjusts standard errors and level 
2 significant tests, and disaggregates the total variance in outcomes among levels of 
analysis (p 171-172).20  
 
20 It should be noted that, in hierarchical linear models, the unconditional model also produces estimates of 
the relative amount of variation occurring at level 1 compared to level 2. However, the Poisson HLM model 
does not incorporate a level 1 variance component in the usual sense, so it is not possible to divide the total 
variance between level 1 and level 2 units (Osgood & Anderson, 2004, p. 535). 
Table 16. HLM Estimates of Variance within and between Countries 
Variable 
Variance 
Component X2 df p-value 
Lethality     
     Groups overdispersion 712.05    
     Country means .84 97.09 49 <.001 
Reliability (.35)     
Hard Target Lethality     
     Groups overdispersion 343.79    
     Country means .74 72.29 49 .02 
Reliability (.35)     
Attacks on Hard Targets     
     Groups overdispersion 104.10    
     Country means .41 54.73 49 .27 
Reliability (.26)     
Successful Attacks on Hard 
Targets     
     Groups overdispersion 57.52    
     Country means .54 60.41 49 .13 
Reliability (.29)     
Highly Successful Attacks on 
Hard Targets     
     Groups overdispersion 9.36    
     Country means .94 77.62 49 < .001 





Each model was estimated using fixed effects for the group level measures. 21 I 
explored random coefficient models, but none of the level 1 slopes for key variables of 
interest significantly varied between countries in the full model for each outcome.22 This 
is likely due to the relatively small sample of terrorist groups (n = 259) resulting in the 
average cluster size of roughly 5 terrorist groups per country. Although past research has 
shown that the number of level 2 units is a more important factor in determining 
statistical power than the number of observations per cluster (Johnson, 2012; Raudenbush 
& Liu, 2000; Snijders, 2005), the small average cluster sizes limit the estimation of 
random slope variance. However, the relatively large number of level 2 units in this study 
(n = 50) limits the negative consequences for testing regression coefficients (i.e., fixed 
effects; Snijders, 2005). Furthermore, level 1 intercepts were kept as random to parse out 
the error variance in the outcomes that was attributable to between-country differences. 
Future research with a larger average cluster size samples are needed to better investigate 
the extent to which the characteristics of terrorist groups vary across country contexts.  
 Each measure was group mean-centered before being introduced into the model. 
Group-mean centering removes between-country variation in the measures of 
organization and group characteristics that might have corresponded with differences in 
levels of violence across countries. The benefit of group-mean centering is that it 
provides a more conservative test of level 1 effects (i.e., group level) by limiting the 
chance of finding spurious level 1 effects due to unmeasured level 2 effects that might be 
related to compositional differences in group characteristics across countries. The results 
 
21 Models are also referred to as “random intercept models” when all level 1 variables are “fixed” in the 
model. 
22 In addition, the magnitude of the coefficient for variables that did have significantly varying effects were 




reported are based on population-average models using robust standard errors. 
Coefficients based on population average models are averaged across the entire sample 
with estimated predicted probabilities for the whole population. Population average 
models are advantageous since they are based on fewer assumptions compared to unit-
specific models (Raudenbush et al., 2011). Finally, the use of robust standard errors 
limits misspecification of variance components by accounting for potential violations of 
model assumptions (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
Findings from Hierarchical Poisson Models 
 
 Table 17 presents the hierarchical Poisson regression analysis predicting the 
number of victims killed for each terrorist group between 2008 and 2017. Results of the 
fixed effects model suggests that terrorist groups with higher levels of structuring of 
activities were more lethal relative to those with lower levels. The concentration of 
authority dimension in a terrorist group did not have a significant effect on the number 
victims killed. Terrorist groups who were large, had expansive anti-system goals, or 
engaged in drug trafficking were significantly more likely to kill a higher number of 
victims. In contrast, older terrorist groups as well as those with within-system goals, 
ethnonationalist motivations, or state sponsorship were significantly less lethal from 2008 
through 2017. The effect of having a religious or left-wing ideology and alliance funding 
were not significant in the model. Taken together, the full model explained a considerable 















Table 18 presents the hierarchical Poisson regression analysis examining the 
number of hard targets killed. Results of the fixed effects model suggests that terrorist 
groups with higher levels of structuring of activities killed more hard targets between 
2008 and 2017 compared to those with lower levels. The concentration of authority 
dimension did not have a significant effect on the number of hard targets killed. Terrorist 
groups who were large, had expansive anti-system goals, left-wing ideological motives, 
or engaged in drug trafficking killed a significantly higher number of hard targets. 
Terrorist groups who were older, had within-system goals, had ethnonationalist motives, 
or those with state sponsorship were significantly less likely to kill hard targets during the 
ten-year period from 2008 through 2017. Religious ideological motives and alliance 
funding were non-significant in the model. Finally, the full model explained a 
considerable amount of the within-country variation for lethality against hard targets 
(pseudo R2 = .82). 
Table 17. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Lethality 
Variable b  se ERR 
Structuring of Activities .47*** .12 1.60 
Concentration of Authority .04 .13 1.04 
Organizational Size .40*** .10 1.48 
Organizational Age -.04*** .01 .96 
Anti-System Expansive .55* .28 1.73 
Within-System -1.11*** .31 .33 
Religious -.32 .18 .76 
Ethnonationalist -1.20*** .24 .30 
Left-Wing .21 .18 1.23 
State Sponsorship -.98*** .34 .38 
Alliance Funding -.02 .25 .97 
Drug Trafficking .82*** .30 2.27 
Power .26*** .05 1.30 
Intercept 4.35*** .19 77.23 
Reliability .57     
Proportion variation  
within countries explained .79   
*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05 
ERR = Event Rate Ratio 
Note: Maximum likelihood coefficients (and robust standard errors) reported from hierarchical 


























Table 19 presents the hierarchical Poisson regression analysis examining the 
number of attacks on hard targets. Results of the fixed effects model suggests that higher 
scores on the concentration of authority dimension were significantly linked to greater 
frequency of attacks on hard targets. The structuring of activities dimension had no 
significant influence the number of times terrorist groups attacked hard targets. Terrorist 
groups who were large, had left-wing ideological motives, received alliance funding, or 
engaged in drug trafficking had a significantly higher number of attacks on hard targets. 
Terrorist groups who were older or those with within-system goals were had a significantly 
lower number of attacks on hard targets. The effect of expansive anti-system goals, 
religious or ethnonationalist motives, or state sponsorship were non-significant in the 
model. The collection of covariates in the full model explained a considerable amount of 
the within-country variation for the number of attacks on hard targets (pseudo R2 = .79). 
Table 18. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Hard Targets Lethality 
Variable b  se ERR 
Structuring of Activities .51*** .18 1.67 
Concentration of 
Authority .10 .11 1.11 
Organizational Size .32** .12 1.38 
Organizational Age -.04*** .01 .96 
Anti-System Expansive .54** .21 1.71 
Within-System -1.62*** .30 .20 
Religious -.43 .22 .65 
Ethnonationalist -1.28** .30 .28 
Left-Wing .75*** .24 2.13 
State Sponsorship -1.18*** .34 .30 
Alliance Funding .03 .23 1.02 
Drug Trafficking .91*** .28 2.49 
Power .31*** .06 1.36 
Intercept 3.24*** .19 25.61 
Reliability .55     
Proportion variation 
within countries explained .82   
*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05 
ERR = Event Rate Ratio 
















Table 20 presents the hierarchical Poisson regression analysis examining the 
number of successful attacks on hard targets. Results of the fixed effects model suggests 
that higher degrees of concentration of authority were significantly related to a higher 
number of successful attacks on hard targets. The structuring of activities dimension was 
not significantly related to the number of successful attacks on hard targets. Terrorist 
groups who were large, had expansive anti-system goals, had left-wing ideological 
motives, received alliance funding, or engaged in drug trafficking had a significantly 
higher number of successful attacks on hard targets. Terrorist groups who were older, had 
within-system goals, or received state sponsorship had a significantly lower number of 
successful attacks on hard targets. The effect of religious or ethnonationalist motives 
were not significant in the model. The collection of covariates in the full model explained 
Table 19. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Attacks on Hard Targets 
Variable b  se ERR 
Structuring of Activities .05 .11 1.05 
Concentration of Authority .26* .12 1.29 
Organizational Size .40*** .08 1.49 
Organizational Age -.04*** .01 .96 
Anti-System Expansive .52 .29 1.69 
Within-System -1.73*** .40 .18 
Religious -.23 .15 .79 
Ethnonationalist -.45 .32 .63 
Left-Wing 1.50*** .40 4.48 
State Sponsorship -.43 .32 0.65 
Alliance Funding .42*** .14 1.52 
Drug Trafficking .72*** .31 2.04 
Power .19*** .05 1.21 
Intercept 2.59*** .14 13.36 
Reliability .55     
Proportion variation within 
countries explained .79   
*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05 
ERR = Event Rate Ratio 





a considerable amount of the within-country variation for the number of successful 





















Table 21 presents the hierarchical Poisson regression analysis examining the 
number of highly successful attacks on hard targets. Results of the fixed effects model 
suggests that terrorist groups with higher levels of structuring of activities had a greater 
number of highly successful attacks on hard targets relative to those with less levels. The 
concentration of authority dimension had no significant effect on the number of highly 
successful attacks on hard targets. Terrorist groups who were large, had expansive anti-
system goals, or engaged in drug trafficking had a significantly higher number of highly 
successful attacks on hard targets. Older terrorist groups as well as those with within-
system goals, religious or ethnonationalist motives, or state sponsorship had a 
significantly lower number of highly successful attacks on hard targets. The effect of 
Table 20. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Successful Attacks on 
Hard Targets 
Variable b  se ERR 
Structuring of Activities .20 .11 1.22 
Concentration of Authority .24* .12 1.27 
Organizational Size .39*** .07 1.47 
Organizational Age -.04*** .01 .96 
Anti-System Expansive .61** .24 1.88 
Within-System -1.56*** .34 .22 
Religious -.14 .17 .87 
Ethnonationalist -.57 .27 .56 
Left-Wing 1.98*** .27 7.27 
State Sponsorship -.61* .31 .55 
Alliance Funding .41*** .16 1.51 
Drug Trafficking .71*** .26 2.04 
Power .22*** .04 1.24 
Intercept 1.77*** .15 5.88 
Reliability .59     
Proportion variation within 
countries explained .81   
*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05 
ERR = Event Rate Ratio 





having left-wing ideological motives or alliance funding was not significant in the model. 
Taken together, the full model explained approximately 81 percent of the within-country 

























Summary of findings: Terrorist group organization and violent outcomes 
 
The primary goal of this section was to examine the relationship between the 
underlying dimensions of organization and violence in terrorist groups. Terrorist groups 
with more structuring of activities were more lethal in general, more lethal when 
attacking hard targets, and had a higher number of highly successful attacks on hard 
targets. However, the degree to which a terrorist group structured its activities had no 
effect on the number of attacks on hard targets nor the number of successful attacks on 
hard targets. Based on these findings, I suspect that the relationship between structuring 
Table 21. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Highly Successful 
Attacks on Hard Target 
Variable b  se ERR 
Structuring of Activities .57*** .18 1.76 
Concentration of Authority .07 .11 1.07 
Organizational Size .38** .13 1.46 
Organizational Age -.06*** .01 .94 
Anti-System Expansive .79*** .24 2.20 
Within-System -1.42*** .35 .24 
Religious -.67*** .23 .50 
Ethnonationalist -.98*** .22 .37 
Left-Wing .31 .27 1.34 
State Sponsorship -1.22*** .28 .30 
Alliance Funding .01 .22 1.02 
Drug Trafficking .97*** .28 2.63 
Power .39*** .07 1.48 
Intercept -.63*** .21 .53 
Reliability .52     
Proportion variation within 
countries explained .81   
*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05 
ERR = Event Rate Ratio 
Note: Maximum likelihood coefficients (and robust standard errors) reported from hierarchical 




of activities dimension and violence is explained by enhanced expertise and human 
capital. Human capital at the group level is related to the training, experience, judgement, 
intelligence, relationship, and insights of individuals within the organization (Barney, 
1991). Researchers have long understood that human capital such as education and 
training plays in organizational success (Andrews, 1965; Becker, 1983; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Mincer, 1974). For instance, research has linked human capital to higher 
organizational commitment (Iles et al., 1990), innovative capacity (Selvarajan et al., 
2007), and overall performance (Dooley, 2000) in conventional organizations.  
In terrorist groups, human capital influences both the capacity to engage in complex 
actions and the efficiency of violence (Asal et al., 2015; Jackson, 2001, 2009). For 
example, terrorist groups with higher degree of human capital may have people with the 
technical skills to construct sophisticated explosives (Jackson, 2009). In turn, these 
terrorist groups are generally more lethal since they have the capacity to develop 
weapons that are highly destructive. There is also evidence that human capital influences 
the effectiveness of violence against hard targets (Asal et al., 2015). From this 
perspective, human capital has little influence of the frequency of attacks on hard targets. 
However, terrorist groups with high levels of human capital have a greater destructive 
capacity when attacking hard targets compared to those with limited capital.  
The accumulation of organization-specific knowledge that is typically codified and 
generated within the organization also increases intra-group cooperation and 
collaboration (Atkeson & Kehoe, 2005; Carmona-Lavado, Cuevas-Rodriguez & Cabello- 
Medina, 2010; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). This type 




when people go home at night (Youndt et al., 2004). In terrorist groups, training through 
indoctrination processes and relationship building exercises maximize group cohesion, 
solidarity, and loyalty (Hegghammer, 2006; Jung & Lee, 2015). In turn, group-specific 
training improves accountability and the agenda setting capacity of the group. 
Next, terrorist groups with greater concentration of authority had a higher number 
of attacks on hard targets and a higher number of success on hard targets. However, 
concentration of authority had no significant effect on the number of victims killed, the 
number of hard targets killed, nor the number of highly successful attacks on hard targets. 
Based on these findings, I suspect that there are two mechanisms that explain the 
relationship between structuring of activities dimension and violence. First, terrorist 
groups with more concentrated authority have increased membership accountability 
(Heger et al., 2012).  In other words, hierarchical terrorist groups have a system of 
rewards and punishments in place to minimize neglectful member behaviors. This is 
closely tied to Shapiro’s (2013) work on the necessity of bureaucratic control 
mechanisms in terrorist organization. Drawing on internal documents collected from Al 
Qaeda in Iraq, Shapiro shows that bureaucracy is necessary in terrorist groups to reduce 
the agency afforded to lower level members. Accountability is especially important for 
terrorist groups seeking to attack hard targets since there is a greater risk of direct 
confrontation and operational failure (Asal et al., 2015; Koehler-Derrick & Milton, 
2019). Without the rewards and punishments associated with hierarchically structured 
groups, members are likely to act in their own interests when faced with adversity and 




Second, terrorist groups with strong concentration of authority have a strong 
agenda-setting capacity. In other words, “there is a clear point at which the flow of 
information and the agenda originate, with few (or no) legitimate alternative sources to 
distort or challenge the right to articulate the operational goals of the organization” 
(Heger et al., 2012, p. 747). Clear and unidirectional agenda-setting creates tighter, more 
cohesive relationships between the leadership and followers within a group. This is 
especially important given the internal agency issues faced by many terrorist groups 
(Abrahms & Potter, 2015; Shapiro, 2013). Members of terrorist groups vary in both 
levels of commitment and goals. Without such a strong agenda-setting capacity, low level 
members are incentivized to act in their own interests as opposed to the collective group 
goals (Abrahms & Potter, 2015; Shapiro, 2013). Leader’s ability to set the group’s 
agenda and articulate a strategic vision provides members with a distinctive and clearly 
defined identity with behavioral prescriptions in times of uncertainty (Hogg 2014) as well 
as a shared understanding of the ideal end state relative to the current problem (Mumford, 
2006, Mumford & Connelly, 1991). Reducing uncertainty and motivating followers to 
sacrifice personally for the strategic goals of the organization are especially important 
considering the elevated risk of failure when attacking hard targets.  
Summary of findings: Additional group characteristics and violent outcomes 
 
While the dimensions of organization were the focus of my analysis, findings from 
the group level control variables also offer implications for terrorism research. Below, I 
discuss six central findings. First, organizational size and drug trafficking were 
significantly related to violence across all five models. In relation to organizational size, 




the human capital (i.e., knowledge, skills, experience, and training possessed both 
individually and collectively by group members) to sustain violent campaigns and the 
necessary expertise to successfully attack hard targets compared to smaller groups (Asal 
& Rethmeyer, 2008; Pearson et al., 2017). Second, large terrorist groups are less risk 
averse given their sheer manpower and ability to absorb the losses of engaging in large 
scale attacks especially on harden targets. For example, Koehler-Derrick and Milton 
(2019) found that, the larger the terrorist group, the more likely they are to use firearms 
as opposed to explosives in their attack portfolio. To be effective, firearms require a close 
proximity between the perpetuator and the intended victim increasing the risk of direct 
confrontation between both actors. Large terrorist groups have a higher tolerance for the 
risk associated with attacks using firearms since they can replace fallen members at a 
lower cost (Koehler-Derrick & Milton, 2019, p. 914).  
Concerning drug trafficking, terrorist groups who traffic drugs are more violence 
across all five outcomes. There are both direct and indirect effects that involvement in 
illicit drug markets have on terrorist groups (for review see Omelicheva & Markowitz, 
2019; Piazza, 2012). For example, drug trafficking generates enormous revenue for 
terrorist groups. Recent estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(2017) indicates that armed groups raised roughly $150 million in 2016 from the Afghan 
illicit opiate trade. This revenue is then available for terrorist groups to purchase weapons 
and pay for training, ultimately increasing their tactical sophistication and destructive 
capacity. Another direct effect occurs when terrorist groups use violence to protect their 
illicit drug markets against uncooperative government officals. Drug trafficking is a 




manpower to protect their drug markets. In terms of indirect effects, the presence of illicit 
drug markets weakens the state and their ability to conduct counterterrorism operations. 
Drug trafficking enables other illicit markets (e.g., weapons, money laundering, human 
trafficking) and places additional burden on state security and law enforcement. Since 
terrorism often occurs in socially disadvantaged states with weak domestic security 
(Piazza, 2008), drug trafficking increases the scope of criminal activities and limits the 
resources that could be used to combat terrorism (Omelicheva & Markowitz, 2019; 
Piazza, 2012).  
The second key finding is that organizational age was significant and negative 
across each of the five violent outcome models. Past research on the effects of 
organizational age and violence have largely been mixed. While some scholars argue that 
older organizations are more violent because they learn from past experiences and 
acquire knowledge that increases chances of successful violent performances (Asal et al., 
2012; Chermak, Freilich, & Suttmoeller, 2013; Ranger-Moore, 1997), other researchers 
have found that organizational age does not have an effect or has an inverse effect on 
violence (Asal & Rethemeyer 2008). I suspect older terrorist organizations are less 
violent in general and less violent against hard targets for two reasons. First, older 
terrorist groups and their leadership do not want to face the “strategic fallout” from 
highly lethal attacks (Abrahms & Potter, 2015, p. 316). Second, older terrorist groups are 
more likely to conserve and not utilize the resources they have developed across their life 
course. In other words, as organizations age, they become more risk-averse and do not 




Next, the third finding is that terrorist groups who receive state sponsorship are 
less lethal when attacking hard targets. This finding is consistent with prior research 
showing that state sponsored terrorist groups are generally less violent (Asal & 
Rethemeyer, 2008; Simon & Benjamin, 2001). Although state sponsorship provides 
terrorist groups with increased firepower, funding, and training, state sponsorship also 
creates a “state restraint” effect for terrorist groups. Through this lens, state sponsors 
restrict the activity of terrorist groups to avoid retaliation (Simon & Benjamin, 2001). 
The state restraint effect is likely even greater for terrorist groups attacking hard targets 
since targets such as police or military are a direct representation of the state (Gibbs, 
2013). Violence against hard targets might exacerbate direct interstate conflict compared 
to other target types.   
Fourth, terrorist group goals had a profound influence on violence. This is 
consistent with Crenshaw’s (1981) argument that terrorist groups serve a variety of goals, 
which are often linked to the group’s strategy. More specifically, I found that terrorist 
group’s that had within-system goals were negatively related to each of the five violence 
indicators, while groups with expansive anti-system goals were generally more lethal, 
more lethal when attacking hard targets, and more successful at attacking hard targets. 
The relationship between within-system goals and violence is straightforward. For 
example, several terrorist groups with goals of policy change did not endorse 
interpersonal violence (e.g., Animal Liberation Front, Earth Liberation Front). Similarly, 
others such as the Niger Delta Avengers and Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta preferred economic damage compared to interpersonal violence. In addition, 




with the existing government such as Ranvir Sena, the Right Sector (Ukraine), and 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad. For these groups, there is little reason to attack targets affiliated 
with the state (e.g., police, military) since they support the same interests, and 
indiscriminate violence would be counterproductive as it would bring increased pressure 
on the government in which they support.  
In contrast, violence in general and against hard targets were greater for terrorist 
groups with expansive anti-system goals. Similar to Piazza (2009a) labeling of 
“universal/abstract groups,” terrorist groups in this category sought to establish an empire 
such as  the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and their affiliates as well as groups seeking a social 
revolution such as the Conspiracy Cells of Fire, Informal Anarchist Federation, and 
Pagan Sect of the Mountain. On a surface level, terrorist groups with empire and social 
revolutionary goals are very different. The key commonality is both goal structures are 
highly abstract and complex posing few limits on the types of violence groups can engage 
in against a variety of targets. Violence committed by terrorist groups with expansive 
anti-system goals is often communicative as opposed to instrumental and viewed as a 
form of signaling (Hoffman & McCormick, 2004; Loadenthal, 2017; Piazza, 2009a). In 
turn, highly lethal attacks are an important tool for terrorist groups with expansive anti-
system goals to grab media attention and communicate their message to a large audience. 
Attacks on hard targets are also important for terrorist groups with expansive goals. For 
example, hard targets represent apostate regimes and foreign occupants of Muslim lands 
for terrorist groups with expansive goals of establishing a Caliphate (Piazza, 2009a). 




interests (e.g., capitalism, globalization) for terrorist groups with expansive goals of 
creating a social revolution (Loadenthal, 2017).  
Fifth, ideology had little effect on violence in ways that are typically theorized. 
More specifically, we did not find that religious or ethnonationist terrorist groups were 
more lethal in general nor against hard targets (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; 
Juergensmeyer, 2003; Tilly, 2003). I suspect this finding is due to the influence of goal 
structure as opposed to ideology on lethality. For example, Piazza (2009a) found that 
Islamic terrorist groups were no more likely than non-Islamic groups to commit high 
casualty attacks after controlling for groups’ affiliation with al-Qaeda (p. 72). In addition, 
Piazza (2009a) found that the inclusion of a measure of universal/abstract goals reduced 
the effect size of Islamic terrorist group on high casualty attacks. Both the affiliation with 
al-Qaeda measure and the universal/abstract goals measure are similar to the anti-system 
expansive goals variables presented here, offering a potential explanation of why I did 
not find a significant effect for religiously motivated groups.  
One caveat of the relationship between ideology and violence is the finding that 
left-wing groups killed more hard targets, attacked hard targets at a higher rate, and did 
so successfully. There are two reasons that explain this relationship. First, the underlying 
ideology of far-left groups (e.g., Marxist-Leninist, Maoist) is framed around a utopian or 
egalitarian future with the current regime being the primary obstacle to reaching such 
goals (Forrest, 2019, p.162). In turn, violence committed by left-wing groups is often 
directed at hard targets such as police and other actors in the criminal justice system, 
military personnel and installations, and politicians.  By attacking hard targets, the goal is 




cause and mobilize the population. Second, many of the most effect and long-standing 
far-left terrorist groups such as the New People’s Army, the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Columbia, and the Communist Party of India-Maoist provide services to underserved 
communities often located in stateless areas (Piazza, 2009b). In turn, these groups can 
establish a territorial network to launch attacks on police and military patrols in these 
stateless communities.  
Finally, terrorist groups who received funding from a non-state ally were 
significantly more likely to attack hard targets and do so successfully. Terrorist groups 
who receive support from a non-state ally have improved resources and operational 
capabilities compared to those who do not receive support (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; 
Horowitz & Potter, 2014). In other words, terrorist groups who receive alliance funding 
have access to better tactical information and weaponry. Collaborations between groups 
also provides the opportunity to develop new skills and transmit knowledge and expertise 
(see Horowitz & Potter, 2014 for review across conventional and malevolent 
organizations). Access to enhanced resources would not only allow terrorist groups to 
attack hard targets more often but also do so more effectively. Admittedly, the binary 
measure of alliance funding used in this study is not as direct nor elaborate of a measure 
of terrorist group alliances as used in other studies (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Horowitz 
& Potter, 2014). Perhaps this is why I did not find a significant relationship between 
alliance funding and the lethality of terrorist groups. Based on the results of this study, 
future research should examine the relationship between terrorist group alliances and 





Terrorist Group Types and Violent Outcomes 
 
Finally, Table 22 presents the hierarchical Poisson regression analysis examined 
each of the five violent outcomes with the cluster types as the main predictor variables. 
The focus of this section is on the cluster type and their relationship to violence. The only 
difference between these models and the hierarchical Poisson regression models 
presented in previous section is that the key predictor variables are the cluster types as 
opposed to the dimension of organization. Given these marginal differences, I combined 
the models into a single table and my discussion focuses on the influence of each cluster 
type on violence. In other words, I do not discuss the group level controls since their 
relationship to the violence outcomes do not substantively change relative to the results 
previously discussed. Beginning with Model 1, the results suggest that simple structure, 
formal-professional, and instrumental-rational terrorist groups were significantly more 
lethal than informal-diffused groups. There were no significant differences in lethality 
between divisional structure groups and informal-diffused groups.  
Model 2 indicates that formal-professional and instrumental-rational terrorist 
groups significantly killed a greater number of hard targets compared to informal-
diffused groups. Simple structure and divisional structure groups had no significant effect 
on the number of hard targets killed relative to informal-diffused groups. The results from 
Model 3 suggest that simple structure, formal-professional, and instrumental-rational 
terrorist groups had a significantly higher number of attacks on hard targets compared to 
informal-diffused groups. The relationship between divisional structure groups and the 






Next, Model 4 indicates that simple structure, formal-professional, and 
instrumental-rational terrorist groups had a significantly higher number of successful 
attacks on hard targets compared to informal-diffused groups. The relationship between 
divisional structure groups and the number of successful attacks on hard targets was non-
significant. Finally, Model 5 suggests that formal-professional and instrumental-rational 
terrorist groups had a significantly higher number of highly successful attacks on hard 
targets compared to informal-diffused groups. Simple structure and divisional structure 
groups had no significant effect on the number of highly successful attacks on hard 
targets relative to informal-diffused groups. 
 
 
Table 22. Fixed Effects Models Predicting Violent Outcomes by Cluster Type 







Attacks on HT 
DV: Successful 
Attacks on HT 
DV: Highly Successful 
Attacks on HT 
b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) 
Simple Structure1 .67 (.27)** .13 (.24) .58 (.19)*** .46 (.21)* .06 (.26) 
Divisional Structure .59 (.31) .12 (.39) .15 (.28) .09 (.26) .13 (.41) 
Formal-Professional  .94 (.26) *** .64 (.28)* .62 (.24)*** .57 (.20)*** .68 (.30)* 
Instrumental-Rational 1.61 (.30)*** 1.20 (.37)*** 1.02 (.26)*** 1.18 (.19)*** 1.26 (.37)*** 
Organizational Size .40 (.10)*** .35 (.09)*** .38 (.07)*** .37 (.07)*** .41 (.12)*** 
Organizational Age -.03 (.01)*** -.03 (.01)*** -.03 (.01)*** -.04 (.01)*** -.05 (.01)*** 
Anti-System Expansive .58 (.30) .64 (.22)* .62 (.23) *** .71 (.18)*** .89 (.32)*** 
Within-System -.88 (.25)*** -1.36 (.29)*** -1.64 (.38)*** -1.34 (.31)*** -1.11 (.33)*** 
Religious -.12 (.17) -.29 (.22) -.27 (.16) -.06 (.16) -.60 (.24)** 
Ethnonationalist -1.25 (.25) *** -1.38 (.30)*** -.49 (.32) -.64 (.28)* -1.14 (.25)*** 
Left-Wing .17 (.22) .73(.26)*** 1.41 (.43)*** 1.88 (.29)*** .36 (.28) 
State Sponsorship -.97 (.32)*** -1.17 (.35)*** -.35 (.31) -.53 (.31) -1.25 (.27)*** 
Alliance Funding -.19 (.30) -.10 (.33) .36 (.19) .34 (.20) -.11 (.32) 
Drug Trafficking .92 (.28)*** .99 (.30)*** .79 (.35)* .85 (.21)*** 1.02 (.29)*** 
Power .23 (.05)*** .28 (.05)*** .19 (.04)*** .21 (.04)*** .37 (.07)*** 
Intercept 4.32 (.19)*** 3.26 (.20)*** 2.45 (.14)*** 1.77 (.16)*** -62 (.22)*** 
Reliability .56 .52 .56 .57 .50 
Proportion variation 
within countries explained .79 .81 .79 .80 .81 
*** p < .001; ** p <.01; * p <.05 
1: Informal-Diffused is the reference category. 




Summary of findings: Terrorist group types and violent outcomes 
 
The main finding from this section is that terrorist groups with higher degrees of 
organization (e.g., instrumental-rational, formal-professional) were more violent relative 
to those with lower levels of organization (e.g., informal diffused). As terrorist groups 
increase in structuring of activities and concentration of authority, their capacity for 
violence increases. This finding also supports previous research on gang organization and 
criminal offending (Bouchard & Spindler, 2011; Decker et al., 2008; Sheley et al. 1995). 
More organized terrorist groups have a greater capacity for lethal violence in general and 
against hard targets because they have the knowledge and skills to perpetrate highly 
sophisticated attacks relative to less organized groups. In addition, more organized 
terrorist groups have the control mechanisms in place (e.g., training in organization rules) 
to ensure accountability and commitment to tactical  
objectives (Shapiro, 2013). 
There are two caveats in the relationships between terrorist group structure and 
violence. First, there was no significant difference in the number of hard targets killed nor 
the number of highly successful attacks between simple structure and informal-diffused 
groups. I suspect this result highlights the importance of the structuring of activities 
dimension as opposed to the concentration of authority in the capacity to effectiveness 
attack hard targets. Recall that simple structure groups have high degrees of 
concentration of authority but low degrees of structuring of activities. Thus, while the 
concentration of authority provides a shared vision and accountability to ensure that 
lower levels members follow through with their objectives, the lack of training and 




simple structure groups are more likely to perpetrate attacks on hard targets but are no 
more likely to kill a high number of hard targets nor have a greater number of high 
successful attacks relative to informal diffused groups. 
The second caveat is that divisional structure terrorist groups were not 
significantly related to any of the violence measures.  This is unexpected, especially 
given that the Afghan Taliban -- one of the most violent terrorist group in the past two 
decades – fit this typology. One explanation is that divisional structure groups do not 
have the necessary training and expertise to make up for their general lack of 
concentration of authority. For example, formal--professional groups lack a concentration 
of authority as well but account for this through high levels of formalization and 
specialization. Despite the relatively high degrees of interconnectedness, divisional 
structure terrorist groups do not have additional control mechanisms in place to regulate 
the actions lower level members. Thus, members and units in the group focus on their 
own goals as opposed to the collective goals of the group. A second potential explanation 
is that divisional structure groups generally lack territorial control, limiting the degree to 
which they can plan and coordinate sophisticated acts of violence. For example, Volders 
(2016) emphasizes the importance of operational time and space in providing terrorist 
groups with the physical space to coordinate activities with relative security. Since many 
groups in the divisional structure typology lack territorial control, they are limited in the 












This dissertation sought to address two overarching research questions. First, 
Which indicators of gang organization can be applied to terrorist groups to develop a 
classification schema of terrorist group structure? Based on my review of the literature, I 
argued that the indicators of gang organization (e.g., presence of leadership, rules, 
division of labor) were linked to four core organizational dimensions including 
centralization, formalization, interconnectedness, and complexity. I used EFA to examine 
the underlying relationships between measures related to these four organizational 
dimensions in the context of terrorism. The results suggest that there are two higher-order 
organizational dimensions in terrorist groups. The first dimension, structuring of 
activities, encompassed indicators of both formalization (e.g., organizational training, 
ideological training) and complexity (e.g., background diversity of members). The second 
dimension, concentration of authority, encompassed indicators of both centralization 
(e.g., presence of leadership, uniforms) and interconnectedness (e.g., territorial control). 
These organizational dimensions are consistent with seminal research on conventional 
businesses (Pugh et al., 1968) suggesting these dimensions underlie both conventional 
organizations and criminal groups. This is important for two reasons. First, this finding 
supports the applicability of organizational theory to study terrorist groups. Second, it 
indicates the mechanisms that drive performance in conventional organizations also 
facilities violence in terrorist groups.  
In relation to the first research question, I also used measures underlying the 




typologies of terrorist groups. Results from a two-stage cluster analysis indicated the 
presence of five basic structural typologies including informal-diffused, simple structure, 
divisional structure, formal-professional, and instrumental-rational. These findings 
support the idea that like gangs (Thrasher, 1927) and conventional organizations (Pugh et 
al., 1968; Mintzberg, 1979), no two terrorist groups are alike. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
considerable overlap existed in the structural typologies found here and those in existing 
terrorism research. For instance, the instrumental-rational typology is similar to the 
bureaucratic (Kilberg, 2012) or mechanistic (Ligon et al., 2013) structure whereas the 
informal-diffused typology shares characteristics with the market (Kilberg, 2012) or 
brand (Zelinsky & Shubik, 2009) structure. This overlap provides some degree of 
external validity as to the typologies developed in this study.  
The second research question was: Do terrorist groups that are more highly 
organized engage in more group level violence than less organized terrorist groups? 
Results from Hierarchal Poisson models suggests that both the structuring of activities 
and concentration of authority dimensions were related to greater degrees of violence in 
different ways. Terrorist groups with greater degrees of structuring of activities were 
more lethal in general, more lethal when attack hard targets, and had a higher number of 
highly successful attacks on hard targets. Based on these results, I argue that the 
structuring of activities dimension is linked to human capital. Human capital, or the 
training, experience, judgement, intelligence, relationship, and insights of individuals 
within the organization, is developed through both training as well as recruitment of 
specialized individuals. Members of terrorist groups with high levels of human capital 




innovation capacity. Both types of capital are byproducts of the structuring of activities 
dimension, and they provide terrorist groups with the skills, knowledge, and abilities to 
successfully and efficiently carry out large scale acts of violence. In addition, members of 
terrorist groups with high levels training in internal organizational policies and rules have 
increased explicit knowledge, while the group has an enhanced organizational memory, 
cohesiveness, and intra-group cooperation. 
A second finding was that terrorist groups with greater concentration of authority 
had a higher number of attacks on hard targets and a higher number of success on hard 
targets. Based on these findings, I argued that the concentration of authority dimension is 
related to the regulation of members’ behaviors through accountability and agenda setting 
(Heger et al., 2012). Building on recent insights on principle-agent theory (Abrahms & 
Potter, 2015; Shapiro, 2013), high degrees of concentration of authority are necessary in 
terrorist groups to control and regulate member behaviors. Members of terrorist groups 
vary in both levels of commitment and goals. The bureaucratic mechanisms inherent to 
hierarchical groups, such as the presence of a command structure and organizational 
incentives and punishments, minimizes the agency afforded to members. In turn, these 
mechanisms also ensure that members are accountable for their actions. The presence of 
one or more central leaders with a strong agenda setting capacity is also an important 
function within the concentration of authority dimension. A strong agenda-setting 
capacity ensures tighter cohesiveness between the leadership and followers within a 
group, and it reduces uncertainty among members. Taken together, the presence of 




capacity increase the likelihood that the behaviors of group members are in the interest of 
the collective as opposed to the individual.  
In relation to the second research question, I also examined the relationship 
between the typologies of terrorist groups and violence outcomes. The results provide 
support for the notion that more organized terrorist groups are also more violent in 
general and better equipped to attack hard targets. For instance, the two most organized 
typologies, the formal-professional and instrumental-rational structures, had significantly 
greater levels of violence across each outcome relative to the least organized typology, 
the informal-diffused structure. Even after controlling for group characteristics such as 
size, age, and ideology, these findings provide further evidence that group structure is an 
important correlate of violent outcomes. 
Structuring of Activities and Concentration of Authority in Gangs 
 
 One of the main goals of this study was to use the gang organization research to 
inform how to measure organization in terrorist groups. However, what remains unknown 
is the degree to which the findings of this study relate back to the original gang 
organization literature. For instance, what evidence is there that the structuring of 
activities and concentration of authority dimensions exist in gangs? Relatedly, how can 
these dimensions be measured? Before moving forward, there are three key differences 
between this study and the research on gang organization to discuss including the 
dimensionality of organization, levels of measurement, and methods of data collection.  
First, there is debate as to whether organization is a unidimensional or 
multidimensional concept. The vast majority of gang researchers have utilized an index 




so, the assumption is that each item of gang organization is related to one another and 
measures a single construct. Pyrooz and colleagues (2012) is of the first to question this 
assumption and find evidence that organization is not a unidimensional concept. More 
specifically, Pyrooz and colleagues (2012) found that items commonly used to examine 
gang organization were weakly related to one another and to measures of delinquency 
and victimization across different datasets. For instance, the mean inter-item correlation 
coefficient between four measures of organization including the presence of a leader, 
regular meetings, rules, and insignia was .32, .35., and .40 across three datasets. 
Furthermore, the direction of each measure of organization was not positive in 
multivariate models predicting delinquency, suggestive that some characteristics of 
organization are not related to offending.  In contrast, Leverso and Matsueda (2019) 
argue that gang organization is a unidimensional concept. Using confirmatory factory 
analysis, the authors found that eight binary measures of gang organization loaded on a 
one-factor model with standardized loading scores ranging from .44 to .92. My 
dissertation supports the idea that organization is a multidimension concept similar to 
findings from Pyrooz and colleagues (2012) and research on conventional organizations 
(Pugh et al., 1968), more research is needed to unpack the underlying structure of 
organization in gangs and terrorist groups. 
Second, the level of measurement of the items used in this study were mixed (i.e., 
ordinal and dichotomous) while the gang organization literature relies solely on 
dichotomous measures. This is primarily a limitation of the existing gang organization 
research. As Pyrooz and colleagues (2012, p. 100) note “A limitation of this line of 




on gang organizational structure. This constrains the variability in the construct of gang 
organizational structure, reducing the likelihood of identifying statistically significant 
findings or identifying a latent construct of gang organizational structure. We recommend 
that future survey development introduce ordinal variables to measure gang 
organizational structure.” Thus, the multidimensionality of terrorist group organization 
may be a function of increased variability in the measures of organization used in this 
study. Future studies on both gangs and terrorist groups should consider adopting ordinal 
level measures of organization.  
Third, this study relied on secondary data sources coded by trained raters to 
examine the level of organization of terrorist groups. In contrast, research on gang 
organization typically relies on survey data collected from either former and active gang 
members (Decker et al., 2008) or law enforcement (Klein, 1971; Maxson & Klein, 1995). 
While data collected from active or former extremists would be optimal to examine the 
organization of terrorist groups, gaining access to extremists is an inherently difficult task 
(LaFree & Dugan, 2007). Furthermore, researchers have relied on survey data collected 
from law enforcement to examine the threat of domestic terrorist groups (e.g., Freilich, 
Chermak, & Simon Jr., 2009), however, this would be difficult in relation to the current 
study given that the majority of groups in LEADIR are international. The use of 
secondary sources comes with limitations that are important to consider. However, this 
approach is consistent with many of the existing data collection efforts seeking to sample 






Structuring of activities in gangs 
 
The structuring of activities dimension focuses on the extent to which terrorist 
groups have formal roles and procedures (i.e., formalization) and specialized sections 
(i.e., complexity). Unlike the concentration of authority dimension described below, the 
scalability of the items underlying the structuring of activities dimension in terrorist 
groups are limited in the context of gangs (see Table 23). For instance, there is limited 
evidence that gangs engage in combat training or have highly skilled members with 
specialized backgrounds. That said, there are both existing and new measures that could 
be employed to examine the structuring of activities dimension in gangs. For example, 
the presence of rules, norms, or codes with punishments for violators are important 
measures of formalization in gangs (Moule Jr. et al., 2014). Gang rules announce 
important organizational values and provide a means of forging consensus in gangs while 
a system of punishments increases discipline in the gang (Decker & Curry, 2000; Decker 
& Van Winkle, 1996; Thrasher, 1927). Gang rules and punishments are functionally 
similar to organizational and ideological training in terrorist groups. 
 In the future, a measure of whether gang members received combat or weapons 
training would be comparable to combat training in terrorist groups. Smith (2015) 
suggests there has been an increase in the number of military-trained gang members in 
the United States. The presence of military-trained members and the extent to which they 
share their expertise in military tactics or weaponry would be useful indicators of gang 
complexity. Finally, the presence of a division of labor or specialization of tasks in gangs 




example, specific roles in the gang related to handling finances, doling out punishment, 
or serving as a lookout would indicate a division of labor (Leverso & Matsueda, 2019). 
 
Concentration of authority in gangs 
 
The concentration of authority dimension emphasizes the degree to which terrorist 
groups have a hierarchical decision-making structuring (i.e., centralization) with limited 
unit or member autonomy (i.e., interconnectedness). Since much of the gang organization 
literature focuses on the degree of hierarchy in gangs, there are several available 
measures used in this study that also account for the concentration of authority dimension 
in gangs. For example, the presence of leadership or shot callers, the level of 
centralization, and territorial control are indicators of centralization commonly found in 
gang organization research (Bouchard and Spindler, 2011; Decker, 2001; Decker et al., 
1998, Decker et al., 2008; Densley, 2012; Maxon & Klein, 1995; Pyrooz et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the presence of regular meetings could be used to assess the 
interconnectedness of gangs (Moule Jr. et al., 2014) while the presence of insignia, 
designated clothing, or distinctive colors in gangs (Bjerregaard, 2002; Pyrooz et al., 2012; 
Sheley et al., 1995) is functionally similar to the use of uniforms in terrorist groups. 
Table 23. Potential Measures for both Dimension of Organization in Terrorist Groups and 
Gangs 
Structuring of Activities  Concentration of Authority 
Terrorist Groups Gangs Terrorist Groups Gangs 
Organizational 
Training 
Training in Group 
Roles Leadership Presence of Leader 
Ideological Training Training in Rules and Codes Centralization 
Levels of 
Membership 
Combat Training Weapons Training Interconnectedness Regular Meetings 
Deep-Level Diversity Division of Labor Territorial Control Territorial Control 






Findings from this dissertation offer three theoretical implications for the 
intersection of criminology and terrorism studies. The first implication is that this study 
highlights the importance of control mechanisms to regulate members behaviors 
corresponding with well-organized groups. Drawing on Weber’s (1946) theory of 
bureaucratic control, both the concentration of authority and structuring of activities 
dimension represent distinct yet interrelated organizational control mechanisms. Broadly 
speaking, Weber theorized that rational collective activities face two inherent problems: 
1) to ensure that individuals officially designated to exercise control actually direct an 
organization’s activities and 2) to ensure that decisions are made on the basis of the best 
possible information (Miller, 1970). To overcome these constraints, formal organizations 
become more bureaucratized and rely on administrative mechanisms for maintaining the 
organization and coordinating activities (Blau & Scott, 1962). Some of the prominent 
characteristics of bureaucracies are a hierarchy of positions and authority, a fixed division 
of labor, adherence to rules, expert training, administration based on written documents, 
and a full-time commitment to organizational activities (Weber, 1946; for review see).  
Based on these characteristics, control in the concentration of authority dimension 
is ensured through the hierarchical structures of positions and authority. Hierarchical 
structures of positions increased control and coordination by restricting free flowing 
communication with structural competent of the organization (Blau & Scott, 1962). 
Bureaucracies also formalize systems of control through a hierarchical distribution of 
authority. Individuals in positions of authority are able to exercise control especially 




issues a command, individuals under their influence are more likely to obey them since 
they have the “right” to exercise control (Miller, 1970). Taken together, the concentration 
of authority dimension enhances control through a strong agenda-setting capacity as well 
as accountability and obedience to an established executive order. This supports Heger 
and colleagues’ (2012) theorizing on why hierarchically structured terrorist groups are 
more violent as opposed to decentralized groups.  
Next, control within the structuring of activities dimension is increased through a 
fixed division of labor, expert training, adherence to rules, and administration based on 
written documents. First, a division of labor within an organization is a marker of 
specialization (Pugh et al., 1968). As noted by Blau (1970), specialization improves 
control and coordination in an organization by limiting the scope of activities and 
broadening responsibilities of experts. Similarly, expert training ensures control as 
individuals gain superior knowledge about the organization or acquire specific skills, 
which limits the scope of activities in the organization. Finally, as organizations become 
increasingly specialized and differentiated, they are more likely to develop standardized 
rules, regulations, and procedures. These impersonal control mechanisms are often 
formalized (e.g., written and filed) and become substitutes for direct executive control 
(Blau, 1968).  
 The importance of these bureaucratic control mechanisms is closely in line with 
recent developments on principal-agent theory and terrorist organizations (Abrahms & 
Potter, 2015; Shapiro, 2013). More specifically, principal-agent theory examines the 
difficulties (e.g., information asymmetry, differing goals) associated with situations 




terrorist groups, principal-agent difficulties are problematic for three reasons. First, 
terrorist leaders and foot soldiers often have different preferences over targets reflecting 
different goals or different means to similar goals. Second, terrorist leaders and foot 
soldiers have access to different information regarding the political value of targets. 
Furthermore, communicating that information within the group is costly and a security 
risk for senior leaders. Finally, when either the first or second problems emerge, the 
conflict of interest over targets between principals and agents makes it difficult to 
credibly communication which targets should be hit (Shapiro, 2008).  
To mitigate these issues, terrorist groups employ bureaucratic control mechanisms 
to reduce the discretion afforded to lower level members. For example, Shapiro and 
Siegel (2012) show how Al Qaeda in Iraq used standardized forms for tracking weapons, 
group funds, and affiliate groups, demanded regular reports from lower level members, 
and sent regular memos and meeting agendas. Abrahms and Potter (2015) also show the 
importance of leadership as a control mechanism. More specifically, when terrorist 
groups experience a “leadership deficiency”, members are incentivized to commit 
violence in their own interests as opposed to the larger group goals Thus, despite the 
increased security risk, terrorist groups rely on bureaucratic practices to reduce agency 
problems and protect their strategic goals. 
Taken together, the results of this study support and build on Shapiro’s (2013) 
work in two ways. First, my findings suggest that the concentration of authority and 
structuring of activities dimensions reflect to interrelated but distinct bureaucratic control 
mechanism. At one level, control in the concentration of authority dimension is based on 




strong agenda-setting. For example, leaders of the Sinjar organization frequently sent 
memos laying down administrative rules on how operative spent money (Shapiro & 
Siegel, 2012). Without such administrative controls in place, lower level operatives are 
incentivized to use group resources and perpetrate violence in their own interest as 
opposed to the collective interests of the group (Abrahms & Potter, 2015). At another 
level, control in the structuring of activities dimension is based on impersonal control 
where expertise and written rules, policies, and procedures guide members activities. For 
example, the Sinjar organization kept technical training manuals and ideological screeds 
to condition members to take favorable actions. There is also evidence that the 
organization required an application from members and kept track of foreign fighters to 
manage expertise and mitigate the actions of actors with an underlying preference for 
violence (Shapiro & Siegel, 2012). 
 In addition, this study builds on the principal-agent framework by suggesting that 
bureaucratic control mechanism, not only regulates members behaviors, but also provides 
coordinating systems for members to engage in sophisticated violence. The crux of 
Shapiro’s (2013) argument is that bureaucratic control mechanisms limit the discretion 
afforded to lower levels members and subsequently limits actions that are counter to the 
group’s goals. Another side of this perspective is that, when these mechanisms are in 
place, members are conditioned to take favorable actions and have the resources to 
successful to do so.  
The second broad theoretical implication of this study is that it highlights the 
importance of human capital in terrorist groups. For example, the structuring of activities 




while the concentration of authority dimension relates to how terrorist groups manage 
human capital.  In criminology, the concept of capital is not new as several researchers 
have advanced the concept of criminal capital (Loughran et al., 2013; McCarthy & 
Hagan, 1995, 2001).  Drawing on ideas on human capital and social capital, criminal 
capital refers to the knowledge and skills that can facilitate successful criminal activity 
(McCarthy & Hagan, 2001). Researchers have generally found a positive, significant 
relationship between measures of criminal capital such as criminal experience, 
specialization, and tutelage and illicit earnings (Loughran et al., 2013; McCarthy & 
Hagan, 2001; Morselli et al., 2006; Uggen & Thompson, 2003). For example, Morselli 
and colleagues (2006) found that individuals who received tutelage from a criminal 
mentor had higher illicit earning and lower chances of being incarcerated compared to 
those who did not receive tutelage. Uggen and Thompson (2003) found that criminal 
experience, measured by the total number of times an offender was arrested in a 36-
month period, had a curvilinear relationship with total monthly illegal earnings, while 
Loughran and colleagues (2013) found that investment in criminal capital yielded greater 
illicit returns in a sample of serious offending adolescents.  
Relatedly, research on criminal expertise has also shown that there are important 
cognitive benefits for offending when individuals invest in their criminality (Bennett & 
Wright, 1984; Nee & Meenaghan, 2006; Nee et al., 2019; Topalli, 2005; Topalli et al., 
2015;  Wright & Decker, 1994; Wright, Logie, & Decker, 1995). Experienced criminals 
are better at recognizing opportunities, responding to risk, and diagnosing environmental 
features that are conductive (or unfavorable) to crime compared to novices (see Nee & 




that, after viewing photos of residential buildings, active burglars were more likely to 
recall situational details about a building and its surroundings compared to a control 
group. Using standardized videos of short dyadic social interactions, Topalli (2005) 
illustrated that active street offenders focused on different perceptual cues related to 
victimization or target vulnerability compared to a control group. Nee and colleagues 
(2019) demonstrate that experienced burglars relied on “script-like knowledge” to locate 
high-value items relative to nonoffenders in a virtual environment.  In sum, research on 
criminal capital and criminal expertise suggests that offenders acquire specific perceptual 
and procedural skills, which facilitate successful criminal activity when they invest in 
criminal training.  
In the context of this study, the criminal capital and expertise frameworks are 
useful in explaining why some terrorist groups have the capacity to successful attack hard 
target and other do not. For example, successfully attacking hard targets requires both 
perceptual skills to identify vulnerabilities as well as procedural skills to exploit those 
vulnerabilities (Berman & Latin, 2008). The problem is that, like ideas on human capital 
(Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1974; Schultz, 1981) the overwhelming majority of research on 
criminal capital operates at the individual level. Thus, little attention has been given to 
criminal capital as a group level concept. Recognizing this limitation, recent theoretical 
advancements in strategic management and human resources have argued that human 
capital also operates at the group - or organizational level (Fagan & Ployhart, 2015; 
Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011; Ployhart, Nyberg, Reilly, & Maltarich, 2014; Ployhart, Van 
Iddekinge, & MacKenzie Jr., 2011).  More specifically, Ployhart and colleagues (2014) 




capacities based on individual knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics that 
are accessible for unit-relevant purposes” (p. 374). In other words, human capital 
resources focus on the accessibility of human capital for unit-relevant purposes and the 
capacities for producing outcomes whereas human capital focuses on the resources 
themselves. Consistent with the resource-based view, organizations rely on human capital 
resources to achieve a competitive advantage in a particular product market (Barney, 
1991) or competitive parity relative to other competitors (Barney & Wright, 1998).  
Based on these insights, there is reason to believe that criminal capital also exists 
at the group level. Building on the criminal capital literature in conjunction with ideas on 
human capital resources, I put forth the concept of criminal capital resources to refer to 
unit level capacities based on individual knowledge, skills, abilities, and other 
characteristics that facilitate successful criminal activities. There are two key differences 
between criminal capital resources and human capital resources. First, criminal capital 
resources are conceptualized as a collective construct while human capital resources 
operate at multiple levels of analysis. Second, criminal capital resources focus on 
criminal outcomes where human capital resources emphasize conventional markers of 
performance or productivity such as customer ratings of a unit’s hospitality, order, 
accuracy, product quality, and speed (Ployhart et al., 2011). In criminology and terrorism 
research, there are several unit level criminal outcomes worth examining, including but 
not limited to, lethal violence, target specialization or diversification, illicit earnings, and 
weapons usage. The point is that criminal capital resources are resources and capabilities 




Perhaps the best illustration of how to measure criminal capital resources and 
their influence on violence come from Asal and colleagues (2015). More specifically, the 
authors examined brigade level human capital in the Provisional Irish Republican Party 
using two proxies: the mean age of the subunits’ members and the proportion of subunit 
members who possessed professional training relative to bomb making. Findings suggest 
that the percentage of members with professional training increased the likely that a 
bridge killed a nonzero number of people with an IED especially in attacks on high value 
targets, while the age of subunit members had no meaningful effects. Put another way, 
professional training provides brigades with the expertise to selectively kill “those people 
they wish to kill” as opposed to indiscriminate violence (Asal et al., 2015, p. 20). Taken 
together with the results of this study, training appears to be an indicator of criminal 
capital resources.     
Last, the third theoretical implication is that this study provides insights into the 
ways in which criminal capital resources are developed or acquired. Drawing on Lepak 
and Snell’s (1999) human resource framework, there are two internalization strategies 
used to build human capital in business firms. First, businesses develop human capital 
through internal development. Internal development strategies focus on “making” human 
capital and building employee skills though training and development initiatives. The 
benefit of internal development is that firm-specific skills are nontransferable and internal 
development is less likely to result in capital loss (Barney, 1991; Becker, 1976). Second, 
businesses also develop human capital through acquisition. Acquisition strategies focus 




acquiring human capital is that firms do not have to further invest in development 
initiatives and have instant access to skilled employees.  
Based on the items retained in the structuring of activities dimension, terrorist 
groups acquire criminal capital resources through both a combination of internal 
development and acquisition. For example, measures of organization, ideological, and 
combat training are internal development strategies in terrorist groups. As noted by Jung 
and Lee (2015, p. 68), training of terrorist groups not only increased knowledge and skills 
but also facilitated indoctrination of their political or religious ideology and creeds.” 
Following Hegghammer (2006), it is likely that training in terrorist groups focus on four 
factors: violence acculturation, indoctrination, training on tactical and operational attack 
skills, and relationship-building with other members. Criminal capital resources are 
greater in terrorist groups who invest in training. Terrorist groups also building human 
capital through acquisition. For instance, the measure of deep-level diversity (i.e., 
background diversity of membership) is related to acquisition. Terrorist groups high in 
deep-level diversity have a heterogenous membership with individuals varying in 
characteristics such as educational attainment or specialized skills such as weapons or 
religious training (Windisch et al., 2019). While some of these skills can be internally 
developed, others cannot, suggesting that individuals developed these skills prior to 
joining the group. Although the deep-level diversity measure does not tease out whether 
these specialized individuals were acquired through traditional “top-down” recruitment as 
opposed to self-selection, there is evidence that terrorist groups engage in periods of 
targeted recruitment and talent spotting (Bloom, 2017; Hunter et al., 2017; Windisch et 




pragmatic assessments of their workforce and selective recruitment (Bloom, 2017). In 
other words, these groups seek to acquire specific criminal capital resources that cannot 
be addressed via internal development strategies.  
In sum, findings from this dissertation emphasize the importance of centralized 
control and criminal capital resources on performance among terrorist groups. In the next 
section, I discuss how findings from this study have practical implications for 
practitioners and those in the field.  
Practical Implications 
 
Findings from this study can be used to guide practitioners including law 
enforcement, the intelligence community, and policymakers as to which terrorist groups 
pose the larger threat based on their organizational sophistication and violent capabilities. 
For example, results from this dissertation suggest that certain group characteristics 
factors are linked to terrorist groups’ capacity to engage in complex violence. Using 
classified and unclassified sources, law enforcement and counter terrorism analysts could 
periodically assess these characteristics as evidence of a group’s increase (or 
diminishing) capabilities. For example, if a terrorist group establishes a network of 
training camps and begins a focused recruitment campaign, it is likely that they have an 
increased capacity to engage in highly destructive attacks on hard targets. If a terrorist 
group loses territory they once held and experiences a leadership decapitation event, it is 
likely that they have a reduced capacity to attack hard targets in favor of soft targets 
(Abrahms & Potter, 2015). Intel analysts could examine these group characteristics on a 
weekly or monthly bases, depending on the availability of the information, to provide a 




 From this perspective, characteristics of terrorist groups can be viewed as group 
level risk factors related to their capacity for violence. Risk factors involve different types 
of adverse conditions that increase the likelihood of delinquency and criminal behavior 
(Hawkins et al., 1998; Loeber et al., 1998; Moffitt, 1990; Simi et al., 2016). Consistent 
with the general theme of this dissertation, much of the growth of the risk factor 
paradigm has come from street gang research (Hawkins et al., 1992; Klein & Maxson, 
2006; Thornberry et al. 2003). For example, the backgrounds of many gang members are 
characterized by adverse family conditions such as domestic violence, sexual abuse, and 
neglect. In relation to this study, risk factors are those indicators of organization that 
increase the capacity of terrorist groups to engage in highly destructive, complex acts of 
violence. Although this study does not examine why ideological groups turn to violence, 
there is evidence that certain group characteristics predict the onset of violence (Asal, 
Chermak, Fitzgerald, & Freilich, 2020). This research coupled with the results of this 
study could be integrated into the risk factor paradigm to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the adoption and capacity of violence among terrorist groups. That said, 
research on group characteristics and violent outcomes is still relatively novel and much 
more research is needed to translate findings into policy.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 
There are five primary limitations of this dissertation to bear in mind. First, the 
LEADIR dataset relies on open source, secondary information for collecting and coding 
organization data. Although an increasing number of terrorism dataset based on open 
source data such as the BAAD dataset (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008), the Global Terrorism 




Database (Freilich et al., 2014), the Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United 
States dataset (Freilich, Chermak, Belli, Gruenewald, & Parkin, 2014), and the Salafi 
Jihadist Inspired Profiles and Radicalization Clusters dataset (Ligon, Windisch, Braun, 
Logan, Derrick, & Armstrong, 2019), there is the potential of reporting inaccurate, 
biased, or false information when using secondary data. Furthermore, given the 
polarization of terrorism, there is also the potential that government-censored information 
may influence results. To mitigate these issues, the LEADIR dataset only included 
terrorist groups with more than five attacks ensuring that there is an ample amount of 
information for each group to collect and code. Nevertheless, results of this study should 
be interpreted with limitations related to open source data in mind. 
Second, the LEADIR dataset includes terrorist groups with more than five attacks 
between 2008 and 2017. While this includes the majority of highly active terrorist 
groups, it does not include all terrorist groups. The removal of terrorist groups with less 
than five attacks likely leads to the removal of less durable – and potentially less 
organized groups. Perhaps the results of this dissertation and the influence of the 
structuring of activities and concentration of authority dimensions would be more robust 
with a more robust sample. The difficulty is that including terrorist with few attacks 
would make it increasingly difficult to examine markers of organization since the amount 
of open source information tied to a group is often linked to how often they perpetrate 
violence. Recall that LEADIR also does not include terror attacks perpetrated by lone 
actors or collectives without identifiable group boundaries. As a result, the 
generalizability of my findings is applicable to highly active terrorist groups with patterns 




violence. Third, since the LEADIR data are limited to a specific time period, I could not 
examine how terrorist group organization changes overtime nor how organizational 
changes influence violence overtime. Rather findings from this study highlight general 
patterns between the degree of organization among terrorist groups and violence during a 
10-year time period.  
Fourth, it was difficult to capture when a terrorist group started and ended. This 
limitation is not unique to this study and several terrorism scholars have emphasized the 
difficulty in capturing this information (e.g., Miller, 2016; Young & Dugan, 2014). In the 
LEADIR dataset, terrorist groups were treated as a different group if they rebranded, 
changed their name, or broke away from a larger group. For example, the Al Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI) and the Islamic State and the Levant (ISIL) are treated as two different 
terrorist groups. As such, ISIL was ‘founded’ in 2013 when they broke away from Al 
Qaeda. The drawback to this approach is that ISIL was well established in 2013 – in 
terms of resources and structure – given their relationship with Al Qaeda. However, 
ISIL’s organizational age would only account for the time in which they self-identified as 
ISIL and not the years in which they operated under a different name. Finally, LEADIR 
relied on fixed-value imputation to replace missing information on variables for which 
substantive knowledge or subject expertise suggested a most likely or highly probable 
value. For instance, missing data for variables that generally leave an evidence trail, such 
as drug trafficking or state sponsorship were replaced with null values when they were 
not mentioned in open sources. Recently, LaFree and colleagues (2018) demonstrated 




compared to other strategies for handling missing data. Nevertheless, the results of this 
dissertation should be interpreted with this in mind.  
While the present effort suggests that the dimensions of terrorist group 
organization are important to consider when examining lethality and hard target selection, 
it should also serve as a springboard for future research. For instance, future research 
could examine the relationship between the dimensions of terrorist group organization 
and other types of violence such as attacks on soft targets or infrastructure attacks. 
Furthermore, future studies could examine other non-violent outcomes. For example, 
both structuring of activities and concentration of authority were correlated with drug 
trafficking at the bivariate level. However, these relationships could be examined through 
multivariate analyses to assess the relative effect of the dimensions of organization on 
drug trafficking after accounting for other group characteristics. Additional non-violent 
outcomes such as state sponsorship or alliance funding could also be examined.  
Future studies should incorporate contextual effects when examining the 
relationship between terrorist group organization and violence. Given the exploratory 
nature of this study, I used HLM to account for contextual influences despite not 
including any higher-level variables. That said, future studies could include contextual 
influence such as measure of social disorganization and relative deprivation and examine 
their cross-level interaction with the dimensions of organization. Finally, it is important 
that future research continue to examine and replicate findings at the group level of 
analysis using different data sources. For example, the relationship between organization 
size and violence found in this study overlaps with findings from previous research (Asal 




(Schuurman, 2018), research should continue to collect and examine data on group level 
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Group Name Size Ideology Goals 
Abdullah Azzam Brigades 0 R E 
Abu Obaida bin Jarrah Brigade 1 R TC 
Abu Sayyaf Group  1 R, EN E 
Achik National Volunteer Council-B  1 EN TC 
Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State 1 R E 
Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat  2 R, EN RC 
Ahlu-sunah Wal-jamea  3 R TC 
Ahrar al-Sham 4 R E 
Ajnad Misr 1 R RC 
Akhil Terai Mukti Morcha  1 LW,EN TC 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 1 R TC 
Al-Ashtar Brigades 0 R RC 
Al-Islah Party 0 R RC 
Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam Brigade 0 R TC 
Al-Naqshabandiya Army 2 EN SQ 
Al-Nasir Army  2 0 RC 
Al-Nusrah Front 3 R E 
Al-Qaida in Iraq  3 R E 
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula  2 R E 
Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent 1 R E 
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb  0 R E 
Al-Shabaab 3 R E 
Al-Sham Legion 4 R RC 
Aleppo Fatah Operations Room 3 R RC 
Algeria Province of the Islamic State 0 R E 
Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo  2 EN TC 
Allied Democratic Forces  2 R RC 
Ambazonia Defense Forces 1 EN TC 
Animal Liberation Front 0 0 PC 
Ansar al-Din Front 1 R RC 
Ansar al-Dine (Mali) 2 R TC 
Ansar al-Islam 1 R RC 
Ansar al-Islam (Burkina Faso) 1 R RC 
Ansar al-Sharia (Libya) 2 R TC 
Ansar al-Sharia (Pakistan) 0 R E 
Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia) 2 R E 
Ansar al-Sharia Operations Room  3 R E 
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis  2 R TC 
Ansaru 2 R E 
Ansarullah Bangla Team 0 R E 
Anti-Balaka Militia 0 R, EN RC 
Arab Movement of Azawad  1 R TC 




Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army 2 R, EN TC 
Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq 2 R, EN TC 
Awami League 2 LW PC 
Azawad National Liberation Movement  3 EN TC 
Badr Brigades 4 R,EN TC 
Baloch Liberation Army 2 EN TC 
Baloch Liberation Front  0 EN TC 
Baloch Republican Army 2 EN TC 
Baloch Republican Guards 0 EN TC 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party  4 EN RC 
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement  1 R, EN TC 
Barisan Revolusi Nasional  2 
LW,EN, 
R TC 
Barqa Province of the Islamic State 0 R E 
Base Movement 0 R RC 
Basque Fatherland and Freedom  1 EN TC 
Benghazi Defense Brigades  2 R RC 
Bodu Bala Sena 1 R, EN RC 
Boko Haram 3 R E 
Caucasus Emirate 2 R E 
Caucasus Province of the Islamic State 2 R E 
Comite d'Action Viticole 0 LW PC 
Communist Party of India - Maoist  4 LW TC 
Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist  3 LW RC 
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist 1 LW TC 
Conspiracy Cells of Fire 0 0 SR 
Coordination Committee  2 EN TC 
Coordination of Azawad Movements 0 EN TC 
Corsican National Liberation Front  1 EN TC 
Deccan Mujahideen 0 R TC 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 0 LW,EN TC 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda  2 EN RC 
Democratic Front of the Central African People  0 EN RC 
Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Cephesi  0 LW SR 
Donetsk People's Republic 4 EN TC 
Earth Liberation Front 0 0 PC 
Economic Freedom Fighters 0 LW,EN SR 
February 17th Martyrs Brigade 2 R RC 
Fetullah Terrorist Organization 4 R RC 
Free Papua Movement  2 EN TC 
Free Syrian Army 2 0 RC 
Garo National Liberation Army 0 EN TC 
Gorkha Janmukti Morcha  0 EN TC 
Gorkha Liberation Army  0 EN TC 
Group of Popular Fighters 0 0 SR 




Haftar Militia 4 0 RC 
Halqa-e-Mehsud 2 R RC 
Hamas 3 R, EN TC 
Haqqani Network 3 R E 
Hasam Movement 1 R RC 
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham 4 R E 
Hezbollah 4 R, EN TC 
Hizb-I-Islami 3 R, EN TC 
Hizbul al Islam  1 R RC 
Hizbul Mujahideen  2 R, EN TC 
Hmar People's Convention-Democracy  0 EN TC 
Houthi extremists  4 R RC 
Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council 0 EN TC 
Illuminating Paths of Solidarity 0 0 SR 
Indian Mujahideen 0 R E 
Informal Anarchist Federation 1 0 SR 
International Revolutionary Front 0 0 SR 
Islamic Courts Union 2 R TC 
Islamic Front 4 R TC 
Islamic State in Bangladesh 0 R E 
Islamic State in Egypt 0 R E 
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara  2 R E 
Islamic State of Iraq  3 R TC 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant  4 R E 
Jahba East Africa 0 R E 
Jaish al-Fatah  4 R TC 
Jaish-e-Islam  1 R, EN TC 
Jaish-e-Mohammad  1 R, EN TC 
Jama’at Mujahideen Bangladesh 2 R E 
Jamaah Ansharut Daulah 0 R E 
Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin  2 R E 
Jamaat-E-Islami  3 R RC 
Jamat al-Tawhid wal-Qisas 0 R E 
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin  1 R, EN RC 
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha - Goit 2 EN TC 
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha  0 EN TC 
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Jwala Singh  1 EN TC 
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Rajan Mukti  2 EN TC 
Janjaweed 4 EN TC 
Jaysh al-Islam  4 R E 
Jharkhand Janmukti Parishad  0 EN RC 
Jund al-Aqsa 2 R TC 
Jund al-Khilafah  0 R E 
Jundallah  1 R, EN PC 
Justice and Equality Movement  2 R, EN RC 




Kamtapur Liberation Organization 0 EN TC 
Kamwina Nsapu Militia 1 EN TC 
Kangleipak Communist Party  1 EN TC 
Karbi People's Liberation Tigers  0 EN TC 
Karen National Union 2 EN RC 
Kata’ib Hezbollah  4 R, EN TC 
Khalistan Liberation Force 1 EN TC 
Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State 2 R E 
Kuki National Front  1 EN TC 
Kurdistan Free Life Party 2 EN RC 
Kurdistan Workers' Party  3 LW,EN TC 
Lashkar-e-Islam 3 R TC 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 1 R, EN TC 
Lashkar-e-Taiba  4 R, EN E 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam  2 EN TC 
Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room  2 R RC 
Libya Shield Force 2 0 TC 
Lord's Resistance Army  1 R, EN RC 
Luhansk People's Republic 0 EN TC 
M23 1 EN RC 
Macina Liberation Front  1 R, EN TC 
Madhesh Rastra Janatantrik Revolutionary 0 EN RC 
Madhesi Mukti Tigers  1 LW, EN TC 
Mahaz Fedai Tahrik Islami Afghanistan 0 R RC 
Mai Mai Bakata Katanga Militia 1 EN TC 
Mai Mai Mazembe Militia 1 EN TC 
Mai Mai Simba Militia 1 EN TC 
Maute Group 1 R, EN TC 
Mayi Mayi 3 EN TC 
Misrata Brigades 2 R RC 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front 3 R, EN TC 
Moro National Liberation Front  2 R, EN TC 
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa  2 R TC 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 1 EN PC 
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance 1 0 TC 
Movement of Niger People for Justice  2 EN PC 
Mozambique National Resistance Movement  2 R SQ 
Mujahedeen Shura Council in the Environs of 
Jerusalem 1 R, EN TC 
Mujahideen Ansar 1 R TC 
Mujahidin Indonesia Timur  0 R TC 
Muslim Brotherhood 4 R E 
Najd Province of the Islamic State 2 R E 
National Democratic Alliance Army  2 LW,EN TC 
National Democratic Front of Bodoland  2 EN TC 




National Liberation Front of Tripura  1 EN TC 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-
Muivah  2 
LW,EN, 
R TC 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang  2 EN TC 
Nduma Defense of Congo  1 EN TC 
New People's Army  2 LW RC 
Niger Delta Avengers  1 EN PC 
Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate  0 EN PC 
Nur-al-Din al-Zinki Movement 2 R TC 
Nyatura Militia 1 EN TC 
Oglaigh na hEireann 0 EN TC 
Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade 0 R TC 
Organization for Revolutionary Self-Defense 0 0 SR 
Pagan Sect of the Mountain 0 0 SR 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad  2 R, EN TC 
Patriotic Ginbot 7 Movement for Unity and 
Democracy  0 EN TC 
Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri  1 EN RC 
Peace at Home Council 0 0 RC 
People's Committee against Police Atrocities  1 LW TC 
People's Liberation Army (India) 2 EN TC 
People's Liberation Front of India 0 LW RC 
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak  1 EN TC 
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak-
Progressive  1 EN TC 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1 LW, EN TC 
Popular Front for the Renaissance of the Central 
African Republic 0 EN TC 
Popular Liberation Army  1 LW RC 
Popular Resistance Brigade 0 R RC 
Popular Resistance Committees 1 R, EN TC 
Popular Resistance Movement  1 EN RC 
Raia Mutomboki Militia 2 EN SQ 
Ranbir/Ranvir Sena 1 0 SQ 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 4 R, EN RC 
Real Irish Republican Army  1 R, EN TC 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia  3 LW RC 
Revolutionary Punishment Movement 0 R E 
Revolutionary Struggle 0 0 SR 
Right Sector 2 0 SQ 
Rubicon (Rouvikonas) 1 0 SR 
Runda Kumpulan Kecil  1 R, EN RC 
Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha  0 EN PC 
Sanaa Province of the Islamic State 1 R E 
Seleka 3 R, EN RC 
Shamiya Front 2 R RC 




Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries 3 R E 
Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna 1 R TC 
Shutdown G20: Take Hamburg Offline! 0 0 PC 
Sinai Province of the Islamic State 2 R E 
Sindhudesh Liberation Army  0 EN TC 
Southern Front 4 0 RC 
Southern Mobility Movement 3 R TC 
Students Islamic Movement of India  0 R E 
Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi  0 EN RC 
Sudan Liberation Movement 0 EN TC 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement - North 0 EN TC 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition  2 EN TC 
Taliban 4 R RC 
Tehrik al-Mojahedin 1 R, EN RC 
Tehrik e-Taliban Pakistan  4 R RC 
Tehrik-e-Khilafat 0 R, EN E 
Terai Army 0 EN TC 
The Defense Command of the French People and 
the Motherland 0 0 SQ 
The Joint Revolutionary Council 0 EN RC 
The New Irish Republican Army 1 EN TC 
Tripoli Province of the Islamic State 3 R E 
Tripoli Revolutionaries Battalion 2 EN RC 
Tritiya Prastuti Committee  1 LW RC 
Turkestan Islamic Party 3 R, EN RC 
Ulster Volunteer Force  1 EN SQ 
United Baloch Army 0 EN TC 
United Democratic Liberation Army 0 EN RC 
United Democratic Madhesi Front 0 EN TC 
United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship  0 LW RC 
United Liberation Front of Assam  2 LW, EN TC 
United National Liberation Front  2 LW, EN TC 
United Revolutionary Front (India) 0 0 PC 
United Self Defense Units of Colombia  0 0 SQ 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) 4 R SQ 
Weichan Auka Mapu 0 LW SR 
Wild Individualities 0 0 SR 
Zeliangrong United Front 1 EN TC 
Size: (0: 0-99; 1: 100-999; 2: 1,000-4,999; 3: 5,000-9,999; 4: 10,000+) 
Ideology: (R: Religious; EN: Ethnonationalist; LW: Left-Wing; O: Other) 
Goals: (E: Empire; SR: Social Revolution: TC: Territorial Control; RC: Regime Change; SQ: Status Quo; PC: Policy 
Change) 
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